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Concern over the viability of urban heritage management as a tool for 
equitable economic development and poverty reduction has emerged as international 
development banks increase lending for culture and heritage. This dissertation 
examines urban heritage management and its ability to connect social, economic, and 
democratic issues to promote sustainable urban futures through a case study of Quito, 
Ecuador. Quito, the first city in Latin America to be recognized as a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site in 1978, represents a strong example of an internationally financed 
historic preservation project and the dynamic struggle between the forces of planning 
and order and spontaneous organization of the city. 
 This dissertation examines the contested role of the historic center: examining 
the use of heritage as a tool for development and seeks to understand the role multi-
scalar governance in the redevelopment of heritage sites. It assesses and evaluates this 
new governance structure and the democratic process, as well as the impacts on civil 
society, in particular informal vendors who worked in the historic center prior to the 
initiation of the project.  
The dissertation shows that heritage can be used as a catalyst for more than 
conservation and provides new insight into semi-formalization measures and degrees 
of informality. It also demonstrates that changing perceptions and re-imaging 
neighborhoods is a slow process which requires more than clearing public spaces and 
rehabilitating old buildings. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction  
A major reason for the regeneration of historic districts is the possible upside 
to economic development through the generation of a tourist industry based on 
heritage. However, other factors may include an improved tax base, increased land 
values, and a wider economic regeneration of the area. In the competitive global 
market place, UNESCO world heritage sites may receive special attention. Although 
not all world heritage sites are well known, they receive 15-20% of the global tourist 
market (Musitelli, 2005) which can encourage countries to have their sites added to 
the ever growing list. Urban world heritage sites can pose particular problems, as both 
public and private space may serve alternative purposes that are viewed as 
incompatible with regard to both the preservation of the site as well as its successful 
conversion into a tourist destination. However, others argue that urban regeneration 
projects in historic districts can provide a fresh economic development strategy and 
foster the intangible benefits of pride, a sense of place, and identity (Serageldin, 
2001).  
The contestation of world heritage relates to the different views people have 
and attach to different properties. Questions such as who is responsible, how should 
the site be preserved, and what use should the site serve are likely to be answered 
differently by a variety of actors. Contrasting opinions about how a site is managed 
and used can be clearly illustrated by the case of the historic center of Quito, Ecuador, 
where local, national, and global actors hold competing visions for the site. However, 
the need for economic development often topples other interests and can result in an 
attempt to convert properties into tourist destinations or cultural enclaves within the 
city. The case of the historic center of Quito is no exception. Since its designation as a 
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world heritage site in 1978, the conflicting interest over the use of public and private 
space became apparent, as a municipal led rehabilitation project was initiated.  
This municipal led rehabilitation project has been cited by some as 
gentrification and displacement under the guise of world heritage (Middleton, 2003); 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Municipality of Quito have 
hailed the project as an economic, social, and political success. The urban and cultural 
transformations that have taken place in the historic center of Quito in the past decade 
move beyond the new building facades and pedestrian areas that can be visually 
observed. The transformations that have taken place stem from deeply rooted cultural 
and class perceptions of public space. These perceptions and subsequent policies have 
resulted in a new urban geography of the historic center of Quito, transforming 
economic and trading activities, tourism, and overall land use patterns.  
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation examines the tensions that arise out of a world heritage site 
designation and the consequent revitalization/economic development project. The 
designation of the historic district of Quito as a world heritage site and the subsequent 
multimillion dollar urban revitalization project financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Municipality of Quito is the research object of this 
study. The new interest and investment in rehabilitating the historic center did not 
only transform and rehabilitate buildings; it also sought to connect economic, social, 
and democratic planning. Can historic centers provide a new approach to urban 
regeneration, or is it simply gentrification and displacement in the name the history? 
Although the regeneration project included numerous strategies, a first priority was 
how to deal with the informal markets which had grown to significant levels over the 
past decades, occupying the streets and sidewalks. Municipal plans indicate that the 
informal markets were primarily responsible for the deteriorated state of the historic 
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center and the general rehabilitation could not be accomplished without first resolving 
the issue of informality in the historic center. Therefore, the top priority of the 
regeneration project included a modernization of informal commerce. This 
modernization resulted in a relocation of fixed stall street traders into indoor 
municipal markets, eliminating the occupation of public space in the historic district 
by street vendors and a semi-formalization of the vendors. This component also 
focused on creating an improved economic and social environment for the vendors, a 
recuperation of public space for the municipality, and an engagement of vendors and 
local government through participatory meetings over several years. It also created 
tensions between the vendors, the municipality, and other actors, including the IDB, 
UNESCO, and the national government over the appropriate use of the site. 
The tensions and complexities that have arisen out of these events are 
examined through the following questions. How are the conflicting visions from 
global, national, and local levels reconciled? Can integrated strategies for urban 
revitalization alleviate poverty and promote social cohesion among traditionally 
divided groups? I examine these questions through four complexities that exist in the 
historic center of Quito: (1) between the physical and cultural environment, (2) 
between the local and the national, (3) between the local and global, and (4) the role 
of gender and ethnicity. 
The first complexity, between the physical and the cultural, can be witnessed 
as new financial investments are made in the historic center by public, private, and 
international agencies to preserve the cultural and historical patrimony and minimize 
the signs of several thriving informal markets and deteriorated residences and 
businesses that once occupied the area. The second complexity between the local and 
national can be examined through economic, social, and democratic levels. Trends of 
decentralization in Ecuador have emphasized the role of cities and municipal 
  
 
4 
governments, as the national government transfers responsibilities to local authorities. 
However, local and national visions for the historic center of Quito are not always 
identical. Presently, local laws and regulations are in conflict with the right to work 
clauses cited in the newly ratified constitution. The complexity between the local and 
the global raises questions about whose heritage and identity is to be preserved, what 
value can this patrimony create on a global scale to attract tourism and potential 
economic development, how does this impact local uses of the space, and what do 
these changes mean to different social groups? Lastly, the role of gender and ethnicity 
can not be ignored, as the majority of informal traders are women and/or of 
indigenous decent. Women and indigenous people already occupy a precarious 
economic and political position within Ecuadorian society. The complexities that arise 
raise questions about how local government and international agencies take into 
account the special needs of what is generally considered an already marginalized 
population in a large planning project.    
All of these complexities and tensions are being played out in the historic 
center of Quito and in other urban spaces in Latin America and around the world. A 
deeper understanding of these processes can assist in preserving historic and cultural 
patrimony, as well as alleviating the potential social and economic displacement of 
urban revitalization projects in historic centers, which can further fragment a fragile 
urban fabric.  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In the past decade the historic center of Quito, Ecuador, has transformed from 
a crowded and deteriorating center city slum to the best preserved, least altered 
historic center in Latin America, according to UNESCO (UNESCO, 2009). This 
transformation impacted more than just buildings and monuments; it had a wide 
reaching social and economic impact on the city. Quito is not alone in its recent 
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renovation, as numerous historic centers are undergoing similar processes in Latin 
America and around the world.1 The availability of international financing and 
renewed popular interest in cultural and historic values has intensified conflicts 
between residents, local government, and international development agencies, as large 
scale historic center rehabilitation projects have been initiated worldwide. The 
complexities and tensions encountered through the meeting of the local and global 
scales can be analyzed through the notion of glocalization. Swyngedouw´s 
glocalisation, “the twin process whereby… institutional/regulatory arrangements shift 
from the national scale both upwards to supra-national or global scales and 
downwards to the scale of the individual body or to the local, urban, or regional 
configurations” (Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 1), aptly describes the process for the case 
examined in this study. For the case of Quito, this implies the convergence of global 
and local forces, such as UNESCO, the IDB, and the municipality, on the historic 
center. Each scale and institution holds a different vision, as well as distinct 
institutional regulations which must be brought together and reconciled.  
The historic center of Quito, a district in a small capital city of approximately 
2 million, was launched into a global network of actors with its 1978 world heritage 
site designation. This global recognition was rooted in one aspect of Quito’s sense of 
place and history, the colonial period. Although a small government city with little 
regional importance, Quito was now expected to upgrade the historic district to fit 
international, universal standards of colonial heritage, through the regeneration of the 
colonial district, rooting its history, space, and place in the colonial era.  
                                                 
 
1
 Examples in Latin America include examples include Mexico City, Mexico, Havana, Cuba, Cartagena 
and Bogota Colombia, Cusco, Peru, and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Fez, Morocco, Cairo, Egypt, 
Istanbul, Turkey, and St. Petersburg, Russia are some examples from around the world. 
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This transformation of the urban landscape was achieved primarily through an 
internationally financed urban revitalization project, which can be analyzed through 
four main bodies of literature. First, the idea of heritage and cultural patrimony and 
what it means to a variety of actors engaged in both the use of a world heritage site 
and its preservation. Second is the literature on economic development and tourism 
studies. Third is the wide body of literature on the informal economy. The historic 
center of Quito has been the work site of thousands of informal vendors who have 
occupied the streets and sidewalks at alarming rates since the 1970´s. These vendors 
are often seen as incompatible with the global vision of a world heritage site, as they 
occupy public space creating a congested, dirty, and unsightly atmosphere. The 
majority of the vendors were fixed stall vendors, whose characteristics often fall 
outside of the informal economy literature. Within the literature on informality, it is 
important to consider gender and ethnicity, as many of the traders are women and/or 
of indigenous decent. Fourth, is the literature on planning, participation, and 
negotiation. The municipality of Quito engaged in a long process of negotiation with 
street vendor associations and individual vendors.  
This dissertation examines the urban revitalization of the historic center of 
Quito through these lenses, examining the old and new forms of regulation in the 
informal economy and paying close attention to why informality is viewed as 
incompatible with tourism and preservation and whether or not these visions can be 
reconciled. As planners it is important to pay attention to implementation of the 
measures taken. How the municipality worked with the vendors in a process of 
participation and negotiation is critical to this project. The process undertaken by the 
municipality attempted to find an alternative that satisfied both the vision of the 
municipality of the historic center and the objective of the vendors to maintain a 
secure and dignified work environment. These themes bring us back to the idea of 
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globalization and glocalization. The marriage of these theories allows one to pay 
attention to the importance of the local policies that were carried out in Quito, without 
underestimating the role of global pressures exerted by UNESCO and the IDB.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
This dissertation uses a case study to analyze the historical background and the 
role of different agencies and actors involved in Quito’s revitalization project. The 
case study approach provides a useful method for describing complex social 
phenomena in a specific context (Yin, 1994). In particular, it is appropriate for the 
case of Quito because the framework provides insight into the rehabilitation project 
through a real-life context, demonstrating the contextual conditions and describing 
complex social phenomena (Ibid).  
The study is based on interviews, observation, and review of secondary 
materials relevant for understanding the transformation of the historic center of Quito. 
The choice of Quito as an embedded case study design is justified by three features. 
First, the importance of Quito as a case study relies on the significance of its 
designation in the first list of UNESCO world heritage sites in 1978. Second, is the 
municipality’s success in securing a multimillion dollar loan from the IDB to finance 
the rehabilitation of the historic district in 1994. Lastly, are the broad urban changes 
which Quito has undergone since its recognition as a world heritage site and the later 
financing for the physical rehabilitation and economic development project. In this 
context, the analysis of Quito’s revitalization within the analytical framework 
presented above can provide insights not only about the features of the policies and 
strategies that were successful, but also about limitations that other cities might 
encounter in trying to replicate the experience.  
Field work and data collection for the study was carried out during the 2007-
2008 academic year. Primary data include in-depth interviews and observation of 
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municipal meetings with stakeholders in the historic center. To identify informants for 
interviews I used the information extracted from secondary sources and a reputation 
method2 to ask interviewees to supply the name of other potential informants relevant 
to the research. In depth interviews were conducted in person and included planners, 
public officials, employees of municipal agencies, NGO representatives, community 
leaders, heads of informal traders associations, informal traders, and small business 
owners. I spent between fifteen minutes3 to several hours with each interviewee 
working from a set of questions designed to elicit information regarding the 
characteristics of their organization, involvement and influence in the urban 
revitalization project, their personal perception of the project and the management by 
the municipality, and the impact of the project on their personal livelihood. I tailored 
questions to each informant based on their particular background and experience. 
These interviews provided invaluable insights into the process of change, as well as 
the differing perspectives of the impacts of this change. In addition, I attended several 
municipal and NGO sponsored workshops and meetings with local residents, business 
owners, and traders. These events provided information about how the municipality 
engages and informs the public, and allowed for the opportunity to listen to lively 
discussions from community members about their concerns regarding the changes 
happening in their neighborhood.  
Secondary data sources include documents compiled to understand the features 
of Quito’s socio-economic conditions, as well as the characteristics of the local 
political system and the revitalization project. Secondary data provides information on 
municipal planning goals, planning processes and policies, as well as the extent to 
                                                 
 
2
 This method allows for prioritization of informants based on the number of times each is mentioned in 
other interviews (Fainstein, 1994).  
3
 A small number of vendor interviews were around 15 minutes in length due to the time constraints of 
the vendors; in the cases where 15 minutes was not sufficient, a second interview was conducted.  
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which residents and vendors were included or excluded in various decision making 
processes. The documents I collected included: municipal plans, ordinances, 
agreements, and contracts, annual reports of municipal agencies, master plans, IDB 
loan agreements and progress reports, correspondence between the municipality and 
vendor associations, public relations materials, newspaper articles, and academic 
studies. Additional documents include socio-economic indicators, tourism statistics, 
informal vendor surveys, and zoning regulations. These documents reveal the 
numbers and characteristics of the informal markets in the historic center, as well as 
municipal perceptions of planning problems. Newspaper articles and planning 
documents enable a detailed chronology of change, and can be used to supplement the 
perspectives of key informants. Media materials collected include video materials of 
municipal meetings from 1996-2003, as well as PowerPoint presentations of 
municipal employees. These materials allowed me to analyze the changes in attitudes 
between the municipality and vendors over time, as well to identify the key points of 
tension between the municipality and vendors. The range of methods employed and 
the longitudinal nature of some of the data allow for an examination of the changing 
nature of the urban environment in the historic center, within the context of an 
extensive urban rehabilitation project.  
The following chapters expand many of the points introduced so far: 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature, examining the concepts of 
heritage, heritage tourism, and its interconnectedness with the informal economy in 
the Latin American city. It also addresses the concepts of participation and negotiation 
in planning and how they connect to the larger theme of glocalization.  
Chapter 3 presents an account of the urban transformation of the historic 
center of Quito, with particular attention to the development and impact of the 
informal economy. In addition, the basic structure of the local government is 
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reviewed. This background information is necessary to understand the historical, 
economic, and political context.  
Chapter 4 examines the municipal plans and how they have influenced both 
the deterioration and development of the historic center. It addresses the social, 
democratic, and economic impact of municipal policies.  
Chapter 5 examines the complex process of negotiation that took place from 
1996-2003 between the informal traders and the municipality.  
Chapter 6 examines the impacts and progress of the new commercial centers 
where the traders where relocated from 2003-2008. It also addresses progress of the 
economic development component since the relocation in 2003. 
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the implications of international recognition, 
financing, and heritage. This chapter pays special attention to the local, national, and 
global influences on shaping the redevelopment of the historic center. It also 
summarizes the findings of this study and a discussion of the Quiteño experience and 
its implications for planners and future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A Framework for Understanding Urban Rehabilitation and Heritage 
Management 
The city in history has traditionally been a place of economic, social, and 
cultural activity. One of the distinguishing characteristics is the intertwining of culture 
and economy in the urban sphere, as culture is increasingly subject to 
commodification in the capitalist system. Local cultures impact the interactions and 
shape intra-urban economic activity, just as the economy drives the complexities and 
dynamism of culture. In essence, culture and place are intertwined, just as place and 
economy are entangled. The tension between culture, place, and economy is evident. 
Although capitalism erodes culture in some sites and generates cultural uniformity, it 
also creates culture in others, as well as contributes to the recent trend to preserve 
culture. This phenomenon is linked to the dynamics of the new economy, as defined 
by Castells, whose form is increasingly informational, global, and networked 
(Castells, 2002). Culture is thus recast from being a distinct sphere of social life, to 
something that permeates everything including the design and rehabilitation of urban 
spaces and the way organizations and institutions, both public and private, utilize 
them in an era of cultural commodification.  
The contemporary city often represents controlled spaces and geographical 
separation by race and class, a result of the increasing segmentation of the market and 
growing divisions between class and income (Christopherson, 1994). In some cities, 
political and economic fragmentation and the narrow definition of community have 
inhibited the creation of a sense of urban community that can represent multiple 
factions in the city, constraining the negotiations of public space, life, and community 
(Ibid). Urban spaces, such as plazas and squares, are places which can contribute to 
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new forms of public life, and help overcome fragmentation of the urban environment. 
Power relationships within communities and neighborhoods are embedded in 
discourse about public space, and such public spaces are those in which citizens can 
engage and confront each other directly (Schaller and Modan, 2005, p. 405). They can 
be spaces where new ideas about community, in particular the development of 
communities of difference can be forged. However, the need for economic 
development can endanger this role of the public square, converting it into an object 
of economic growth, rather than one of community. The continuing informalization of 
the labor market can also alter the landscape of cities, as once public spaces become 
occupied with street vendors, these limit its public use but also add to the city’s 
activities and social interactions. 
This global-local tension produced through the drive for economic growth 
coupled with the search for an urban identity can be witnessed through the recent 
trend to conserve culture and history in space through urban heritage preservation. 
This is demonstrated by tourism and real estate led rehabilitation contrasted with local 
uses of space. Certain privileged places represent points from which cultural artifacts 
and images are broadcast across the world, transforming local cultures and the 
geography of culture (Scott, 2000). The historic center can represent such a space, as 
increased interest in preservation can bring with it the pressures of tourism and the 
introduction of a symbolic economy, altering the cultural landscape, as well as 
recuperating the historical past. The symbolic economy is characterized by the 
production of space, the synergy of investment and culture, and the production of 
symbols to construct both a “currency of commercial exchange and the language of 
social identity (Zukin, 1995, p. 23-24).” The historic center has the potential to play a 
significant role in the symbolic economy and has converted into an important, yet 
contested, asset for city planning and local economic development. This research 
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looks at the contested role of the historic center; examining the use of heritage as a 
tool for economic development and social and democratic improvement, and seeks to 
understand the role local, national and international actors’ play in shaping the 
redevelopment of the historic center of Quito. In addition to the municipality and the 
IDB, organized informal vendors are a significant political force in the historic center 
and play a key role in the transformation of the historic district from a large informal 
market to what UNESCO considers the best preserved historic center in Latin 
America.  
The present chapter begins with a conceptual discussion of the pressures 
created through the designation of urban world heritage sites and the complications 
that arise out multi-scalar management and “ownership” of the site, given that at a 
minimum UNESCO, the state, and local government must now agree on policy and 
strategy. Because historic centers in Latin America are often characterized by 
informal markets and roaming traders, the analytical framework also needs to take 
into account the literature on the informal economy, giving careful consideration to 
the semi-formal status of the fixed stall vendors, as well as to ethnicity and gender. In 
addition, I also address the politics of participation, community engagement and 
negotiation in order to reveal the complexities of planning at multiple levels. Lastly, I 
end with a discussion of how planners can help to reconcile the competing visions for 
the historic center. The goal of the chapter is to show how the central thesis has been 
built by choosing these theoretical bodies of literature, highlighting the key concepts 
which have helped define the research questions.  
THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO  
In 1978, in recognition of being the best-preserved, least altered historic center 
in Latin America, UNESCO declared Quito’s colonial center a World Heritage Site. 
Quito was among the first 12 sites ever recognized worldwide. Since then, there has 
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been considerable interest and investment, both local and international, in the 
conservation of the historic center of Quito. Quito aptly represents the multi-scalar 
governance tensions that can arise out of a UNESCO designation. Since 1992, the 
historic center of Quito is managed by the municipality, as the Ecuadorian National 
Institute of Cultural Patrimony gave the municipality custody of the historical 
patrimony in the historic center of Quito. However certain regulations from the state 
still apply to its management. The municipality actively sought external funding to 
finance the rehabilitation and finally came to a loan agreement with the IDB in 1994. 
Since the loan agreement, the IDB also has played an active role. The issues of multi-
scalar governance converge on the historic center as the state, the municipality, 
UNESCO, and the IDB must all negotiate and agree on how to manage the site.  
Quito, like other historic centers in Latin America, was a site of informal street 
trade and commerce prior to its recent rehabilitation. The changes initiated by the 
above actors have brought about an ensuing controversy over the conflicting use of 
space in the historic center; in particular, the occupation of public space in the historic 
district by informal markets and traders. Questions of informality, particularly fixed 
stall vendors, played a key role in the rehabilitation of the historic center. The 
relatively formal status and organization of the fixed post vendors created a political 
space that resulted in a long process of planning, negotiation, and engagement with 
the vendors that might not have existed with more informal and less organized 
vendors. The conflicts over space in the historic center of Quito embody the multiple 
controversies and tensions that world heritage can produce in a city, particularly with 
regard to the past, present, and future uses of public spaces. 
UNESCO AND WORLD HERITAGE SITES 
In 1972, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) introduced the World Heritage Convention, aimed at the protection of 
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world cultural and natural heritage. Since its enactment in 1972, 185 states have 
signed the convention and 878 sites have been designated by UNESCO as world 
heritage sites of “outstanding universal value (UNESCO, 2009).” The first list of sites 
was declared in 1978 with 12 sites; the historic city of Quito, Ecuador was among this 
first list.  
The World Heritage Convention  
The historical underpinnings of the World Heritage Convention began in 1931, 
with the Athens Conference organized by the League of Nations and created the first 
base for cultural world heritage, the Carta del Restauro, also known as the Athens 
Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments. After World War II, UNESCO 
played an important role in rescuing heritage sites around the world prior to the 
convention, such as Venice, Italy and Abu Simbel, Egypt in the 1960´s. In 1971, the 
Nixon administration in the United States sought to commemorate the centennial 
anniversary of Yellowstone Park and saw this as an opportune time to introduce a 
trust to preserve cultural and natural heritage world wide. In addition the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature prompted UNESCO to examine issues of 
natural heritage. UNESCO also sought to give a structural character to its activities. 
These multiple interests culminated at a meeting in Paris in 1972, where the World 
Heritage Convention was signed. The high number of countries party to the 
convention, 186, make it one of the most successful international agreements, as well 
as one of UNESCO’s vital tools for preservation and conservation (UNESCO, 2009). 
However, the convention is often criticized for expressing a western notion of 
heritage, as the idea of the American national park was the cornerstone for the 
development of the convention. There have been some efforts to counteract this 
criticism, as various endangered sites have benefited from the technical and financial 
assistance made available due to their designation as a world heritage site.  
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The World Heritage Convention declares that sites are property of all 
humanity and the responsibility of the international community. However, it also 
recognizes that the sites are located in sovereign territories. The state must agree to be 
included in the list, and is often the initiator of the process along with the locality,4 
which then requires the state to pledge to care for the site so that it may be handed 
down to future generations. World heritage does not necessarily compete with 
national heritage, as each country remains the primary care taker of the site after 
designation and is financially responsible for the adequate care and investment 
required to maintain the site. The world heritage convention aims to preserve the 
world’s ‘best’ heritage sites, that is sites that meet certain quality criteria. In order for 
a site to be added to the world heritage list, the property must meet the criteria of 
“outstanding universal value” (UNESCO, 1972), fulfill a criterion of authenticity and 
meet one of the six criteria outlined in the convention. Article 1 defines cultural 
heritage as: 
 “monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and 
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave 
dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of buildings: 
groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, 
their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or 
the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological 
sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, 
ethnological or anthropological point of view (UNESCO, 1972).” 
However, outstanding universal value is not clearly defined in the convention. 
For cultural sites, it must be one of the best representations of their own culture, but 
culture is also not clearly defined (UNESCO 1972, p. 3). It is possible for a site to lose 
                                                 
 
4
 For the case of Quito, Ecuador, the municipality and the state collaborated in the process, which was 
encouraged and guided by Ecuadorian national and UNESCO employee, Hernan Crespo. 
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its world heritage designation if it has lost the qualities of world heritage due to 
human intervention or natural disasters; however only two sites have been removed 
from the list, both due to human intervention.5 
The World Heritage Committee has added new sites to the world heritage list 
since 1978. In 2009, 890 properties were inscribed in the world heritage list: 689 
cultural sites, 176 natural sites, and 25 sites of mixed cultural and natural heritage. 
These sites are located in 148 states. Almost 50% of the sites are located in Europe 
and North America. 31 sites are considered in danger, all of which are located outside 
of Europe and North America (table 1). The World Heritage Convention is not only 
words on paper, but is above all a useful instrument for concrete action in preserving 
threatened sites and endangered species. By recognizing the outstanding universal 
value of a site, states party to the convention commit to its preservation and strive to 
find solutions for its protection. If a site is inscribed on the List of World Heritage in 
Danger, the World Heritage Committee can take immediate action to address the 
situation and this has led to many successful restorations, making the World Heritage 
Convention a powerful tool to gather international attention, action, and financing, 
particularly for endangered sites.6 
  
                                                 
 
5
 There are two cases where sites have been removed from the world heritage list: Arabian Oryx 
Sanctuary, Oman and Dresden Elbe Valley, Germany. The Oman´s Arabian Oryx Sanctuary was de-
listed in 2007 due to Oman’s reduction of the protected area by 90%. This was seen by the World 
Heritage Committee as destroying the outstanding universal value of the site which was inscribed in 
1994. The World Heritage Committee decided to remove Germany's Dresden Elbe Valley from 
UNESCO's World Heritage List due to the building of a four-lane bridge in the heart of the cultural 
landscape which meant that the property failed to keep its outstanding universal value. 
6
 Some success stories of endangered sites which have been saved due to their world heritage 
designation and later listing as an endangered site include: the Giza Pyramids, Egypt, Whale Sanctuary 
of El Vizcaino, Mexico, Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal, Mount Kenya National Parl/Natural 
Forest, Kenya, and Angkor, Cambodia,  (UNESCO, 2009).  
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Table 1: World Heritage Sites by Region 
Source: UNESCO, 2009 
 
The present world heritage list contains both well-known and less well-known 
sites. Annually, potential world heritage sites apply for inclusion in the world heritage 
list. The 33rd session of the World Heritage Committee, which took place in June, 
2009, reviewed 52 site nominations and 12 new sites were approved for inscription in 
the World Heritage List at this meeting (UNESCO, 2009). Regular additions are 
important, otherwise a static list might lose importance with the public over time; 
however it is unclear how the ever growing list can maintain a high standard of 
outstanding universal value. 
Not everything is known about the impacts of world heritage recognition. The 
impact on cities, according to Jones, is under-researched (Jones, 1994, p. 316). The 
advantages and disadvantages of a world heritage site designation are a subject of 
debate. Does the designation assist with preservation, such as financing and technical 
assistance? Will tourism increase, boosting the local economy and/or endanger the 
site? On the other hand, designation could cause local tensions, as sites often have 
Region Cultural Natural Mixed Total % 
Africa 42 33 3 78 9% 
Arab States 60 4 1 65 7% 
Asia and the Pacific 129 48 8 185 21% 
Europe and North America 375 56 9 440 49% 
Latin American and the 
Caribbean 83 35 3 121 14% 
Total 689 176 24 889 100 
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multiple uses that may conflict with the idea of world heritage as expressed in the 
convention.  
What is Heritage? 
Heritage, as defined by Graham, is conceptualized as knowledge that 
constitutes both economic and cultural capital that changes with time and space; a 
contemporary issue of the past whose meanings are defined in the present (Graham, 
2002). Heritage and historic districts are in essence economic and cultural resources 
which can be exploited to promote tourism and economic development. Lowenthal 
argues that heritage is a private, not a public resource as ownership transforms its 
value; “Ownership gives it essential worth…Claims of ownership, uniqueness, and 
priority engender strife over every facet of collective legacies (Lowenthal, 1998 p. 
227).” Once a site is considered of value due to its heritage, ownership, possession, 
and tenure can all become entangled in a struggle over its past, present, and future 
uses. Similarly, Tunbridge and Ashworth argue that heritage is likely to become a 
contested resource if more than one individual claims it; various persons have 
different reasons for preserving or not preserving a site and “all heritage is someone’s 
heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s (Tunbridge, 1996 p. 21).” World 
heritage sites are especially susceptible to conflict, as these sites are claimed for 
different purposes by various actors at more scale levels than other kinds of heritage: 
local, national, and global. According to Lowenthal, “too much is now asked of 
heritage. In the same breath we commend national patrimony, regional and ethnic 
legacies, and a global heritage shared and sheltered in common. We forget that these 
aims are usually incompatible (Lowenthal, 1998, p.221).” The increasing worth of 
heritage to some parties can aggravate conflicts over ownership, use, and significance.  
As the world becomes more interconnected through the development of 
technologies and the pace of globalization accelerates, relationships between cities, 
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states, and non-governmental institutions create a web of transnational 
interconnectedness and an institutional order (Finnemore, 1996). This global order 
consists of culturally empowered and legitimized actors, such as the nation state and 
international organizations such as UNESCO, as well as local governments (Brenner, 
2004). The development of world heritage clearly demonstrates the power and 
influence of this hegemonic network, as an authority on culture and heritage. 
UNESCO is a powerful producer of symbol and imagery of what represents culture, 
and what is worth preserving. Finnemore also claims that states are socialized to 
accept new norms and values by international organizations (Finnemore, 1996). From 
this perspective, states and cities can be educated and socialized about world heritage. 
However, the relationship is not entirely passive, as states and cities actively engage in 
the process of cultural recognition with UNESCO. For the city of Quito, recognition 
of heritage could be considered a contradictory process which transformed the historic 
district into an increasingly contested space, both locally and globally.  
International organizations, such as UNESCO and the IDB, encourage the 
production of memory and symbol through recognition and financing of a privileged 
selection of heritage preservation projects. Heritage is converted into a system of 
institutionalized and formalized interpretations of history, culture, and nature, 
bringing order to the past and creating an imagined global community of sites. Despite 
the cultural differences celebrated by heritage, they are recognized because of their 
common and universal representation of humankind in history. In fact it could be 
argued, that the one thing we know about heritage, is that it often obscures the 
complexities of history and politics behind its recognition. Richard Wilk describes this 
as an international beauty contest, which “…substantially narrow our gaze to 
particular kinds of difference….washing them with the legitimacy of objectivity 
(Wilk, 1995, p. 130).” World heritage has a judge and jury, at UNESCO in Paris.  
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Harvey also contends that locality only matters because of globalization and 
that the uniqueness and identity of place has become important because of the need 
for security in a shifting, uncertain age (Harvey, 1989b). Massey discusses this 
production and perpetuation in terms of a search for a “global sense of place”, 
involving “the search after the real meanings of place” and “the unearthing of 
heritages (Massey, 1993, p. 236.)” She suggests that it is a “response to (a) desire for 
fixity and for security of identity in the middle of all the movement and change (Ibid 
p. 236).” While these represent cultural quests for identity and social pursuits for 
community and stability, it is not difficult to imagine how the assertion of the local 
amidst global forces may easily become reactionary responses, involving “certain 
forms of nationalism” and “sentimentalized recovering of sanitized heritages (Ibid, p. 
232).” In other words, heritage is a cultural and political project with multiple aspects, 
a tool for states and cities in their nation-building and identity efforts, as well as their 
engagement in “cultural prestige competitions” (Smith, 2005). The use of heritage to 
serve political ends is thus a short step away from its integral role in a people’s search 
for cultural and social identification.  
The mix of traditional and modern creates new urban rites and rituals, multiple 
memories, and a rediscovered identity. The rediscovery of colonial history through 
urban heritage and memory are in fact contradictory in symbolism and identity 
(Mignolo, 2000). The capacity of historical memory to coalesce politicized groups 
cannot be understood fully without recognizing that simultaneously, historical 
memories play critical roles and history is a way of recording, remembering, and 
experiencing the past. Historical memories are deeply rooted in a society and 
introducing a different history or a veneration of the colonial legacy through 
preservation and rehabilitation can reinforce already fragile social relationships. 
Historical memories suggest that contentious history cannot be separated from politics 
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and power relations. To the degree that the political life of a society remains 
contested, historical memory will be intertwined with that contestation. And yet the 
need to address the problem of contentious history is crucial for the urban 
rehabilitation of colonial sites. 
Thus, world heritage can be regarded as a cosmopolitan project, as the sites 
mobilize world citizens, not locals, with a taste for the “other” and embrace a 
distanced identity, one that unites a universal idea of human kind, rather than the local 
(Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, & Chakrabarty, 2000). Sites are transformed into 
spaces of representation, which is globally dispersed through media. However, behind 
the nominations and imagery is a complex set of actors in a highly politicized and 
contested process. Intricate political interplays between local government and national 
and international agencies, local organizations, developers, businesses, residents, and 
workers all with vested interests in urban revitalization can be witnessed.  
As Mollenkopf has argued, the classic market approach to urban development 
can not adequately predict economic development strategies, rather factors rooted 
within the political system itself, not the economy, account for the actual program 
design (Mollenkopf, 1983). Mollenkopf claims that the evolution of urban programs is 
a result of competition between political entrepreneurs who aspire to strengthen their 
political position through the implementation of new programs which would increase 
their public base. These programs allow for the emergence of “progrowth coalitions,” 
or a group of diverse local constituencies with a stake in promoting urban growth. 
These new coalitions can push for the expansion of urban development programs and 
create new systems of alliances in the local political arena. In Quito, stakeholders and 
politicians used the opportunity presented by the world heritage designation and funds 
available to build a new political urban base which helped politicians gain and remain 
in power and the distribution of funds to politically connected groups. Progrowth 
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coalitions created a bridge between government, business, and the public resulting in 
political entrepreneurship and urban policies which aggravated already existing 
tensions. However, unlike the conditions Mollenkopf describes for American cities, 
the coalitions of Quito included representatives of the poor, and in some case 
improved the conditions of the urban poor instead of exacerbating them (Ibid). As 
Mollenkopf argued for American cities, the case of Quito replicated the new forms of 
conflict generated in the urban sphere. Heritage can create opportunities for new 
political alliances, but it can also create conflicts.  
Once named a world heritage site, the state, conservation, and preservation of 
the site are of global concern. UNESCO and other local, national, and international 
actors become engaged in rehabilitating (if necessary) and preserving the site. This 
recognition often brings a sense of pride, forging the idea of community and 
citizenship around the particular site and producing national imaginaries (Anderson, 
1991). However, it can also bring about or increase already existing tensions, as world 
heritage sites may be in use for other purposes when recognized. This was the case for 
historic center of Quito.  
THE CITY AND CULTURE 
Sharon Zukin contends that the city is not only a combination of land, labor, 
and capital, but an “expression of symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement” 
(Zukin, 1995, p. 8). Additionally, these symbolic images are often marketized at both 
a national and global level. The historic center is a perfect example of how both a 
physical space and an image can be used as tools of exclusion and commercialization. 
The use of certain historical subjects as images and symbols which are produced and 
reproduced both locally and globally poses a dilemma with regard to power, space, 
and preservation. The ability to “democratize” the preservation of historic centers, 
through both use of space and image, by providing a fair and just process which is 
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inclusive of multiple histories and interests, can allow for the maximum respect for 
history, as well citizens. The historic center has the potential to be a public space for 
all, rather than a privatized space for a few. However, cultural economic policies can 
often result in the creation of exclusive spaces and tourist enclaves, as opposed to 
inclusive spaces of public life. 
The concept of the cultural industries was first developed by Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, in their critique of the industrialization of culture in advanced 
capitalist societies (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1977). For Adorno and Horkheimer, the 
industrialization of culture, and its absorption within capitalist industry and 
commodity aesthetics, meant the negation of true art and culture, and the artificial 
differentiation of cultural commodities in the context of overall standardization and 
mass production (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1977). Mattelart and Piemme argue that 
Adorno and Horkheimer developed a critique of the cultural industries that saw an 
ideal form of culture as one that was “too closely connected with nostalgia for a 
cultural experience untainted by technology and lost sight of the overall economic 
dynamics of the industries that provided mass communication and cultural goods and 
services (Mattelart & Piemme, 1982, p. 52).” 
Since these early debates on the commodification of culture, a number of 
works on creative cities has been developed to generate effective cultural economic 
policies that can lift depressed cities out of economic crisis and market them in the 
global economy. Authors such as Richard Florida and Charles Landry have forged the 
idea of the creative class and the creative city as solutions to urban decline. Florida’s 
The Creative Class focuses on the ability of a city to attract and maintain residents of 
the creative class, who then become the driver of urban economic growth (Florida, 
2005). Rehabilitated historic areas are just one example of the types of attractions 
local government can invest in to draw the creative class to a particular city.  
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Landry argues that creativity is necessary to begin to address governance, 
trade, equity, cultural identity, and basic infrastructure issues, particularly in 
developing country cities, as well as developed country cities (Landry, 2000, p. 22). 
He cites cities such as Barcelona, Curitiba, and Bangalore as cities that combined 
excellent leadership with creative ideas in the pursuit of “successful cities.” Landry 
outlines 7 areas which the creative city must address.7 The sixth point is of particular 
interest with regard to historic districts: 
Recombining the old with the new imaginatively – reconnecting the past with 
the present and re-presenting it in the future reveals untold assets. History is a 
huge undervalued resource and recombining the old and the new can trigger 
untold solutions by imaginatively linking ideas, perspectives, traditions, 
materials used, institutions, and structures created (p 259).  
History in space, brought to life through historic districts, can provide one 
form of creative policies that cities can build upon. However, carefully incorporating 
some of the other seven points, such as addressing inequality and living inter-
culturally must be carefully planned into such policies to avoid exclusion, 
marginalization, and gentrification. 
 According to Bianchini and Parkinson, in the 1970’s and 1980’s there was a 
reassertion of the city center as a “catalyst for civic identity and public sociability 
(1993, p. 10)” and the primary goal of the cultural policy was to enhance community 
building (Ibid). Cultural economic policy came later in the mid 1980’s focusing on 
recreating the image of a city, and less on creation of community and identity (Ibid). 
According to Harvey, such cultural economic policies, like urban heritage 
preservation and downtown renewal, “smack(s) of a constructed fetishism, in which 
                                                 
 
7
 These include: (1) creating value and values simultaneously (2) transition from hardware to software 
solutions, such as improvements in governance and organization rather technology, (3) increasing 
resource productivity rather than labor productivity, (4) living inter-culturally, (5) valuing varied 
visions, (6) history, (7) the learning city (Landry, 2000 p 259) 
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every aesthetic power of illusion and image is mobilized to mask the intensifying 
class, racial, and ethnic polarization going on underneath (Harvey, 1989a, p. 21).” 
Planners and policy makers are faced with the challenge of constructing policies that 
promote economic development, but at the same time are politically and socially 
inclusive. Representing the historic center with just symbols and images that can 
build, not divide communities and promote sustainable local economic development is 
not a simple task. For the case of Quito, it’s physical deterioration over time requires 
not only significant investment for rehabilitation and maintenance, but also poses the 
problem of housing a low income population, not seen as compatible with tourist 
destinations (IDB, 1994).  
URBAN HERITAGE MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
The availability of international financing and renewed popular interest in 
cultural and historic values has intensified conflicts between residents, local 
government, and international development agencies, as large scale historic 
rehabilitation projects have been initiated throughout the world. Both the World Bank 
and IDB have received an increasing number of requests from borrowing countries to 
consider loans for urban heritage conservation projects in order to develop cultural 
assets to both preserve cultural patrimony and generate income (World Bank, 2003). 
Regardless of motivations, cultural and historic preservation is becoming an 
increasingly important tool for economic, social, and democratic development, 
according to the IDB and World Bank. However, putting rhetoric aside, most projects 
tend to expand on the typical tourism and urban revitalization project, taking 
advantage of the central location and of the potentially valuable buildings and public 
spaces, rather than developing a comprehensive urban development strategy for 
historic centers.  
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A growing commercial heritage industry is commodifying pasts into heritage 
products and experiences for sale as part of modern tourism consumption. The 
adjective, heritage, is not only being applied to the provision of goods, but is also an 
integration of the cultural and economic domains. From this perspective, heritage can 
be organized into two distinct themes: the conflicts and tensions that arise from this 
multiple construction of heritage and the interaction of the production and 
consumption of heritage by locals and tourists alike.  
As cities are sold like other commodities, place making has become one of the 
most important elements to attract tourists (Judd & Fainstein, 1999). According to 
Britton, the construction of a city’s heritage requires a large dose of “mythology, folk 
memory, and popular fantasy (Britton, 1991, p. 463).” Heritage and architecture 
which represent the past can provide advantages in marketing the city, as opposed to 
places like Cancun or other new resorts without historical roots (Judd & Fainstein, 
1999). Urban historic centers are obvious markers of heritage. In developing country 
cities, where crime and security are considerable obstacles, the result can be the 
conversion of the historic center into a tourist enclave, fragmenting the urban 
landscape, replacing the idea of place making within a city to place marketing. Place 
making, as defined by Lefebvre, is the struggle around rights to the city (Lefebvre, 
1991). Lepofsky and Fraser extend this idea to the contested process of participation 
on both the production and meaning of a place, where citizenship plays a key role 
(Lepofsky & Fraser, 2003). Redevelopment of historic districts can represent new 
meanings for community and local identity when inclusive urban policies are 
considered. 
 Place marketing can be a powerful tool of local government and developers in 
revitalizing depressed urban areas. The historic center and the remaking of historic 
centers through redevelopment projects are processes of both place making and place 
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marketing. It can result in the privatization or semi-privatization of once public 
spaces, spaces of public culture. As tourist enclaves are formed to maintain the image 
that is marketed, police and private security forces can reinforce the differences 
between affluent tourists and local residents. Negotiating culture, objectives of local 
residents, and tourism is not simple, and someone is bound to lose out in the process. 
Bringing everyone to the table can result in long deliberations, particularly if the local 
government and organizations in charge of redevelopment have difficulty keeping an 
open mind, lack funds necessary to satisfy concerns of citizens, or if such concerns 
would interfere with project objectives. On the other hand, community 
commodification, may take place, as involving citizens can help insure that residents 
fulfill tourist expectations, especially where traditions and heritage of local residents 
are key tourist attractions (Taylor and Davis, 1997).  
Urban development projects, such as the renovation of historic districts, 
waterfronts, and international landmark events serve to create a competitive position 
of the city in the global economy. Swyngedwouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez argue that 
urban development projects are just an extension of neoliberal forms of governance 
contributing to social exclusion and polarization, rather than fostering social 
integration and integrated urban development (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 
2002a). Urban development programs (UDPs) often lack integration of the city with 
the metropolitan region as a whole and are associated with new forms of governance, 
such as public-private partnerships and network governance. These new governance 
structures often diminish the role of government and the voice of the public, while that 
of experts is strengthened resulting in a loss of democratic accountability. UDPs are 
often criticized for being elitist in nature, catering to the middle and upper class 
constituency (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002) or to business interests 
(Miraftab, 2004; Schaller & Modan, 2005). Urban policies have developed in parallel 
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to neoliberal economic policy, focusing on re-centering the city in a competitive 
global hierarchy; resulting in a recreating and re-imagining of the city both locally and 
globally to potential investors, tourists and developers. 
Quito’s regeneration rests on this assumption. The recreation of its image as a 
carefully preserved colonial historic center, as opposed to a sprawling informal 
market, will not only create an international tourist destination and improved real 
estate values, but also a space for leisure activities for local residents. The creation of 
a public private partnership was a cornerstone of the rehabilitation project. The 
Historic Center Development Corporation (ECH),8 now know as INNOVAR, like 
many public private partnerships, certainly removed some decisions from the public’s 
eye; others were carried out in a more participatory spirit. However, in the end a small 
group of actors competed for the right to represent the public. In particular the vendor 
association leaders represented street traders to the municipality and created a new 
elite infrastructure of what was considered an otherwise marginalized population 
which generally operated outside of the formal political arena. The vendors are now 
actively engaged in local politics relating to the historic district. These new political 
spaces open as citizens renegotiate the power structures in urban landscapes, show the 
growing power leveraged by the once politically marginalized groups (Hanley, Ruble, 
and Garland 2008), as well as the new levels and spaces of governance. 
Quito and the Barcelona Model  
The initiative that sparked the idea of the creation of a public private 
partnership for Quito came from the IDB and the city of Barcelona, a successful 
example for urban heritage management through a public private partnership. 
Barcelona, a city renowned for its urban redevelopment in the 1980’s, has become a 
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global image as model for urban renewal and a reference point for Latin American 
cities. According to Rojas and Castro of the IDB, “With Bank assistance, the 
Municipality of Quito (Ecuador) is attempting an approach similar to Barcelona’s in 
the rehabilitation of the central section of the large historic center (Rojas, 1999, 
p.13).” However significant criticism of the “Barcelona Model” exists, and given the 
drastic economic and political differences between Quito and Barcelona, its usefulness 
as a model is questionable.  
 Marshall argues that Barcelona “has acted as a staging post for Hispanic and 
Latin American diffusion (Marshall, 2000, p. 312);” a number of Brazilian and other 
Latin American cities have employed the services of Catalan consultants and 
contractors marketing the success of the Barcelona model (Arantes, Vainer, & 
Maricato, 2000). However, Barcelona’s urban planning export has not been limited to 
Latin America. Barcelona, the city, its government, citizens, and design professionals 
were awarded the RIBA Royal Gold Medal in 1999 for its urban strategy and design 
standards.9 British cities have incorporated aspects into their planning policies, as well 
as other European and Spanish cities (García, 2004). In addition, McNeill has argued 
that the “Barcelona Experience” is a “role model for the municipal left across Europe 
(McNeill, 2003, p. 74).” However, controversy surrounds the idea of the “Barcelona 
model,” with regard to both innovations in planning as well as socially and 
participatory oriented policies.  
Barcelona has been recognized internationally for its unique approach to urban 
revitalization, initiated after the fall of former dictator, Francisco Franco and the 
reinstatement of democracy in 1981. The redevelopment of the city, especially under 
Mayor Maragall, focused on its modernization, linking public and private investment. 
                                                 
 
9
 This is the first time a city and only time at present a city has been awarded this honor instead of an 
individual architect.  
  
 
31 
A key component of the urban revitalization process focused on the deteriorated and 
old neighborhoods in or around the historic district. The originality of the “Barcelona 
model” lies in the effectiveness of public sector leadership, significant political and 
social consensus, and deployment of a variety of political and planning tools which 
motivate large scale projects, as well as its open and collaborative nature (Borja et al., 
1997; Monclus, 2003). Particularly around the 1992 Olympic Games, Barcelona 
transformed from an aging industrial city into a flexible, post-modern city improving 
its position within the urban hierarchy in Spain and globally (Monclus, 2000). 
Globalization provided both pressure and opportunity, which Barcelona capitalized 
on, recognizing the importance of city marketing and re-branding the image of the city 
internationally (Kearns & Philo, 1993; Ward, 1998). Few international landmark 
events provide the international exposure and opportunity for city re-branding and 
Barcelona took advantage of its selection to host the 1992 Olympic Games. This 
transformation has made Barcelona a competitive city within the national, European, 
and global network of cities (Trullén, Lladós, & Boix, 2002). Local reforms through 
new forms of governance, political strategies and creation of cultural capital, launched 
Barcelona as a competitive city within the global hierarchy and introduced, according 
to some, a distinctive approach to urban governance.  
According to Pep Subiros, “the systematic use of urban planning as an 
instrument of civic policy to build a civic identity and new forms of community life 
based on an infinite variety of groups, interests, attitudes, values, and memories 
inherent in any large city” is what characterizes the urban revitalization process in 
Barcelona (Subiros, 2003, p. 292).” Rebuilding the city as a center of social and 
political life is not just a physical process of modernizing infrastructure, but of 
repairing the social and political fabric and healing the divide that exists among 
populations of different cultural, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Barcelona 
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exploited the modest municipal resources available to develop an urban renewal 
strategy that brought together the rehabilitation of physical space and infrastructure 
with culture and history (Ibid, p. 295). Blakely describes the model as a “quality of 
life model,” relying on the development of new forms of economic growth to fund 
social policy and service delivery resulting in a reduction of inequalities (Blakeley, 
2005; McNeill, 2003).  
Barcelona employed a dual strategy of decentralization and citizen 
participation. However, decentralization is not necessarily linked to democracy, and 
democracy is not necessarily enhanced or extended through citizen participation. 
Decentralization of urban projects resulted in the creation of a number of public-
private partnerships. Bel and Warner describe an example of street cleaning which 
was publicly coordinated, but all private service delivery. They argue that this model 
balanced concerns of residents and tourists, as well as public and private interests. 
This example could provide a model for other cities that seek to create a space for 
both economic development while promoting public life (2009, p. 532). The shift in 
governance toward the private-sector in Barcelona, particularly since the 1980’s and 
primarily in the form of public-private partnerships allowed private powers, not 
public, to dominate particularly in economic development. However, in a time of 
limited public funds and in a city where fiscal autonomy is limited, linking public and 
private investment was critical to financing projects and services (McNeill, 1999). 
Barcelona relies heavily on fiscal transfers from both the central government and the 
regional Catalan government. The central government still distributes the majority of 
public funds, as well as controls the port of Barcelona and the airport (Marshall, 2000; 
McNeill, 1999). Linking private sector investments with limited public sector funds 
was critical for both financing, as well as maintaining autonomy over projects without 
requiring Catalonia’s or Madrid’s approval. Although, Barcelona may have attempted 
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to incorporate social and environmental goals into projects, developers may be 
discouraged from investing, in contrast to publicly funded projects.  
Citizen participation was meant to bring the city government closer to the 
public and formal frameworks were established through neighborhood associations. 
According to Blakeley, communication between the associations and the city council 
was fluid; however communication between neighborhood associations and citizens 
was much less frequent. Blakely argues that associations became simple extensions of 
the municipality, diminishing the ability of the citizen participation framework to be a 
vehicle for empowerment and voice of the public (Blakeley, 2005). Marshall and 
Capel both argue that decisions were made primarily within an elite network and few 
ordinary citizens were aware, interested, or informed of the majority of projects 
(Capel, 2005; Marshall, 2000). Although direct participation may have been limited, 
Barcelona maintained ideals of public commitment especially in the areas of public 
space, transport, and some social programs such as health services (Marshall, 2000).  
Barcelona promoted a new appreciation for the historic district, particularly in 
the reclaiming of public spaces (streets, squares, and parks); focusing on the 
regeneration of public space and the role public space can play in city renewal 
(Monclus, 2003). Approximately 150 projects were carried out in the 1980’s for the 
recuperation of public spaces in Barcelona (Monclus, 2003, p. 407). This investment 
in public space, architecture, and monuments assisted in the creating and selling of 
cultural capital through re-branding; enhancing the identity of the city or region, in 
this case Catalan identity (Monclus, 2000). Maragall’s “Barcelona posa’t guapa” 
campaign “consolidated the perception of the citizen of the public landscape as a 
common and public good, which contributes to the improvement of the collective 
heritage and increases the comfort, tranquility, and sociability in the city (Ajuntament 
de Barcelona, 1992, p. 6).” In effect, the spatial, social, and economic changes which 
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took place were often justified by the council and mayor in the name of culture and 
heritage. In Barcelona, like in many other cities, incorporating culture into the 
economic realm is complex, particularly when considering the increasing autonomy of 
the Catalan region. However, Maragall has been careful to disassociate himself from 
the nationalistic and regional identity discourse (Balibrea, 2001).  
It is important to recognize the major critiques of the “Barcelona model”; they 
include the semi-privatization10 and privatization of public spaces and services and the 
lack of incorporation of the urban area into metropolitan region (Capel, 2005, p. 37). 
Frequently urban rehabilitation results in the displacement and expulsion of local 
populations. There is contradictory evidence with regard to the situation in Barcelona 
(Balibrea, 2001; Capel, 2005; Marshall, 2000). Escalating real estate prices and 
buildings designated for demolition has displaced residents throughout the city. 
Grassroots organizations such as KRAX11 and Forum Ribera del Besos have 
organized to defend citizens’ rights and minimize the impacts or urban renewal.12 
The framework for urban revitalization derived from the “Barcelona model” 
assumes that effectively managed conservation of cultural and historic districts can 
achieve two interrelated goals: local economic development and strengthening of civil 
society and civic institutions. Given the contradictory evidence with regard to the 
impacts of the “Barcelona model,” caution must be used as the framework is 
implemented and “sold” in developing countries to mitigate the potential residential 
and economic displacement. Danger exists in selling an “under-theorized” model, 
particularly where power contexts are equally unclear (Marshall, 2000) 
                                                 
 
10
 Semi-privatization indicates the use of mixed capital enterprises and ventures to finance public 
goods, including urban spaces.  
11
 KRAX is derived from the concept cracks in the city: urban in-between spaces in which urban 
transformation processes conflict with local resident’s social and cultural needs. 
12
 The author participated in meetings with both organizations in June and July 2006.  
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The use of mega-events, such as the Olympics (successful) and Forum 2004 
(unsuccessful), as symbolic devices to boost local pride and establish a Barcelona 
brand reflects a top-down approach to cultural representation, with local identity being 
used as a marketing device. This has resulted in what Balibrea refers to as a 
“totalizing and coherent representation/meaning of the city” that is “hegemonically 
constructed... for the foreign viewer” and can lead to the “alienation and 
displacement” of the local citizen (2001, p. 189). Such displacement would in fact 
contradict the objectives of the model and aggravate social and economic tensions. 
The goal for cities like Quito is to achieve the image Barcelona has attained 
internationally, while mitigating problems of displacement and gentrification. 
However, as Swyngedouw argues, urban development policies are just extensions of 
the neoliberal agenda (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002) and scholars 
already question the democratic and social polices of the Barcelona model, the 
likelihood of success under these assumptions is limited for cities like Quito.  
Quito, unlike Barcelona, has yet to achieve a special image internationally. No 
mega-events like the Olympics have taken place.13 Gentrification and displacement 
have clearly occurred in the Quito project, although the municipality has made 
attempts in several instances to negotiate and alleviate the impact of this inevitable 
effect of rehabilitation. Similar to Barcelona, key actors, in this case vendor 
association leaders negotiated directly with the municipality leading to a new power 
structure and hierarchy which was not necessarily inclusive. In addition, 
ECH/INNOVAR, the public-private partnership, was able to make a number of 
decisions outside of the public eye14. Although the IDB refers to the Barcelona model 
                                                 
 
13
 Miss Universe was hosted in Quito, Ecuador in 2004; the city paid US$5 million for the right to host 
the pageant.  
14
 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of the ECH/INNOVAR 
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and Quito frequently in the literature, the municipal officials in Quito feel the 
connection is limited and that they have negotiated a unique project with the IDB.15 
However, certain similarities such as the creation of a public private partnership and 
the representation of “the public” through associations can be clearly seen in the 1994 
IDB loan proposal (IDB, 1994).  
GLOBALIZATION, GLOCALIZATION, AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The multi-scalar understandings of glocalization have become increasingly 
prevalent in the literature on globalization. The most influential scholar in this 
approach has been Erik Swyngedouw. Swyngedouw’s idea of glocalization expresses 
the implications of spatial scales which help to shape global and local spaces, which 
are historically constructed and mediated through social relationships, bridging new 
possible levels for both action and inaction (Swyngedouw, 2004). New approaches to 
public policy such as “new governance” are characterized by the collaborative nature 
of government and other agencies and the challenges and opportunities created 
through this new network of collaborative actors (Salamon, 2002). The shift from 
centralized, hierarchical governance to organizational networks on a global is 
characterized by the establishment of interdependencies where government gains 
important new relationships with other agencies, but at the loss of the ability to exert 
complete control (Ibid, p. 11).  
Network Governance 
Collaboration, persuasion, and negotiation have replaced the former control of 
the state in a new network of institutional actors. For planners and managers, this 
means they must learn to create incentives for the outcomes they desire, in order to 
persuade the vast network of actors engaged in the program or policy, as authoritarian 
                                                 
 
15
 Based on author interviews of municipal officials during fieldwork in Quito in 2007-2008 
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control has eroded. Network theory has four principle characteristics: pluriformity, 
self-referentiality, asymmetric interdependencies, and dynamism. Pluriformity 
illustrates the diverse range of organizations and agencies that cooperate and 
collaborate, many of which have limited knowledge and information about each other. 
Each actor or agency has their own interests and approaches the relationship with a 
different set of perspectives and incentives is illustrated through self-referentiality. 
Asymetric interdependencies illustrates the interdependent relationship of all actors in 
the network, including the state, highlighting the power differential among actors, as 
they rarely have the same power and perspective as each other. In situations when all 
actors agree on an objective, they may all not want it with the same urgency or 
sequence as others. Lastly, dynamism describes the fact that all of these features 
change over time (Salamon, 2002, p. 12-14).  
These new levels, scales, and networks of governance can be witnessed as 
actors at the local, national, and global level compete in an ever more horizontal 
governance structure for power. Instead of centralized hierarchical agencies, most 
spheres of policy are characterized by a variety of policy tools, many of which place 
government agencies in a “complex, interdependent relationship with a host of third 
party partners (Salamon, 2002, p.3).” According to Sørenson, network governance 
challenges the hegemony of the nation-state from above by international organizations 
(political globalization) and from below by local government (decentralization) 
calling into question the fundamental foundations of liberal democracy, “the people” 
as the self-regulating sovereign, in a horizontal network governance system 
(Sørensen, 2002, p. 695). As the nation-state recedes, decline of the central 
government, and the role of the city, local government, and international institutions 
increases, a new framework is needed to examine the political and democratic 
processes, particularly patterns of inclusion and exclusion from said processes. 
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Sørenson argues that this fragmentation has indeed caused an intensified 
competitiveness in political battles, as a variety of levels of actors, including different 
levels of government, private organizations, firms, non-government organizations, and 
public-private partnerships fight for the right “to speak” on the behalf of the people, 
which can lead to the concentration of power among elites and limited democratic 
representation (Sørensen, 2002, p. 698). 
Jessop extends this idea through meta-governance, governance through 
regulation or self-regulation, as increased autonomy of public and public-private 
institutions has eroded the traditional government structure (Jessop, 1998 and 
Sørensen, 2002). Meta-governance is the management of such complexities and 
pluralities that exist within the ever globalizing world and incorporates the idea of 
“negotiated decision making” as opposed to hierarchical and top-down decision 
making (Jessop, 1998).  
Jessop identifies three general constraints affecting governance and 
heterarchy/self-organization: (1) cooperation vs. competition; (2) openness vs. 
closure; (3) governability vs. flexibility; (4) accountability vs. efficiency (Jessop, 
1998, p. 41-42). Jessop describes cooperation as the largest constraint, particularly 
when quick action is necessary, and progress is held up due to consensus building. 
Partnerships often emerge, but as Jessop mentions, the tradeoff is often elite capture; 
partnerships often represent political and economic interests and often do not include 
a mechanism for inclusive citizen participation. The second constraint, openness vs. 
closure creates the dilemma of maximizing the possible range of coordination without 
creating an environment of short-term, opportunistic commitments. Therefore 
minimizing negative externalities of a closed system, such inefficient firms and 
underemployed workers can be difficult. Governability, the ability to guide, vs. 
flexibility, the ability to adapt, produces a number of dilemmas, primarily focused on 
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the complexity of the system, and again the ability to avoid duplication and outdated 
methods and maximizing resources and strategic capacities to create a balanced 
system through a horizontal system, not to fall into the danger of vertical top-down 
approaches. Lastly, accountability vs. efficiency poses the much debated dilemma of 
public-private partnerships and whether they serve the interest of the public or private 
interests, capturing public resources for private interests and/or extending the states 
interests into the private market. Frequently such structures, since they are marketized, 
leave social issues on the sidelines.  
According to Jessop, meta-governance provides both institutional and strategic 
advantages. Institutionally through collective learning and the forging of 
interdependencies and strategically though developing shared visions which 
compliment existing governance structures/patterns, where the role of the state is a 
participant in a collective community of actors (Jessop, 1998, p. 42). As these new 
forms of governance emerge (networks, partnerships, etc) the role of the state is 
minimized and less centralized and converts to a mediator-like function among the 
actors. Jessop argues that this role is growing, particularly as governments 
decentralize and authority is dispersed not only among different levels of government 
but also outsourced to partnerships and private firms. Jessop also charges the state 
with the role of securing social cohesion in society, and therefore managing these 
relationships is critical.  
 The constraints of operating in a network governance structure can witnessed 
in the historic center of Quito, as the municipality is forced to engage and manage a 
variety of actors, the global level from above and civil society from below. In 
addition, the pressure to make decisions that will move the project along in a 
reasonable time frame and at an affordable price, both financially and socially, 
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presents a complex mediator and coordinator role for the municipality, as the 
representative institution in this network of actors.  
Globalization and Glocalization 
Castells, in his foundational work, The Urban Question, set out to place cities 
in history and as an integral structure of the capitalist mode of production (1977). 
Lefebvre identified globalization as the contradictory process of integration and 
fragmentation which polarizes and differentiates urban spaces (1991). Both analyses 
demonstrate the reorganization of space in the urban context, due to both historical 
differences and forces of globalization. In a more extreme sense, Neil Smith argues 
that it results in the erasure of histories and geographies that created them, rewriting 
history through modernization and urban cleansing (1996). Holston argues that 
“Globalization is a process that generates contradictory spaces, characterized by 
contestation [and] internal differentiation… (1999, p. 193). It is important to examine 
these new spaces and pressures, introduced from above (national and global forces) 
and from below (civil society), particularly their impacts on urban spaces in the 
developing world. 
As international economic and governance structures transform, the city and 
region emerge as a critical actors and the engine of economic growth, how do we 
begin to understand the remaking of urban spaces in the rapidly globalizing world? 
Such pressures are producing what Swyngedouw calls “glocalisation;” “the twin 
process whereby…institutional/regulatory arrangements shift from the national scale 
both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the 
individual body or to the local, urban, or regional configurations, and…economic 
activities and inter-firm networks are becoming simultaneously more localized, 
regionalized and transnational (2004, p. 1).”  
  
 
41 
As highlighted by Swyngedouw, the relationship between neoliberal economic 
policy economic policy (deregulation, privatization, decentralization, and labor market 
flexibility) and new urban policy (city marketing, shift from social to economic policy 
and new state entrepreneurialism) have lead to urban development projects 
characterized by partnerships, privatization of public funds, real-estate development, 
and flagship projects (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002b, p.548). The 
quasi autonomous entities formed from these structures in the name of efficiency and 
flexibility demonstrates a significant deficit with respect to accountability, 
transparency, and representation, where decisions are often made by boards, out of the 
public eye (Ibid). Although some projects may incorporate degrees of citizen 
participation, it is typically done in a highly formalized environment, maintaining 
existing power structures and dominant coalitions. The shift from centralized, top-
down strategies to decentralized, network-horizontal forms of governance and 
planning has sometimes resulted in increasing inequality of the decision making 
process, rather than increased participation. Yet these processes are often legitimized 
for their superior ability to offer more inclusive, participatory approaches to planning 
and governance. In addition, UDPs frequently result in the dislocation of jobs and 
displacement of people, leading to segmented labor markets and a socially, 
economically, and democratically fragmented city. In cities where UDPs target 
traditionally marginalized populations, such as informal vendors or low-income 
groups, this is likely to occur. A participatory process may legitimize some actions; 
however the negotiations and transaction that take place may not be in the interest of 
all.16 
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 Swyngedouw, et al. cite London, Brussels, Bilbao, and Lisbon as examples UDPs with high levels of  
autonomy of the managing organizations, which resulted in urban fragmentation and exclusion, as well 
as reinforcing  the tendency to minimize and avoid social and political debate over strategy. 
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The case of Ecuador and the capital city Quito is an excellent example of a 
developing country and city in a constant process of decentralization and 
recentralization: however, also in the process of reinventing and recreating the capital 
city in an effort to re-structure and transform into a flexible, competitive, and creative 
city that drives local and national economic growth. The case of Quito saw a 
combination of all these ideas incorporated into the urban revitalization plan, as actors 
at a variety of levels competed to exert their vision of the historic district: UNESCO 
and the IDB at the international level, the local municipality and the national 
government in the nation state, the new public private partnership, INNOVAR, and 
the consultants, and other organizations that have arrived to fight for a piece of 
potential economic benefit or to secure their former residence or place of work in a 
potentially changing urban environment. The union of stakeholders into groups or 
formal federations consolidated actors which lead to the concentration of power and 
decision making among a handful of elite representatives and municipal officials. The 
burden of managing these actors fell primarily on the municipality of Quito. The 
ability to foster an open, accountable and participatory project, that is both efficient 
and flexible was a challenging task, and failed at many stages. As explained below, 
participation in an attempt to build consensus with the informal vendors resulted in 
what could be considered an inefficient and costly negotiation process which lasted 
over five years and in the end fostered a sense of paternalism with the relocated 
traders and a sense of abandonment by those left out.  
The Informal Economy 
Informality was first identified as a term by an ILO team of experts visiting 
Kenya and headed by Keith Hart in the early 1970s (Hart, 1972). The consequent 
debate about the informal economy has centered on the definition of the informal 
economy, the cause and functions, its capacity to generate income, employment, and 
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growth, as well as its links to the formal economy. According to Hart, the informal 
economy is characterized by a dualist economy, based on the distinction between the 
formal and informal or wage-earning and self-employment (Hart, 1972). Although 
Hart’s original notion of the informal economy is limited to the self-employed, the 
introduction of the concept made it possible to incorporate activities that were 
previously ignored into economic development.  
Perhaps the most widely accepted definition of the informal economy is that of 
Castells and Portes (1989, p. 12-13): it is a process of income generation that is 
“unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which 
similar activities are regulated.” This absence of regulation can come either “from 
above” or “from below”: from above, the state may choose not to regulate a given 
sector; and from below, individuals whose work is regulated by the state may choose 
to avoid complying with those regulations. 
Bromley examined both the horizontal and vertical linkages of the informal 
economy with the formal economy through a case study of Cali’s street vendors 
(Bromley, 1978). He argues that street vending is little more than disguised wage 
work, in a more precarious environment with little or no labor standards, whose 
employers evade government regulations. The informal and the formal economies are 
not separate sectors functioning independently, as Hart described, but rather are 
connected on a number of levels. Subsequent studies followed demonstrating similar 
analysis of Bromley’s; arguing that strong links exist between the formal and informal 
economies (Beneria & Roldán, 1987; Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989; Rakowski, 
1994). Later Bromley and Gerry identified a continuum of informal or casual work, 
divided into four categories: short-term wage work, disguised wage work, dependent 
work, and true self employment (Bromley & Gerry, 1979). This continuum showed 
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both differing levels of security as well as inter-connectedness with formal activities 
in the informal or casual sector.  
Early works about the informal economy focused on the split between the 
dualist approach (Hart) and the non-dualist approach (Bromley). Although the 
definitions differed, one point of agreement was that the informal economy existed 
and was a significant part of the economy. How to deal with it through policy also 
became a new concern of development agencies, NGOs and governments worldwide. 
In the early 1970’s the ILO argued that the informal economy could stimulate growth 
through the creation of jobs, and had the potential to grow faster than the formal 
economy, particularly in developing countries (ILO, 1972). Weeks reinforced some of 
these ideas, arguing that that there were advantages to the informal economy in 
developing countries, as it could produce low-cost goods for low income consumers; 
increasing the incremental employment/output ratio while ensuring efficient 
utilization of capital (1975). There certainly are advantages to the informal economy, 
particularly in its ability to create new employment, with little capital investment and 
absorb a sector of the labor force that has difficulty entering the formal economy for a 
variety of reasons (Chen, Khabvala, & Lund, 2002). However, small scale enterprises 
are often subordinate and dependent, operating within a complex network of local, 
national, and global economies, not a separate economy. Beneria observes that 
globalization has allowed for the recognition of these links through consumer 
campaigns (Beneria, 2003).  
Globalization has had a profound impact on labor conditions in both 
developing and developed countries (Beneria, 2003). Increases in subcontracting, 
outsourcing, and deregulation have resulted in an ever increasing deterioration of 
labor market conditions. This has also resulted in an intensification of informalization. 
An increasing number of households rely on precarious and unstable work. The 
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growing informal economy in the developing world is characterized by a lack of legal 
status, precarious and unstable work conditions, and no access to social benefits. 
According to Perez-Sainz, structural adjustment, diminishing public sector 
employment, and market deregulation have contributed to the decline of formal sector 
employment and further growth in the informal sector in Latin America (Perez-Sainz, 
2000). Informality is no longer considered temporary or something that will 
eventually be absorbed into the formal sector. Rather it is viewed as a permanent and 
expanding part of the economy, particularly as formal opportunities diminish. Such 
conditions often imply economic insecurity and poverty for those working in the 
informal economy (Beneria, 2003),  
Governments and development agencies had to decide whether to create 
policies that attempted to reduce or eliminate the informal economy, would stimulate 
its growth, or simply ignore it. The World Bank estimates that over 83% of new jobs 
are created in the informal economy and 40% of employment in urban areas is in the 
informal economy in Latin America (Charmes, 2000). In 2002, the ILO estimated 
approximately 51% of the non-agricultural employment in Latin America is informal; 
women are disproportionately represented with 58% of women’s employment being 
informal and men’s informal employment representing approximately 48% of total 
employment (ILO, 2002, p. 19). Informal activities in developing countries were and 
still are at a minimum tolerated by local and national governments and are more 
frequently stimulated by government and development policies; informality has long 
been a significant part of the economy that has developed with awareness of the state 
(Castells & Portes, 1989). 
Regardless of the debates over the definition the informal economy, it is now a 
growing, not diminishing, part of the economy in both advanced and developing 
economies (Castells & Portes, 1989). However, the approaches have generally been 
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divided into two sectors, the legalist and structuralist. The structuralist approach can 
be divided into two parts. First, the ILO structuralist approach identifies two types of 
informal activities, survival strategies of the poor and the unemployed who have lost 
their jobs due to economic crisis, such as structural adjustment (Marquez & Portela, 
1991). The underground/black market structuralist approach of the 1980’s is 
characterized by economic restructuring and class struggle. It rejects economic 
dualism characterized by the early writing of Hart and the ILO, and describes the 
ways in which forms of productions and workers are integrated in local, regional, and 
international context of a network of formal and informal work (Beneria & Roldán, 
1987; Beneria, 2003; Castells & Portes, 1989). It differs primarily from the 
development/ILO approach in that it views capitalist greed as a primary driver of the 
informal economy and recognizes its existence in advanced economies.  
The legalist and pro-market approach is often synonymous with Hernando de 
Soto and differs primarily from structuralist approaches in the identification of the 
causes of informality. The legalist approach is in agreement with the structuralist in 
terms of informality representing a survival strategy for the poor. However it differs in 
that the underground structuralist approach identifies capitalism as the root cause of 
informality while de Soto and the legalists view the informal entrepreneur as an 
evader of government regulations in an effort to cut costs and “[a] spontaneous and 
creative response to the state’s incapacity to satisfy the basic needs of the 
impoverished masses (de Soto, 1989, p. xiv-xv).” This approach criticizes the state 
and bureaucracy, which often prevent the small entrepreneur from entering the formal 
market as well as fail in providing adequate employment. However, as Portes (1994) 
argues, this approach romanticizes the entrepreneur, fails to account for the 
exploitation of unprotected employees and falls short of recognizing that bureaucracy 
and inefficiency exist in advanced economies as well. De Soto argues that regulation 
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(and the bureaucracy linked to it) and labor protection disadvantage small firms, 
making them comply with regulations of large firms (1989). However, Portes 
contends the reverse, that large firms receive disproportionate advantages and that the 
removal of regulation, which the legalist approach recommends, would in fact hurt 
small firms by making large firms more agile and competitive relative to the small, 
informal entrepreneur (Portes, 1994). The case of Quito provides an example of a city 
which attempted to legally reduce regulation for informal vendors in an effort to 
achieve compliance over the use of space. 
Political and Socioeconomic Marginalization 
A common understanding of the term ‘informality’ centers on the idea of 
marginalization. On the political side, informal workers are often understood to be 
unable to organize, thus relegating them to the margins of social and political life 
(Carrión 1994). Roberts (1995) suggests that informal workers are petty entrepreneurs 
rather than employed workers and have “ambiguous class identities, malleable 
political loyalties, and a lack of autonomous organizational power (p.92).” The lack of 
perceived organization among informal workers also may help explain why street 
commerce has remained outside formal politics in urban centers throughout Latin 
America until recently. However, the cases of Quito, as well as other examples in 
Latin America such as Mexico City and Lima, demonstrate that informal workers are 
capable of organization and political engagement when their work spaces are 
threatened (Cameron 1991; Cross, 1998). The formation of organizations and 
associations can help facilitate coordination, make collective negotiations possible, 
and provide a mechanism for the enforcement of rules and regulations. Leaders can 
use their position to mobilize members behind negotiated agreements with the 
authorities and social pressure within organizations can facilitate compliance among 
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members. Without associations, street vendors may lack such enforcement and 
coordination mechanisms.  
The absence of structured coordination may result in what outsiders perceive 
as chaotic interaction that characterizes many street markets. However, fixed post 
vendors in the historic center of Quito have formed organizations and the majority of 
vendors are part of an organization. Vendors who work on the same block or street 
also exhibit surprisingly high levels of social capital; many are part of strong migrant 
networks and it is commonplace for vendors at the same market to lend each other a 
hand by watching over a nearby post, providing a neighbor with change for a 
customer, or helping one another avoid police expulsions (Hanley, 2000). The idea 
that street vendors are unorganized is unconvincing for the case of fixed-post vendors 
in the historic district of Quito. 
Marginalization can also appear as a socioeconomic problem that is thought to 
be common among informal workers. Early conceptualizations of the term 
‘informality’ were often based on the notion that small-scale units outside the formal 
wage economy exhibit low productivity, low capital-to-labor ratios, and simplistic 
forms of organization. Yet empirical research on informal workers of all types has 
shown that many of these workers earn a substantial living by engaging in informal 
income-generating activities. The informal economy is not a euphemism for poverty. 
Evidence from Quito presented in subsequent chapters likewise shows that street 
vendors can be highly successful entrepreneurs who are deeply engaged in local 
politics. Leaders of vending associations are savvy strategists and employ the legal 
system, media, protest, and a variety of other tactics to press their demands. Thus, 
while some street traders make just enough to survive, others have lucrative 
businesses and substantial capacity to overcome marginalization. 
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Ecuador, employment, and women 
In Ecuador, informality has expanded rapidly since the 1970’s, due to 
industrialization, a series of economic crises, and the recent dollarization in 2000 
which have resulted in the scale back of social programs and rising rates of formal 
unemployment (Beckerman & Solimano, 2002; Beneria & Floro, 2006; Floro, 1992). 
In addition, women earn on average only 65% of male earnings in urban areas and 
unemployment rates are for women are double those of men, consistent with trends in 
other Latin American countries (World Bank, 2002). In a comparative study of 
households in Bolivia and Ecuador, Beneria and Floro found that urban women in 
informal households in Ecuador are exceptionally vulnerable, and often seek credit to 
meet basic needs. In addition intra-household incomes between men and women are 
not pooled, and women tend to be responsible for managing debt repayment (Beneria 
& Floro, 2006). Therefore, women’s debt is their own, not household debt. Female 
headed households are approximately 21% of the total, with 15% located in urban 
areas (World Bank, 2002). Female heads of households have less education than their 
male counterparts and higher illiteracy rates (World Bank, 2002). As in other 
countries, women are a vulnerable group in Ecuador and more likely to feel the 
impacts crises, as well as any modification with the informal markets, good or bad.  
In the historic center of Quito, prior to the relocation, approximately 68% of 
the vendors were women (IMQ, 1996). In 2008, 64% of municipal market stalls were 
registered to women (SDS, 2008); this indicates that a small number of women did not 
participate in the process. With regard to restructuring of the informal markets in 
Quito, there are three factors that could have contributed to unequal access for women 
in the municipal markets.17 First, women have limited bargaining power within the 
                                                 
 
17
 Although the municipality subsidized the registration fee by approximately 50 percent, many small 
traders did not have the capital to buy into the market buildings. $17 may seem like a small amount of 
money, but many traders earn less than $1/day and are already in debt; others are successful 
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household. Second, the likelihood that women would be solely responsible for the 
debt, with regard to formalization policies or investments in employment and 
entrepreneurship could have interfered with their participation. Lastly, women’s 
income is often considered secondary or supplementary, and the risk of the investment 
for the household may have outweighed the potential benefits. Empirical studies have 
shown that women often hold fewer assets than men, as least in terms of value (Deere 
and Doss 2006); the purchase of a market stall could have represented an 
accumulation of an asset for the women. As Deere and Doss point out, the 
accumulation of assets is critical for the security of women (Deere and Doss 2006). 
The overall high participation of women in the modernization of informal commerce 
in Quito could give these women the necessary assets for accumulation or could result 
in a burdensome debt.  
Informality, Negotiation, and the Historic Center 
According to Rakowski, bringing the informal economy into the policy arena 
can lead to empowerment and democratization (Rakowski, 1994). As Perlman argued 
in 1976 the poor are not politically marginalized and readily enter the political process 
when possible. However, Roberts argued that political mobilization over urban 
demands is often difficult to sustain, as officials buy off and or placate demands 
(Roberts, 1995). Cameron observes that those in the informal economy are just as 
pragmatic as formal firms, as they support groups and institutions that provide 
services they need to survive (Cameron, 1991). Empirical studies have demonstrated 
this to be the case, particularly in reorganization informal workers in the historic 
districts of Mexico City and Lima (Cameron 1991; Cross, 1998).  
                                                                                                                                            
 
entrepreneurs and attempted to purchase multiple stalls. See chapter five for a further discussion and 
description. 
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My research in Quito to a limited extent supports these findings. The 
municipality employed a different approach than Lima and Mexico City to the 
formalization or modernization of the informal markets.18 The relocated traders still 
remain semi-informal, as they do not pay sales or income tax and are exempt from 
other labor laws. In addition, the municipality pays for a number of services related to 
the maintenance of the markets, which they believe is necessary to keep the traders in 
the markets and off the streets. The behind the scenes negotiation and the latter 
paternalistic attitude is often portrayed by local newspapers and academics as corrupt, 
as traders leaders are accused of accepting gifts and other preferential treatment in 
exchange for guaranteeing the maintenance of their association members off the 
streets. The municipality describes the project as the most successful element of the 
rehabilitation, resulting in a reduction in the corruption of the traders associations and 
local mafias, as well as the creation of a dignified work environment for the traders.  
HISTORIC CENTER AND INFORMALITY 
Although historic districts in Latin America may traditionally house local and 
national government buildings, since the 1970´s these areas have seen drastic changes. 
As wealthy residents have left for newer accommodations and improved services, 
historic centers have been left to deteriorate. The services are often poor, public 
transportation limited, and many cities such as Lima, Quito, and Mexico City have 
seen the historic districts transformed into the locus of informal markets, catering to 
low cost and contraband products, as well as low cost housing. This rapid conversion 
into the heart of informal street vending has resulted in the occupation of plazas, 
sidewalks, and public spaces.  
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 See Chapter 5 for a further discussion.  
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In Quito, the rapid expansion of informal commerce in the historic district took 
place in the 1970´s, although trading in public spaces, particularly the plazas, has 
always occurred, well before the concepts of the historic district or informal economy 
existed. This expansion, in the form of both ambulant traders and fixed stall street 
vendors has prompted a long battle over the use of public space in the historic district 
between the vendors and the municipality. The Municipality has also attempted to 
regulate the vendors with varying intensity and force over several municipal 
administrations. Since Quito’s designation as a UNESCO world heritage site and 
subsequent investment by the IDB, these tensions between the traders and 
municipality have escalated. The case of Quito exemplifies a space where heritage 
preservation and rehabilitation of historic districts is closely intertwined with the 
informal economy.19 For Quito, this has resulted in a long negotiation between the 
municipality and historic center street vendor associations, primarily representing 
fixed stall vendors.  
This dissertation focuses on the negotiation and relocation of fixed stall 
vendors in the historic district of Quito, which occurred due to the convergence of 
competing interests over the use of public space in the historic district. The standard 
definitions of informality rooted in an absence of regulation do not adequately capture 
the condition of street vendors with fixed stalls in the historic district of Quito. The 
fixed stall street vendors of the historic district of Quito, often referred to as informal 
vendors20 in municipal documents, are neither formal nor informal; rather, they border 
on formality both before the rehabilitation of the historic center and afterwards.  
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 See chapter 4 for a detailed history and discussion of trading, street vending, and planning in Quito.  
20
 They are also referred to as comerciantes populares (people’s merchants), and comerciante 
minoristas (small scale retailers). 
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The vendors who set up fixed stalls on the streets of the historic district create 
a unique set of public policy problems that has attracted municipal intervention for 
decades. Municipal officials have issued endless streams of policy measures which 
attempt to regulate vendors and reduce the impact of these problems. However, street 
vendors with fixed stalls also had strong incentives to become regulated, in a limited 
context. Complying with regulations legitimates their claim to space and gives them 
the right to occupy public space in the historic center for the purpose of private 
commerce. In addition, this semi-regulation can constrain the ability of the 
municipality to use repressive measures to remove them from the streets. Regulation 
can also help vendors defend their space from potential competitors, particularly in 
strategic commercial areas such as the historic center, where space is limited. The 
historic district of Quito, particularly prior to the relocation in 2003, was considered 
such an area, where vending space was at a premium and membership in a traders 
association necessary in order to set up a market stall on the street and occupy public 
space.   
Municipal officials and street vendors therefore both faced strong incentives to 
formalize street commerce through regulation. However, each side is confronted with 
conflicting incentives over the implementation of individual elements of 
formalization. For the municipality, imposing taxes, licenses, and other kinds of 
regulations can help control chaos and congestion in the streets and subsidize the 
municipal expenditures related to street vending, such as sanitation. Ceding too much 
autonomy to vendors can also constrain their ability to enforce policy. For street 
vendors, regulations can legitimate their position in the streets, but they can also 
impose considerable and sometimes excessive costs.  
Each side is confronted with incentives to selectively implement certain 
elements of formalization, and those incentives frequently change over time. As a 
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result of these conflicting incentives, street vendors and municipal officials are 
engaged in a constant process of negotiating the terms of formality. The conflicts and 
tensions between vendors and the municipality arise not necessarily over the issue of 
formalization, but rather over the specific terms of formalization. The negotiations 
over the terms of formality are conditioned by changing political circumstances at 
both the national and local levels. Policy incoherence at the national and municipal 
levels may constrain the ability of local-level officials to enact effective formalization 
measures. At the local level, the balance of power between vendors and municipality 
influences the incentives for and against the elements of formalization. These factors 
explain why the street vending sector in the historic center of Quito is characterized 
by a semi-formal relationship and a continuous cycle of negotiation and conflict 
between the associations and municipality. The conflicts that arise out of these 
tensions over regulation and semi-formalization intensified in Quito after the 
UNESCO designation in 1978 and the IDB loan in 1994. 
PLANNING AND POWER 
The profession of city planning was established from a vision of the good city, 
though how to achieve this vision and the idea of the good city have changed over 
time. Its roots lie in the 19th garden city of Ebenezer Howard, in Baron Haussmann’s 
radical redevelopment of Paris, and in the ideas of the city beautiful movement from 
Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford. While history shows that approaches to 
achieving the good city and planning differed in their visions and orientation toward 
democracy, their foundations lie in the desire to order and improve the chaotic and 
unhealthful character of the industrial city. Their common purpose was to achieve 
efficiency, order, and beauty through the imposition of reason.  
Critque of rational planning and top-down, non-local solutions has led to the 
emergence of collaborative, consensual, and negotiated planning processes. These 
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processes have attracted attention from both theorist and practitioners as rational, 
technical, and master plan models of planning have been considered authoritative and 
undemocratic. Wide participation, in the urban planning context, has been justified as 
the means of balancing multiple interests outside the traditional top-down rational 
model. However, the participatory paradigm provides at best inadequate justification 
to the planning process, as participatory processes also necessarily exclude some 
groups.  
The Rational Model and the Master Plan 
The rational model and the physical master plan were the dominant, late-
twentieth century modes of planning practice throughout the world. This approach 
sees planning as a deliberative, problem solving process. This classic model usually 
ended with production of a master plan and its potential implementation in the form of 
legislation, regulation, or proposed projects and programs (Alexander, 1998). The 
master plan often took into account the functional and economic determinants of 
urban activities and their proper aesthetic and spatial relationships (Beauregard, 2003 
p. 100). Beauregard argues that the master narrative is often incompatible with the 
urban form; the objective of orderliness, functional integration, and social 
homogeneity are no longer realistic. However, the master plan is not dead, and many 
planners search for ways to impose technical expertise and/or a grand vision such as a 
master plan in the planning process (Ibid, p. 119). Opponents of this top-down 
approach criticized the distributional consequences of these approaches questioning 
who benefited from planning efforts. Displacement of low-income urban inhabitants is 
considered a consequence of rational planning and the lack democratic ideals and 
failure to integrate racial, ethnic, and gender planning. This led to the development 
and debate of participatory planning, the communicative model of planning, and the 
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idea of the just city, which has attempted to incorporate a more balanced mode of 
planning. 
Communicative and Collaborative Planning 
The participatory approach in the public planning domain has become 
institutionalized as a method of good planning practice as opposed to the rational 
hierarchical approach. In the public sphere, especially in community planning, 
democratic principles and public participation have become increasingly accepted as 
means for balancing and rationalizing multiple interests and preferences. The 
objective of participation is to forge consensus among interested parties, including 
planners, decision-makers, citizen groups, advocacy groups, and other stakeholders 
outside the traditional decision-making setup.  
The theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas has lent a 
foundational basis to John Forester’s argument for participatory planning and use of 
narratives. Forester argues that planning by its very nature is politically deliberative 
and not entirely personally reflective (Forester, 1999). The communicative planning 
paradigm asserts the need to discover and balance stakeholders’ interests while 
marginalizing the fringes. It unduly privileges the communication among participants 
and necessarily excludes individuals and groups who cannot participate. Participatory 
planning aims at justifying actions directed at changes towards a better ‘future’, with 
the consent of the ‘present’ (Kaza, 2010). However, the participatory planning 
paradigm has been conflated with the end of the process, namely the forging of 
consensus between various groups (Innes, 1996; Margerum, 2002) or community 
action (Harwood, 2003; Reardon, 1998). Participatory planning is typically meant to 
deflect criticism that planning appears to be top-down, an instrument of the state 
which encroaches on personal freedoms. By enabling wide participation in the 
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planning procedures in the public realm, checks are meant to be instituted against 
power imbalances. 
The end objective of participation is a consensus to a particular course of 
action that may or may not be represented in formal documents such as plans. Any 
justification for wide participation in public planning procedures has to make an 
argument that participation, especially of previously marginalized individuals or 
groups, will lead to just states or, in a particular urban planning context, to ethically 
more acceptable planning processes. A justification for consensus as an end of 
participatory processes appeals to the idea that when various groups consent to a 
particular program of action it is more easily realizable and the process of building 
shared understandings will open up new avenues for collaboration.  
Both Forester and Innes recognize the reality of the power imbalances and 
modify communicative rationality to suit planning purposes. They account for the fact 
that systematic distortions of information do occur and are perhaps necessary. Huxley 
argues that access to information and participation, as in the case of other social 
processes, is skewed for different groups and planners have an ethical responsibility to 
correct it. Huxly also recognizes that planners, by strategically manipulating 
information, can persuade others of a particular view of reality and therefore the end 
objective is not consensus but pragmatic consent (2000). 
It is also pervasively believed and accepted that local problems need local 
solutions by local people. While the goals of the argument, to advocate a more vocal 
and legitimate representation of local interests (Healey, 1997) in the solving of a 
problem are a worthy cause, it fails to identify that local interests are rarely a cohesive 
entity. Sager contemplates the dilemma of communicative planning by asking,   
How can participants show empathy and be so open to the arguments of the 
other actors as required in communicative planning, and simultaneously be 
  
 
58 
skeptical and critical enough to avoid being manipulated (Sager, 2002, p. 
242)? 
Hillier argues, recognizing the legitimacy of stakeholders and encouraging 
them to participate allows a fuller range of views to be aired than would otherwise be 
possible (Hillier, 2002). However, stakeholders are essentially opportune collectives 
and individuals with a vested interest in a particular discussion. Thus to organize these 
collectives, one would need sufficient grounds to prove that the organization would 
benefit from engagement or direct action. Participatory decision-making does not 
overcome the power differential or improve upon representation in terms of cost, 
reliance on knowledge, or opportunities for radical views to be heard. However, the 
process of participation may justify specific practices in specific situations as a 
substitute or complement to representative democracy. Therefore, eliciting consent 
typically involves shaping or changing preferences of individuals and entities. The 
costs and benefits are not purely economic and can include non-quantifiable entities 
such as loss of social standing.  
Healey uses the term collaborative planning to describe the process by which 
participants arrive at an agreement or action that expresses their mutual interests 
(Healy, 1997). She argues against a structuralist or political economy approach by 
contending that people do not have fixed interests. Healy also identifies two practical 
problems of communicative planning in practice. First is the gap between rhetoric and 
action; participation may end with a consensus and agreement, but may end there with 
no future implementation. A second practical problem of communicative planning is 
the lengthy time required for such participatory processes, leading to burn-out among 
citizen participants and disillusion as nothing ever seems to get accomplished.  
The failures of planning during the peak of the master plan and urban renewal 
programs substantiate many of the objections to top-down expert-driven planning and 
make desirable the communicative and collaborative turn in planning. Nevertheless, 
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the cruelties of massive clearance programs were not simply the result of deference to 
expertise; business and political interests, not experts, constituted the power base on 
which the urban renewal endeavor was mounted, and the experts directing the 
programs were almost all physical determinists drawn from the design and 
engineering professions rather than planners and housing analysts (Gans 1968).  
THE JUST CITY 
Just-city theorists fall into two categories: radical democrats and political 
economists (Fainstein, 2000). The radical democrats differ from communicative 
planning theorists in that their concept of participation goes beyond the involvement 
of stakeholders, but rather believe that progressive social change results only from the 
exercise of power by those who previously had been excluded from power (Harvey, 
1992). The political economy group takes an explicitly normative position concerning 
the distribution of social benefits (Fainstein, 2000). According to Sandercock, a theory 
of the just city values both participation in decision making by relatively powerless 
groups and the equity of outcomes (1998). However, a persuasive vision of the just 
city needs to incorporate an entrepreneurial state that not only provides welfare but 
also generates increased wealth; moreover, it needs to project a future embodying a 
middle-class society rather than only empowering the poor and disfranchised 
(Fainstein, 1997). The just-city perspective must take into account that the results 
attainable through public policy are seriously constrained by the economy. Therefore 
even when the principal concern is not economic, economic interests limit possible 
courses of action. It also needs to incorporate participation in public decision making 
because benevolent authoritarianism is unlikely (Fainstein, 2000).  
Just city theorist seek to interpose the planning process between urban 
development and the market to produce a more democratic and just society and work 
from “the basic premise . . . that any distributional conception of social justice will 
  
 
60 
inevitably be linked to the broader way of life in which people engage" (Smith 1997, 
p. 21).” The argument is that while there may be no universal standards of good and 
bad, there are criteria for judging better and worse (Smith 1997; Fainstein 1997). For 
communicative planning this means practices that allow people to shape the places in 
which they live; for just-city theorists it concerns the development of an urban vision 
that also involves material well-being but which relies on a more pluralistic, 
cooperative, and decentralized form of welfare provision than the state-centered 
model of the bureaucratic welfare state. 
Local Problems, Local Solutions? 
Community based development is an important part of development 
assistance; it refers to projects that include the beneficiaries in design and 
management. Participation is the cornerstone community based project, in an effort to 
acquire and incorporate local knowledge. According to the World Bank, in 2002 
approximately $7 billion of the development portfolio was dedicated to community 
based development, while in 1996 only $325 million was lent for community based 
projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Community based development is viewed as a 
mechanism for making development more inclusive, enhancing sustainability, 
empowering the poor, building social capital, decreasing corruption, and 
strengthening governance (Dongier et al, 2001). However, investigation into the 
effectiveness of community based development suggests that is it not effective in 
poverty reduction or in adequately including the preferences of the poor in project 
design or management and the participatory and community inclusive process is often 
dominated by elites (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). This is due to the fact that better 
networked and better educated groups are often able to capture the benefits of the 
project than poorest and least educated. There are a number of case studies that 
demonstrate when heterogeneity of the community is carefully managed the poor and 
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marginalized can play a significant role in community development (Finterbusch and 
Van Wicklin, 1989; Khwaja, 2001; Rao and Ibanez, 2003; Katz and Sara, 1997). 
However, Katz and Sara note that staff training is critical and even well trained staff 
can be ineffective in overcoming entrenched forms of exclusion (Katz and Sara, 
1997). Women may even be more susceptible to due to their weak bargaining power 
(Argarwal, 2001). Mansuri and Rao argue that community development projects can 
lead to poor project design and outcomes that are at odds with the intention of the 
project (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Community development projects pose the 
difficulty in minimizing the replication of power structures in participatory process to 
include the marginalized in order to minimize elite capture.  
The case of Quito is characterized by a combination of planning models from 
the master plan to the just city and community involvement. Several master plans 
have been developed since the 1940´s until present. The municipal government has 
instituted a policy of participatory planning described in both plans and by employees 
as holding a vision of social welfare and democratic ideals. However, this process has 
been characterized by many of the weaknesses of the participatory process described 
above: lengthy time investment, costly information distribution, the consolidation of 
power among a handful of individuals who claim to represent the majority, and the 
lack of technical expertise and planning which may have led to poor project design, 
limiting the social and economic benefits of the investment in the future.  
CONCLUSION 
The examination of historic districts as contested spaces, both physically and 
symbolically, characterizes them as spaces of struggle in the contemporary city. The 
careful selection of symbols and imagery, the manner in which the city, state, and 
local government engage citizens, tourists, real estate investors, and international 
donors must be carefully considered in the rehabilitation of historic districts. In post-
  
 
62 
colonial states, the manner in which images and symbols of colonial domination are 
portrayed may require more cautious consideration. Local economic development is 
critical to the sustained importance of historic districts and tourism can obviously 
provide substantial income. However tourism often provides low-paying, service 
sector jobs for the majority, while reserving parts of the city for certain people and 
excluding others. How can the rehabilitation of these spaces bring the urban 
community together, rather than further fragmenting already divided groups? The use 
of historic preservation as a way to increase cultural capital and re-brand the city in 
the international arena, particularly for developing countries can take a heavy toll on 
the local population, as well as municipal budgets. These impacts can be exaggerated 
when actions are justified by global institutions, acting in the name of all humanity, 
but forgetting about those that live and work in site. Considering whether and how 
urban heritage management can connect democratic, social, and economic urban 
development through carefully planned inclusive strategies is critical as urban 
preservation projects are being developed throughout the Americas. Unless historic 
preservation is rooted in local struggles for justice and equality, preservation projects 
are in danger of representing the growing division between class and race that exist in 
Quito and other Latin American cities; a new gentrification with a UNESCO stamp of 
approval. Or can heritage really open spaces that can lead to securer conditions for 
workers, a better environment, and a historic space that can be enjoyed by both 
tourists and locals?  
The following chapters of the dissertation illustrate the changing patterns of 
informal commerce within the historic center of Quito and the potential impact of 
rehabilitation with regard to tourism and economic development. Two key arguments 
frame the discussion. First, policy contradictions at multiple levels of governance 
pressure the municipality to administer the historic center in a certain manner, as well 
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as manage the street vendors in a way that is considered compatible with a heritage 
site. Second, at the municipal level, the balance of power between street vendors and 
the municipality influence strategy choices made on both sides of the negotiating 
process. Mayors often align themselves with certain political factions; they can 
implement favorable formalization policies to certain vendor associations who 
supported their election. The development of allies and enemies of street vendor 
associations shaped the strategies and negotiating process, as well as the final outcome 
of the modernization process in Quito. Lastly, the ability of the municipality to 
implement and enforce policies with regard to vendors and public space effectively 
influences the likelihood of a sustained rehabilitation of the historic district. Hostile 
municipal administrations, organized opponents of street vending, and pervasive 
corruption and incapacity at the municipal level have facilitated a cycle of instability 
with regard to street vending in the historic district.  
The events that have led up to the recognition of Quito as a world heritage site 
and the subsequent international investment in the historic center leads us to reflect on 
the idea of world heritage and the management and development of sites. Heritage and 
the interpretation of heritage as a universal colonial history is a singular interpretation 
of what are often complex and heterogeneous spaces. Management of the sites under 
varying scales of governance with even more diverse visions for the site make the 
possibility for successful economic, social, and democratic tenets to be incorporated 
into regeneration projects nearly impossible.  
The argument therefore places planning and policy at the nexus of the 
intertwining of the informal economy and heritage management and urban 
transformations in historic districts. Fixed stall street vendors in the historic district 
are not difficult to manage because they evade regulations or fail to organize. Rather, 
decades of laws and ordinances show that the inability of the municipality to enforce 
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the regulations is more of a problem. Street vendors in Quito are deeply embedded in 
struggles over regulation and its impact on their ability to generate income and 
working conditions. The municipality is invested in re-branding the historic center 
both locally, nationally and internationally as a tourist destination, a site of world 
heritage with renovated buildings and open plazas, free from the obstructions, 
congestion, and deterioration caused by the vendors. This long struggle reached its 
culmination in 2003, when after decades of attempted regulation, and years of 
negotiation, the street vendors moved off the streets and into municipal constructed 
commercial centers to clear the way for a large scale rehabilitation of this UNESCO 
world heritage site. The chapters that follow examine this process and impact on the 
street vendors, the site and its long term viability as an economically productive 
historic center, as well as the spaces of convergence and divergence among the 
different levels of governance and key actors.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Quito in History 
In Latin America, the historic center is often a space where the richness of 
cultural heritage is often contrasted with the poverty of the residents. Many local 
governments have been confronted with tasks of balancing the provision of basic 
services to the urban poor in historic centers and preserving the cultural heritage of 
cities. Quito’s history as a city related to its emergence as UNESCO world heritage 
site holds a long and rich history which predates the Spanish conquest. This chapter 
provides an overview of the physical and socio-economic characteristics of the city as 
well as a brief introduction of the history of Quito, its urban transformations, in the 
context of national events that have impacted the growth of the city and the 
transformation of the historic center from the core central area to a center city slum. 
The history, pre-colonial, colonial, and modern, is necessary to understand the present 
economic and political circumstances that have led to the transformation of a once 
quiet Andean settlement to the emergence of a Spanish administrative center and to 
what is today a site of world heritage and a colonial historic center of international 
recognition.  
PHYSICAL SETTING 
Ecuador is located in the North Pacific coast of South America (figure 1). It is 
divided geographically into three regions: the coastal lowlands (costa or litoral), the 
Andean highlands (sierra), and the westernmost beginnings of the Amazon basin 
(oriente). During the colonial period, these three regions’ economies functioned 
largely independently of each other even though all three were joined in the 
administrative district of the Audiencia de Quito, which stretched from present-day 
southern Colombia into northern Peru (figure 2).  
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Figure 1: Map of South America, elaboration Lisa M. Hanley 2010 
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Figure 2: Map of Provinces of Ecuador, Elaboration Lisa M. Hanley 2010 
 
The city of Quito is located 24 kilometers south of the equator, and is the 
second highest capital in Latin America, with an elevation averaging 2,850 meters. 
Quito is located in a valley surrounded by the Andes Mountains that include two 
active volcanoes, Pichincha and Pululahua. The city’s geographical location has 
subjected it to a number of natural disasters including volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, 
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and mud slides; the city is also considered at high risk for lava flows and ash storms. 
A number of natural disasters have plagued the city including powerful earthquakes 
that have killed thousands, left scores homeless, and caused incalculable damage to 
infrastructure, including historic buildings. The most recent destructive earthquake 
occurred on March 5, 1987. This magnitude 7 earthquake killed approximately 1,000 
people and is considered the most destructive earthquake with regard to the physical 
heritage of the historic center, in particular churches and bell towers (Benavides, 
1988). Quito’s climate and vegetation are typical of the high equatorial area, with 
average temperatures ranging from 50-60 degrees Fahrenheit and receiving an annual 
rainfall of 1,000 millimeters. Although Quito has grown significantly, the historic 
center still remains centrally located within the modern city. This is perhaps due to 
Quito’s unique geography, as spatial growth is constrained. 
POPULATION GROWTH AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT  
Quito´s growth from the colonial to modern period began slowly. In 1680 the 
estimated population was 40,000, however in 1906 it was only 51,858 (Minchom, 
1994, 135).21 The physical area expanded from approximately 43 hectares in 1537 to 
97 hectares in 1748, and 238 hectares in 1888 (Lara, 1992, 315). However, by the 
1960’s both Quito’s population and spatial area began to increase rapidly as a result of 
urbanization and migration (table 2).  
Since 1950, only six official censuses have been taken in Ecuador: in 1950, 
1962, 1974, 1982, 1990, and 2001 (INEC, 2008). From 1950 to 1990 the metropolitan 
 
 
                                                 
 
21
 Michom´s source is the Archivo General de Indias, Seville. 
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Table 2: Growth in Area and Population of Urban Quito 1534-2001 
Year Total hectares Population (Urban area) 
1534 8 – 9 1,000 
1537 43 3,000 
1650 n.a. 25 - 35,000 
1680 n.a. 40,000 
1748 97 58,000 
1780 117 59,000 
1825 130 65,000 
1850 n.a. 75,000 
1888 238 85,000 
1906 n.a. 51,858 
1922 294 n.a. 
1941 497 150,000 
1950 n.a. 211,000 
1974 6,902 600,000 
1982 11,760 866,472 
1990 n.a. 1,105,526 
2000 19,135 n.a. 
2001 n.a. 1,388,500 
Sources: Gomez, 1980; Hardoy and Dos Santos, 1984; Lara, 1992; Minchom,  
1994; Sheck, 1969; PDM 1 and 6, 1992; Direction of Territorial  
Planning, 2008 
 
region grew in population from 275,399 to 1,388, 500, a 485% increase in just 40 
years.  
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Figure 3: Growth of Urban Quito 1760-2000, Elaboration Lisa M. Hanley 
Source: DMQ, 2008 
 
The most recent census estimates the urban population at 1,388,500 and the 
metropolitan region has a population of 1,842,201 in 2001. In 1990, the urban 
population was 1,105,526 and the metropolitan region was 1,388,500. The population 
growth between 1990 and 2001 was 2.2% for the urban population and 2.6% for the 
Legend 
2000 
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metropolitan region (figure 3). These growth rates have created a demand on housing 
and infrastructure that the city has often struggled to meet. Since 2001, demographic 
growth has slowed according to estimates by the municipality. 
The rapid population growth since the 1950´s has resulted in a lengthening of 
the city on a north-south axis. The spatial growth has been limited to longitudinal 
growth due to the physical constraints of the city; its location in a river basin 
surrounded by volcanoes making a circular or east-west growth impossible. However, 
in recent years metropolitan growth to the east valleys has taken place, changing the 
traditional north-south linear structure of the metropolitan region (figure 4). 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF QUITO AND THE HISTORIC CENTER 
Quito is located in a relatively poor Andean nation. This capital city has high 
rates of poverty, with the historic center faring worse than the average in most cases. 
Although the city has grown, the historic center has actually lost population over time. 
In 1978, the population of the historic center was 99,894 (IMQ, 1979). However, by 
1990 the historic center had a population of 58,300 and in 2001 just 50,982. The 
historic center symbolizes the ethnic diversity and poverty of Quito, as low-income 
residents worked and resided in the area for many years prior to rehabilitation. 
The majority of population of the historic center identifies as Mestizo, as do 
most residents of Quito. However, the self defined indigenous population residing in 
the historic center is approximately 8% of the total population, compared to about 3% 
for rest of the city (table 3). 
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Figure 4: Map of Metropolitan and Urban Area of Quito, Elaboration Lisa M. Hanley 
Source: DMQ, 2008 
 
The levels of primary and secondary education for the historic center are 
slightly better than the rest of the city. However, it has a significant proportion of 
residents without any education, and those with a college or post-graduate degree are 
significantly lower than the city of Quito (table 4).  
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Table 3: Ethnic Composition of Quito and the historic center 
  Metropolitan Quito 
Ethnicity Men Women Total Percent 
Indigenous 30,686 30,548 61,234 3.3% 
Black 11,282 11,127 22,409 1.2% 
Mestizo 723,368 760,638 1,484,006 80.6% 
Mulato 17,650 17,283 34,933 1.9% 
White 108,594 126,917 235,511 12.8% 
Other 2,136 1,972 4,108 0.2% 
Total 893,716 948,485 1,842,201 100% 
  
  Urban Quito 
Ethnicity Men Women Total Percent 
Indigenous 21,364 20,949 42,313 3.0% 
Black 8,628 8,597 17,225 1.2% 
Mestizo 542,863 577,275 1,120,138 79.9% 
Mulato 13,577 13,234 26,811 1.9% 
White 88,209 104,469 192,678 13.7% 
Other 1,806 1,681 3,487 0.2% 
Total 676,447 726,205 1,402,652 100% 
  
  Historic Center 
Ethnicity Men Women Total Percent 
Indigenous 2,363 1,835 4,198 8.2% 
Black 285 186 471 0.9% 
Mestizo 19,831 20,256 40,087 78.6% 
Mulato 534 452 986 1.9% 
White 2,437 2,711 5,148 10.1% 
Other 41 51 92 0.2% 
Total 25,491 25,491 50,982 100% 
         
 
Source: INEC 2001 
 
  
 
74 
The illiteracy rate for the population above 10 years of age in the historic 
center is 3.5% for men and 5.0% for women, which is slightly higher than the average 
for the city, which is 3.0% for men and 4.9% for women (INEC, 2001).  
The poverty rates in the historic district are, on average, higher than the rest of 
the city. In fact, only 15.6% of households in the historic district are considered not 
poor and 20.9% are considered chronically poor (table 5). 
 
Table 4: Educational Achievement 
Level of 
Education 
Historic 
Center Percent 
Urban 
Quito Percent 
Metropo-
litan 
Quito Percent 
None 1,542 3.6% 31,708 2.7% 53,490 3.5% 
Primary 14,838 34.2% 374,637 31.7% 522,750 33.8% 
Secondary 19,508 45.0% 514,522 43.6% 662,747 42.9% 
College 7,328 16.9% 252,643 21.4% 299,597 19.4% 
Post-Graduate 123 0.3% 7,826 0.7% 7,826 0.5% 
Total 43,339 100% 1,181,336 100% 1,546,410 100% 
 
Source: INEC, 2001 
 
Although the poverty rates are high in the historic center, the availability of 
public services tends to be accessible in the general population. The old structures and 
the chronic subdividing of buildings have resulted in shared bathrooms for many of 
the dwellings. The availability of public water, sewage, garbage collection, cooking 
fuel, and electricity are about the same or slightly better than the rest of the city 
(table6). Overall, the historic center can be considered a relatively poor neighborhood 
compared to the rest of the city, regardless of the rich history and concentration of 
physical and cultural patrimony of the area. Quito’s early years illustrated a different 
picture of the historic center, as the nucleus of the elite and upper classes.  
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Table 5: Levels of Poverty 
Description     
Metropolitan 
District 
Urban 
Quito 
Historic 
Center 
Basic needs not 
met (NBI) 
Poverty 
Household 
% 22,2% 19,9% 21,2% 
Population 467,358 328,107 14,188 
  
        
Extreme 
Poverty 
Household 
% 8,2% 5,9% 3,2% 
Population 205,242 116,354 2,484 
Poverty Index 
(Living below the 
poverty line 
  
Household 
% 43,5% 42,9% 80,9% 
  
Population 813,738 613,478 41,739 
Integrated 
poverty 
Chronic 
Household 
% 16,9% 15,1% 20,9% 
Population 371,666 260,087 14,337 
  
        
Structural 
Household 
% 13,6% 10,7% 3,4% 
Population 300,921 185,694 2,403 
  
        
New poor 
Household 
% 26,6% 27,8% 60,0% 
Population 442,072 353,391 27,402 
  
        
Not poor 
Household 
% 43,0% 46,4% 15,6% 
Population 727,521 600,251 7,101 
Source: INEC, 2001 
 
It took centuries for the historic center to deteriorate, and today the historic center is in 
a state of transition again, as millions of dollars have been invested to rehabilitate the 
area. 
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Table 6: Public Services and Utilities 
Access To 
Metropolitan 
District Urban Quito 
Historic 
Center 
Potable Water, Public Network 91,0% 93,2% 98,9% 
Potable Water, inside house 78,0% 82,9% 80,2% 
Sewage, Public Network  83,4% 91,7% 98,6% 
Garbage Collection  90,0% 95,3% 98,0% 
Availability of Electricity 97,6% 98,3% 98,9% 
Toilet - Exclusive Use 78,4% 82,6% 69,3% 
Shower - Exclusive Use 68,9% 70,8% 50,0% 
Energy for Cooking - Gas  96,2% 97,4% 94,8% 
Availability of Telephone Service 58,4% 61,9% 50,4% 
Source: INEC 2001 
 
INDIGENOUS BEGINNINGS: THE PRE-COLONIAL CITY 
Latin American cities were built on the foundations and convergence of two 
urban traditions: that of the pre-Columbian civilizations and those of Spain and 
Portugal. Most Latin American cities, although not all, were built on the foundations 
of indigenous settlements.22 The decision to locate cities on existing indigenous sites 
generally fell within an overall plan for the control of the indigenous population and 
extraction of resources. The indigenous population was left to adapt itself to the new 
spaces and symbols of the Spanish cities, which were not so different from the 
previous Incan order (Hardoy, 1975). Quito is a classic example of total destruction of 
virtually all evidence of a former civilization by the Spanish. Only one small piece of 
the evidence remains, the foundations of a watch tower on Mount Pichincha. This site 
                                                 
 
22
 Lima, Peru is a noteworthy exception of city that was built totally new. 
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today includes a manifestation of the new conqueror’s religion, a statue of the Virgin 
Mary (Crespo, 1977).  
Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, Quito was on the brink of emerging from a 
pre-Incan agricultural village. Between 500 and 1500 the first inhabitants of Quito, the 
Quitus, settled in the valley that is now the modern day capital of Ecuador. It 
remained a settlement of the indigenous nation Quitu and was a principal economic 
and religious center of the region. Between 1470 and 1500, the Incan Empire began its 
conquest to the northern part of the Andes, and conquered the settlement of Quito. By 
the year 1500, the Incan Empire extended from Southern Columbia to Northern Chile 
and Argentina. The Empire was divided into two main political centers, in Cuzco, 
Peru, and Quito, Ecuador. The new Inca city was built by Tupac Yupanqui and his son 
Huayna Capac. What little is known about the pre-colonial city is through the account 
of the Spanish conquerors. These accounts indicate that the Inca city was an 
agricultural center and rural retreat for the Inca royalty. As the capital of the northwest 
quarter of the Incan empire, Quito was the center of the regional government and 
military command for the region, as well as a focal point of trade, collection of taxes, 
culture, and religion (Sheck, 1969, p.26). The Spanish were more impressed with the 
landscape than the city itself. After Atahualpa, the Inca King, was murdered by the 
Spanish, the city was burnt to the ground by Rumiñahui, one of his generals, in order 
to take the glory away from the Spanish of capturing the city (Hardoy, 1984, p. 39).  
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COLONIAL CITY 
The destroyed Incan city was transformed to a colonial city after the Spanish 
conquest of the 16th century. The Spanish first reached what is present day coastal 
Ecuador in 1526. However, Pizarro did not arrive until 1532 and the Spanish did not 
dominate the region until 1535. Pizarro led an expedition to the site where he found an 
abandoned and destroyed city. Pizarro set out to erect a Spanish city to be called San 
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Fransisco de Quito. In 1547, Quito was declared an administrative and religious center 
for the region, and functioned similarly to those introduced previously in Mexico and 
Peru. The administrative role of Quito was strengthened when it was made a seat of 
the Real Audiencia, the judicial center of the Viceroyalty of Peru’s northern region in 
1563, and later in 1740 the Real Audiencia of the Viceroyalty of New Granada.  
During the colonial period, all urban functions were primarily related to 
imperial administration. The colonial city was a place where a representative of the 
Spanish crown exerted control over all aspects of society, including economic, 
political, and socio-cultural. The primary economic function of the colonial city was 
to provide raw materials for the mother country, Spain. The Spanish opened up Latin 
American cities to the mercantile system. However, little economic growth occurred 
in the Latin American city during this era.  
Quito as a Religious and Cultural Center 
During this time Quito was also designated as a religious center. This role was 
strengthened when Quito was granted a seat of the bishop in 1544, and later of an 
archbishop. This designation had two important impacts. First is the development of 
Quito as an educational center. The San Andres School was founded in 1555, and two 
universities, the San Fulgencio and San Gregorio were founded as early as 1603 
(Crespo, 1977). Religion, the arts, and education were all supported by the region’s 
rich agricultural lands that provided the necessary wealth to support the building 
activity that characterized Quito’s first 300 years of colonial existence. Thus Quito 
during the colonial period was the center of political and religious control over a 
territory approximately the size of modern day Ecuador (Ibid).  
Since the 16th century, Quito has been the home of a powerfully original form 
of Baroque art that evoked both European influences (the mudejar tradition, the 
Gothic tradition, Mannerism) and Indian traditions, known as the Quito School. The 
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Franciscans played a major role in the creation of this art. The colonial origins are 
traced to the school of Artes y Oficios where the first indigenous artists in Quito were 
trained. The works of the Quito School are characterized by the combination and 
adaptation of European and Indigenous features. European features incorporated 
Flemish, Italian, and Moorish influences. The features illustrating its indigenous roots 
include the portrayal of characters with mixed traits, frequent appearance of ancestral 
indigenous customs, location of the scenes within the Andean countryside or cities, 
and the presence of local flora and fauna. The works of the Quito School were 
produced during the sixteenth to eighteenth century with strong colors and elaborate 
decoration. During its height in the 17th century the art was characterized by a 
baroque style. Well known artists from the Quito School include sculptors Bernardo 
de Legarda and Manuel Chili (Caspicara) and painters Fray Pedro Gocial, Hernando 
de la Cruz, Nicolas Javier de Gobiar, Miguel de Santiago, and Manuel de Samaniego 
(Banco Central de Ecuador, 2009; Alborno and Arevalo, 2000). The art decorated the 
religious buildings of the time in the form of painting and sculptures, but also as a part 
of the physical structure. The art of the Quito School can be viewed today as it is 
displayed in many of the churches and religious structures of the historic center or in 
important museums such as the Banco Central of Ecuador and the Museum of 
Colonial Art in Quito. Quito’s designation as a religious center and the subsequent 
establishment as an important artistic center during the colonial period certainly 
contributed to its recognition as world heritage site.  
Economic Functions of the Colonial City 
Quito’s economic functions expanded as the Spanish used a number of 
institutions to control and exploit the region’s resources and labor. The encomienda 
system was first introduced by the Spanish and was similar to the ayllu system of the 
Inca’s. In essence, the ecomienda system gave the encomendero, land owning Spanish 
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elite, the right to request tribute in the form of tax and labor, which replaced that 
previously claimed by the Incan elite. Tribute was paid in gold or goods at prices 
fixed by the Audiencia and no labor was accepted as a form of tribute. Although these 
reforms increased the Crown’s tributes and decreased the encomendero’s power, due 
to the loss of control over labor, there is little evidence suggesting that it improved the 
conditions of the indigenous population. The encomienda systen was never as 
important of an institution in colonial Quito as it was in Peru or Mexico, since it was 
rapidly replaced by the reformed tribute and mita system (Cushner, 1982).  
However, in the 16th century, the Spanish Crown grew concerned with the 
political and economic control of the encomenderos in the Audiencia of Quito and 
abolished the system, converting the control of indigenous labor from the 
economendero to the Crown. A new class of appointed officials emerged, the 
corregidores de indios, who were responsible for Indian welfare and the regulation 
and organization of Indigenous labor. The corregidores de indios administered a new 
system of forced indigenous labor where tribute was directly regulated by the Spanish 
Crown. This system was known as mita. The workers, referred to as mitayos, were 
assigned work on a rotating basis for periods up to one year. The mitayos were paid 
wages but were not allowed to accumulate capital. At any given time up to one fifth of 
the indigenous population was subject to mita demands by the Audiencia. The mitas 
in Quito were used to build the city, cultivate land, extract mineral deposits, and 
establish a textile industry (Schodt, 1987).  
This system produced three social groups within the colonial society. The 
upper class was comprised of peninsular Spanish who monopolized the high civil 
offices directly appointed by the Crown. The Spanish born and Creole elites whose 
wealth was in land or commerce and who typically purchased lower ranking civil 
positions, and the distinctly less privileged group of magistrates, clerks, and clergy 
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either Spanish born or Creole. The second social group consisted of mixed race 
mestizos who occupied service and craft positions and were regarded as socially 
inferior. The third group, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, was composed of the 
indigenous population and black slaves, mostly found on the coast (Schodt, 1987). 
Due to the lack of mineral resources in the Audiencia of Quito, land took on an 
added value, particularly as cities grew and agriculture became profitable. In the late 
1540’s the Audiencia approved an ordinance to grant lands that belonged to Indian 
towns to newly arrived Spaniards. By 1589 so much land had been distributed that the 
Audiencia ceased supplying newly arrived Spaniards with land. In the end, by the late 
16th century large numbers of the indigenous population were landless or owned so 
little land they could not support their family. The result was a large population of 
landless wage laborers who were bound to their employers in a system of debt 
peonage known as concertaje (Cushner, 1982). 23 
The growth of the agricultural industry in the early 1700’s led to the 
emergence of the hacienda system in the highland or Sierra of present day Ecuador. 
The hacienda system essentially consolidated the two older forms of land and labor 
management, the encomienda system and the corrigedor de indios/mita system. The 
hacienda had a permanent resident labor force know as huasipungeros who had the 
right to a plot of land in exchange for their work on the estate. Their work usually 
consisted of at least four days of agricultural labor combined with other domestic 
chores. In essence, the huasipungeros worked full time on the hacienda for the right to 
farm a subsistence plot of land. 
                                                 
 
23
 This influenced the growth of Quito in the modern era, when mechanized forms of agriculture were 
introduced, resulting in a large influx of migrants. 
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Town Planning and the Laws of the Indies 
The Spanish followed a very rigid system of land settlement and town 
planning in the form of formalized written rules and regulations known as the Laws of 
the Indies. The Laws of the Indies were a compilation of royal edicts concerning the 
planning of cities issued by the Spanish crown beginning with the establishment of 
Santo Domingo in 1501. From a standpoint of urban planning, what emerged over 
time was a set of 148 ordinances dealing with site selection, city planning and political 
organization (Crouch, 1982).  
In 1523, the Laws of the Indies were written and became the first planning 
legislation in the Americas. The Laws of the Indies were based on Greek and Roman 
colonial building laws, which took into account the quality of soil, availability of 
water, suitability for defense, among other site selection factors (Hardoy and Gutman, 
1992). These laws established consistent standards for design, which included plaza 
size, street width, orientation of gates and walls, location of government and 
administrative buildings, and the subdivision of land into lots. Few modern cities in 
Latin America escaped the patterns implemented under the Laws of the Indies and 
many characteristics of the spatial pattern can be seen in cities across Latin America 
today, such as Quito. As a result of these regulations, the distance from the central 
plaza, the most exclusive and convenient area of the city, meant a decreased social 
and economic standing in the Americas in this period. However, this is no longer true 
for many Latin American cities today, including Quito.   
When the Spanish founded Quito, it had a population of approximately 1000 
and an area of eight or nine hectares (Sheck, 1969, p.67). The first plan for the city 
was drawn by Captain Juan Diaz de Hidalgo in the mid-sixteenth century. This plan 
shows land divided into solars24 (lots) measuring 150 square feet. The solars were 
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 Four solars formed a block of about 1/4 of an acre.  
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distributed among the original 204 Spanish settlers and sites were also designated for 
religious and government buildings (Gomez, 1980). The upper classes and dominant 
religious and government institutions were located in the center, and the residences 
and institutions surrounding this core were of declining status with distance from the 
center. In Quito, as with other colonial cities, the focus of the city was the central 
plaza, for Quito the Plaza Grande. In Quito, the Plaza Grande is bordered by the 
cathedral, the Archbishop’s Palace, the Municipal Hall, and the Governor’s Palace 
(today, the presidential palace). Surrounding buildings were major churches, cloisters, 
and residences of the Spanish elite. Beyond the residences were shops, workshops, 
and the homes of middle class residents, such as clerks, merchants, and artisans. On 
the outskirts of the core were the poorest residences, those of manual laborers and 
Indigenous people. Quito was organized into six main parishes at this time 
(parroquias): El Sagrario, Santa Barbara, San Marcos, San Sebastián, San Blas and 
San Roque, which today make up the parish of the historic center.25 The elite 
dominated the central parroquias of El Sagrario, Santa Bárbara and San Marcos, while 
the outlying districts of San Sebastián and San Blas mostly housed indigenous 
agricultural workers living under quasi-rural conditions. The largest mestizo 
population congregated in San Roque, an artisanal center on the northwest (Minchom, 
1977, p. 30-31). This socio-racial organization of space clearly demarcated a structure 
of power in which proximity to the center indicated status.  
THE ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE OF QUITO 
The Spanish colonial city was a functional city, serving as the center for trade 
and government, both an agricultural and religious center, rather than an architectural 
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 The term parroquia initially referred to a religious parish. However, it has become a civil 
denomination and it is in this fashion that the word will be used in this dissertation. 
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work of art. Quito in the sixteenth century was a simple city, with plain architecture. 
The Plaza Grande was surrounded by unadorned Hispanic homes and further away 
laid the choza style houses of the indigenous population, as illustrated in the drawings 
and paintings of this period (Peralta and Tasquer, 2007). The majority of buildings 
that today form the fabric of the historic center of Quito were built in the seventeenth 
century, with a few major exceptions. The sixteenth century exceptions include the 
church of San Fransisco and its surrounding buildings (1573-1581), the convent of 
San Augustin (1581), and the cathedral of Quito (1572). Significant religious building 
surviving the 17th and 18th centuries include the convents of Santo Domingo and La 
Merced, the annex to the cathedral, El Sagrario, the church and school and La 
Compania de Jesus, and the monasteries of La Concepcion and Santa Clara. The “casa 
del patio” was the popular residential style of the Spanish elite, and continued into the 
republican era with minor modifications. Today, an example of traditional colonial 
residential architecture known as the Casa de los Siete Patios was purchased by the 
city council in 1976 and rehabilitated in 1991 with the financial assistance of the Junta 
de Andulucia.  
Most of the surviving public buildings were rebuilt and expanded in the 
nineteenth century. These include the Palacio de Gobierno, Palacio Municipal, Palacio 
Arzobispal, and the Teatro Sucre (Peralta and Tasquer, 2007). These and other 
buildings and monuments, regardless of their deteriorated condition, and the overall 
preservation of the colonial planning structure contributed to Quito’s inscription in the 
World Heritage List. Today there are 4,286 buildings and monuments in the historic 
center registered as historical structures: 42% are considered religious architecture and 
58% civil architecture (Inventario de Areas Historicas, 1988).  
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THE POST-COLONIAL CITY (1833-1925): THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD AND LIBERAL 
REVOLUTION 
The post-colonial city is the product of independence in Latin America. The 
small young capitals of Latin America were re-planned, incorporating baroque lines 
against an architectural background formed by already existing buildings and 
monuments. Tree-lined avenues and public parks were created, but were far less 
comprehensive than the European and American transformation. The post-colonial 
city in Latin America is characterized by its commercial and industrial nature. It was 
equipped with more services and a variety of economic functions in comparison to 
earlier years. However, in spite of the newfound political freedom, the former colonies 
remained economically dependent on Europe. Additionally, the spatial extent and 
population was much larger than the colonial city, due to the influx of rural migrants 
and improved health and hygiene conditions (Schodt, 1987).  
Independence 
In 1822, Ecuador gained independence from Spain. Independence changed the 
political structure and the geography the country; however it had relatively little 
impact on the economic and social structure of the society. The economy was 
regionally divided and poorly developed, with few links to the outside world. As the 
capital city, Quito retained its role as the administrative and political center, only 
without any responsibility to Spain. The physical organization also remained the 
same; the central plaza remained the focus of the city and the socio-economic 
hierarchy of the colonial period in tact.  
The Liberal Revolution 
At the end of the nineteenth century Ecuador began to enter capital markets 
with the export of cacao. Britain, France, and USA began to invest in the small 
Andean nation and Ecuador’s international isolation began to diminish. A civil war 
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erupted in 1895 between the land owning elite in the sierra and the agricultural export 
capitalists of the coast, in what is known as the “Liberal Revolution.” The liberal 
coastal elite emerged victorious under the leadership of General Eloy Alfaro. The 
liberals sought to reduce the power of the church, the largest land owner in the 
country at the time, remove obstacles to free trade, and ensure the flow of cheap labor 
to the coastal plantations (Schodt, 1984). The liberal policies benefited the coastal 
export economy; however, the concentration of land ownership in the highlands 
remained unaffected. 
After decades of little change in the basic structure of the city of Quito, 
dramatic changes began to take place under the new liberal government in 1895. A 
railway from Guayaquil to Quito was completed in 1908 (Sheck, 1969, p.80). New 
commercial and industrial activities were established such as textile manufacturing 
and banking, and a new urban working class emerged as migrants from the rural 
highlands were drawn to Quito in search of employment opportunities. The change 
from a primarily administrative city to an economic center impacted the physical and 
socio-economic structure of the city, as Quito began to produce not only for internal 
consumption but also for capital markets. Most of the new industry was located 
between the city center and the rail terminal, which was located on the southern edge 
of the city. Migrants and the urban working class began to settle in around this new 
industrial hub (Ibid). 
Cacao Boom and Bust 
From 1885 to 1920, cacao represented between 65 and 70 percent of all 
exports (Schodt, 1987, p.36). However, by 1930 international competition and disease 
resulted in a decline of cacao production. Large numbers of workers were dismissed 
from plantations and began to flood urban areas. In addition the Sucre, the national 
currency, was devaluing rapidly causing inflation and increased cost of living. This 
  
 
87 
contributed to deteriorating conditions in the highlands as well as a breakdown of the 
agricultural labor system. The national economic problem of the 1920’s and 1930’s 
contributed to major changes in Quito. The city’s population continued to increase 
with migrants and a residential segregation of socio-economic classes began to 
emerge on a north-south axis, the middle and upper classes concentrating in the north 
and the popular classes to the south. This marked the beginning of the exodus of the 
upper classes from the residences in the city center, the location for the urban elite 
since Quito’s founding.  
The physical geography of the valley limited the city expansion to the east or 
the west. To the south of the city center lay the industrial district along with working 
class neighborhoods, so the elite began to settle in the flat area north of the city center. 
The residential shift by the upper classes took place for a number of reasons. Public 
works projects financed by the state initiated expansion on the outskirts of the colonial 
city including improved transportation, public services, and low density development 
that attracted the elite to the northern area. Other improvements in local infrastructure, 
including the introduction of electric lights, a sewer system, potable water, and a 
tramway network, marked the beginning of a new spatial pattern for the city. In 
addition fear of civil unrest and crime prompted the elite to physically separate their 
residences from the working class areas in the south. The historic center residences 
formerly occupied by the elite were increasingly inhabited by migrants’ and the 
working urban class. In stark contrast to the nineteenth century, a shifting sense of the 
spatial distribution of the city paralleled the demographic rise at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The traditional colonial city followed a radial pattern from the 
center outwards; the modernization of transport initiated an expansion of the city on a 
north-south axis that still exists today. In effect, Quito began to shift from a radial 
socio-spatial map to one arranged about a longitudinal north-south axis. The migrants’ 
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growing presence can be considered one of the fundamental shifts in the social and 
cultural landscape of Quito. At this time the new urban dichotomy emerged which 
persists today, Quito antiguo and Quito moderno, the old and the new city. The new 
migrants and long term residents would not only bring about conflicts in social and 
cultural terms, but also contributed to the new spatial transformation of the north and 
south.  
The municipality’s interest in planning the city’s subsequent development 
grew during the remainder of the 1930’s, though efforts were routinely hampered by 
lack of funds given the country’s economic crisis. As the decade and the worst of the 
crisis abated, the municipality began to consider the possibility of a master plan. In 
1942, following years of discussion and preliminary studies by foreign and national 
urbanists, the Uruguayan architect Guillermo Jones Odriozola submitted the first draft 
of his soon approved Plan Regulador. Although it would be many years before Jones’ 
plan was fully implemented, the transition from radial to longitudinal socio-spatial 
orientation had been essentially determined. A corresponding shift in the economic 
and social structure of the city paralleled Quito’s spatial reconfiguration (Kingman, 
2005).  
However, churches and plazas continued to function as focal points, many in 
the historic center. Surrounding the church and plaza of San Fransisco, stores 
specialized in the sale of grains, jewelry, and the renting and selling of carriages and 
later automobiles. The church of Santo Domingo marked the principle entry of the 
city and was considered the transportation hub. The surrounding areas were transient 
in nature where the primary trade of the city passed through. The Plaza Grande and 
San Blas were known for their fruit and milk markets. The major indigenous market 
could also be found here with vendors selling products and crafts from the country 
side. The  
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Figure 5: Map of Historic Center and Mariscal Sucre, Elaboration Lisa M. Hanley 
Source: DMQ 2008 
Plaza del Teatro was a principle social center for the upper classes (Lara, 1992). Until 
around 1950, the city retained this central core in the historic center. However, with 
the subsequent expansion of the city with a north-south longitudinal shape, new 
centers of commerce began to spring up in both the north and the south.  
Banana Boom and Bust 
After World War II, economic growth took off again in Ecuador, in particular 
due to the export of bananas. Ecuador became the largest exporter of the fruit, which 
was controlled primarily by five foreign companies (Schodt, 1984). The economic 
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prosperity of the 1950’s resulted in the first decade of Ecuadorian history which was 
not influenced by political unrest. After 1956, banana production slowed, and 
employment on the coast decreased. At the same time population growth continued to 
increase, creating an ever growing sector which could not be absorbed in the agro-  
export business. More and more migrants moved to the cities and were absorbed into 
marginal urban employment. 
Prior to the 1920’s, the history of Quito is the history of what is today known 
as the historic center. The 1920’s brought about new construction and rapid 
population growth which continued through the 1950’s, stretching the city from a 
small circular core to a long narrow city on a north-south axis in the valley. A new 
central business district began to form to the north of the historic center in the 
Mariscal (figure 5). The 1940’s and 1950’s marked a period of deterioration of the 
historic center, with increasing population density and declining housing quality. The 
once opulent mansions of the elite were now subdivided into rental units, which grew 
smaller and smaller, as pressure to absorb the migrants in the city increased.  
Modernization 
The modern Latin American city has typically accommodated the influx of 
migrants in slum or squatter settlements during this period, characterized by self-built 
housing and a lack of services. Since services are costly and not uniform in the Latin 
American city, those on the periphery or living in poorer areas are generally not 
serviced. New squatter settlements appear near the urban periphery, so the lowest 
quality housing tends to be located on the edge of the city. Older slum and squatter 
settlements are constantly in processes of improving houses and services, therefore 
these older settlements tend to be in better shape and closer to the central business 
district or historic center than the new ones.  
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Although historic centers may provide improved services and infrastructure 
than their peri-urban counterparts, the tolls of urban population pressures, crumbling 
infrastructure, and diminishing economic bases since the 1970’s posed huge 
challenges for local government. Many local governments have been confronted with 
tasks of balancing the provision of basic services to the urban poor in historic quarters 
and preserving the cultural heritage of cities.  
For Quito, the 1960’s were characterized by a continued deterioration in the 
agro-export model that encouraged the boom and bust cycles of cacao and bananas. 
Many land owners in the rural highlands modernized their land holdings. The 
agricultural modernization required less labor, resulting in a large number of landless 
peasants. This sent another wave of rural migrants to urban areas. Quito nearly 
doubled in population and extended nearly 20 kilometers on the north-south axis. 
However, it only grew to 4 kilometers from east west at its widest point. This physical 
expansion took place with little municipal planning or control. For the historic center, 
this marked a period of “turgurizacion26,” with increasing population densities and 
deteriorating living conditions. The residential population density was high, reaching 
50 inhabitants per hectare, compared to just 14 per hectare in the rest of the city 
(Sheck, 1969, p.10).  
The decline of the historic center occurred for a number of reasons. In the 
1970s and 1980s, the decentralization of some government activities and the 
development of new offices and retail locations in the north led to the decline of land 
value and the overall economic status of the historic center. Many wealthy residents 
continued to move to the north of the city where contemporary houses, wider streets to 
accommodate automobile traffic, and modern services were available. As the wealthy 
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 Turgurizacion is defined as the general deterioration and conversion into a slum area, “slumming.” 
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residents moved out, low-income residents began to occupy the historic center, 
subdividing many of the larger homes into multiple units, which were generally 
overcrowded and inadequately serviced. 
Petroleum Boom 
The 1970’s was dominated by the emergence of petroleum production in the 
eastern lowlands, the oriente. Unlike cacao and bananas, petroleum was the property 
of the state. The oil boom of the 70’s shifted the previous economic dominance of 
Guayaquil and the coast to Quito. Residential, commercial, and industrial expansion 
of the city continued, aided by petroleum profits and a growing civil service (Schodt, 
1987). This also marked the continued shift of administrative, commercial, and 
political concentration of activities to the Mariscal district, about 2 kilometers north of 
the historic center. It also brought about renewed attention for the historic center. 
After decades of general neglect, the historic center of Quito was declared a World 
Heritage Site in 1978.  
UNESCO World Heritage Site 
Regardless of the deterioration that had taken place, UNESCO considered the 
historic center of Quito a “sui generis,” “where the actions of man and nature are 
brought together to create a work unique and transcendent of its kind (UNESCO, 
1978).” The historic center of Quito is composed of three principle plazas: the Plaza 
de San Francisco, Plaza Grande, and the Plaza de Santo Domingo. Religious buildings 
such as the churches of San Francisco, Santo Domingo and the Compania, the 
Convents of La Merced and San Augustin which surround the plazas represent a rich 
fusion between Hispanic and indigenous cultures, as represented through art and 
architecture. The central square is bordered by the Government Palace, the Municipal 
Palace, the Bishop's Palace and the Cathedral, and other religious buildings of the 16th 
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to 18th centuries are spread throughout the historic center. The colonial dwellings are 
often constructed of adobe with whitewashed facades and are built around interior 
patios. The urban ensemble of architecture, art, and culture in Quito is considered an 
eminent example of the colonial Spanish city and is why UNESCO inscribed the 
historic center on the World Heritage List (Ibid). 
The Student Movement and the Historic Center of Quito 
After the 1987 earthquake which severely damaged a number of historic 
properties in the historic center, a movement among the architecture students of the 
Central University of Ecuador emerged, led by Professor Jorge Benavides Solis. The 
students of third and fifth year of architecture studies launched a campaign in defense 
of the historic center. The objectives of the campaign were to motivate the students to 
discover the unique urban and architectural characteristics of the historic center, to 
encourage the students to recognize and respect the heritage of the historic center, and 
to create both an institutional and public awareness in order to defend the heritage of 
the historic center (Benavides, 1988).  
Over 100 students created an inventory of 476 historic buildings and the 
necessary interventions required for their preservation. This inventory was presented 
to the municipality. The students created photographic material and technical plans in 
order to document the level of degradation and determine the level of intervention. On 
January 7, 1988 the students organized a conference at the College of Ecuadorian 
Architects in order to create awareness among public and municipal authorities and 
institutions, whose “negligence had permitted the deterioration of the historic center 
of Quito in an alarming and irreversible form (Benavides, 1988, p.65).” On January 9, 
1988 over 500 students marched throughout the historic center under the protest 
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slogan “Unite the public, unite to fight for the defense of Colonial Quito.”27 Over a 
one week period the students collected 9,870 signatures confirming support for their 
campaign. Lastly, on March 23, 1988, the students organized a pedestrian day in the 
historic center called “Let’s go to the Center.”28 The objectives of the day were to 
demonstrate that the historic center can be recuperated and encourage the authorities 
to institutionalize pedestrian Sundays. The day was filled with activities including a 
march for cleanliness in the historic center, a public painting exhibition by Oswaldo 
Guayasamin, music, and other forms of entertainment in the public spaces.29 
The materials created and collected throughout the campaign were later 
displayed at the Casa de Benalcazar and Casa del Sucre, two historic buildings located 
in the historic district. The exhibition in the Casa del Sucre was viewed by, at the 
time, Mayoral candidate Rodrigo Paz.30 Professor Benevides addressed Mr. Paz, 
requesting his assistance “to defend our cultural heritage…(and) our national 
identity….Mr. Paz, we can not continue to tolerate so much civic and political apathy, 
so much indifference towards our cultural patrimony (Ibid, p. 69).” Rodrigo Paz 
promised to incorporate the concerns presented into his mayoral campaign.  
The activities of the students were documented in a book titled “La Toma 
Simbolica del Centro de Quito,” published in 1988 by the National College of 
Ecuadorian Architects. The efforts by the students are considered by many municipal 
civil servants to be a turning point in the municipal vision, and more importantly in 
municipal effort and action to recuperate the historic center. In fact, many of the 
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 Translation by author, “Unete pueblo, unite a luchar  por la defense del Quito Colonial.” 
28
 Translation by author, “Vamos al Centro.” 
29
 Guayasamin is perhaps the most famous Ecuadorian artist. His works are internationally recognized, 
with over 180 individual exhibitions worldwide before his death in 1999. 
30
 Rodrigo Paz was elected Mayor of Quito and served from 1988-1992 
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students that participated in this project later worked for the municipality in a variety 
of posts related to the rehabilitation of the historic center.  
THE MUNICIPALITY, LEADERSHIP, AND THE CHQ 
Although Quito was declared a UNESCO world heritage site in 1978, under 
the leadership of Mayor Sixto Duran Ballen, it would take two more administrations 
for a new vision of the historic center to come about. Under the leadership of mayors 
S. Duran Ballen (1972-1980), Alvaro Perey (1980- 1984), and Gustavo Herdoiza 
(1984-1988) the municipality occasionally sought donations to finance restoration and 
conservation projects. However, the vision of the historic center was singular, as the 
administrations focused solely on restoring buildings and monuments. The election of 
Rodrigo Paz in 1988 is considered a turning point for how the municipality viewed the 
historic center. Although few concrete policies or projects took place under Paz’s 
administration, the Master Plan for the Integral Rehabilitation of the Historic Areas of 
Quito (1989-1991)31 was developed under Paz’s administration. This plan represented 
the first integral vision for the historic center, including economic, social, and 
territorial development, rather than simply focusing on the conservation of historic 
buildings and monuments.  
Jamil Mahuad succeeded Paz, and under his leadership the 1994 IDB loan was 
signed, and large scale financing for the rehabilitation of the historic center was 
secured. Limited negotiations with street vendors took place under his administration. 
In 1999, Roque Sevilla became Mayor, as Mahuad ended his term early in order to 
assume the presidency of the Republic of Ecuador. Sevilla continued the policies of 
Mahuad, expanding the negotiations with vendors and continuing the projects outlined 
in the IDB loan for the short time that he was mayor. Sevilla lost the election 
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 See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the plan 
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campaign to Paco Moncayo, who was mayor from 2000-2008. Moncayo is often 
credited with recuperating the historic center, as the relocation of street vendors took 
place in 2003, paving the way for the initiation of the large scale rehabilitation 
projects set forth in the IDB loan. Moncayo recently lost his re-election campaign to 
Augusto Barrera in 2008; however this dissertation will only deal with events before 
Barrera’s election.  
The Municipality of Quito and Key Departments 
The Municipality of Quito is an autonomous local government with special 
status due to its condition as capital. The city of Quito and its metropolitan region are 
governed by a municipality with a democratically elected mayor and 15 elected 
municipal council members. The council members form 13 municipal commissions 
which oversee various aspects of the city. This dissertation is concerned with activities 
of the Commission of the Historic Center. 
The territory of the metropolitan region is divided into 32 parroquias or 
parishes. In 1993, Mayor Jamil Mahuad decentralized Quito into eight administrative 
zones. One of these zones is the Administration of the Central Zone Manuel Saenz 
(AZC). This zone encompasses the historic district in its totality, as well as some of 
the contiguous neighborhoods. One of the principle functions of the AZC with regard 
to the historic district is the responsibility for the general functioning of the district, as 
well as control over physical patrimony. More importantly, for the first time an entity 
is charged with approving the interventions set forth by the Commission of the 
Historic Center, one of the 13 municipal council commissions. In addition, the AZC  
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Figure 6: Organizat ion Chart of Relevant Municipal Departments, Source: DMQ, 
2008 
 
also serves as a liaison to the community. Since its inception, a series of community 
participation projects have been initiated, including the process of negotiation with the 
community of informal vendors 
The offices of the municipality which are overseen by the mayor are divided 
into various departments (figure 6). This dissertation will focus on the activities of 
office of territorial planning. In addition to the municipal departments, there are seven 
municipal corporations. The Metropolitan Corporation for Tourism, the Metropolitan 
Corporation for the Urban Development of Quito (INNOVAR), and the Fund for the 
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Salvation of Cultural Heritage (FONSAL) are of particular importance. The municipal 
corporations are managed by different departments, the directors are appointed by the 
mayor, but they have separate budgets and are not required to abide by municipal 
contracting and budgeting laws. This allows the metropolitan corporations more 
flexibility, but at the same time transparency is limited.32  
 
THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO  
The historic center of Quito is composed of 14 neighborhoods and spans a 
geographic space equal to approximately 606 hectares; 376 of these hectares are 
occupied by urban buildings for residential and commercial use and 230 hectares are 
green spaces (figure 7). The central nucleus is 54 hectares and comprises over half of 
the historic buildings and monuments of the historic center (IDB, 1994). The historic 
center of Quito today, like many other Latin American capitals, is the node of a 
number of administrative and economic functions of the city. It is both the seat of 
national and local government and the majority of the principal administrative offices 
of the municipal government. 183 primary and secondary schools, managed by the 
federal department of Education, are located in the historic center. In addition, the 
second largest federal prison, the Garcia Moreno Rehabilitation Center which houses 
approximately 2,000 prisoners, is located on the outskirts of the historic center 
(DNRC, 2009). The Garcia Moreno Prison was built in 1875 and is a historical 
building. The municipality is working with the federal ministries to decentralize the 
high concentration of schools in the area. In addition, they wish to relocate the jail to a 
different part of the city and convert the building into an archive for historic 
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 A further discussion of metropolitan corporations and public private partnerships can be found in 
Chapter 4 
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Figure 7: Nucleus of the Historic Center and Surrounding Neighborhoods,  
Elaboration     Lisa M. Hanley Source: DMQ, 2008 
 
documents. The old bus terminal, Cumanda was also located on the outskirts of the 
historic center. In July 2009, after several years of planning and construction and an 
effort to decrease traffic in the historic center as well as decentralize bus services, the 
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bus terminal was split into two terminals, one to the south in Quitumbe and one to the 
north in Carcelen. The Cumanda terminal was closed. 
Housing 
The historic center is also home to approximately 50,000 inhabitants; it has 
negative growth rate of 1.2%. Approximately 80% of the residents live at or below the 
poverty line (INEC, 2001). The housing stock is compromised of poorly maintained 
buildings which have been subdivided into multi-family buildings. 70% of the 
households are renters and 24% are owner occupied (INEC, 2005-2006).33 The 
proportion of renters is high compared to the metropolitan area where only 42% are 
renters. The historic center has 1480 single family homes and 2470 multifamily 
buildings. 1708 have between two and eight families per building and 588 houses 
between eight and 15, and the remaining 84 buildings have more than 15 households 
each (CHQ Plan Especial, 2003).  Densities reach 152 inhabitants per hectare in the 
peripheral neighborhoods, and 65 inhabitants per hectare in the core (Ibid). The 
municipality hopes to revive the residential capacity of the historic center and attract 
middle and upper income residents. 
Informal Markets 
 Its role as a place of popular and informal commerce and residential area has 
diminished in recent years, giving way to tourism and small formal businesses. Since 
the 1970s the historic center was a locus for the informal economy and street markets 
until 2003. It was evidenced by a strong concentration of markets, which thrived in 
part due to the proximity of a large low-income population, frequent transport services 
through the historic center, and a high pedestrian movement. Thus, the historic center 
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 The remaining 6% received housing in return for services, is identified as transferred or other (INEC 
2005-2006).  
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represents a zone of competing interests. It symbolizes the city as it was in colonial 
times, through the colonial buildings and monuments scattered throughout the 54 
hectares which compose the central area (IDB, 1994). However it was also the place 
of business of at least 8,000 street vendors, representing rural migrants and families 
that have worked in the historic center for decades. Reconciling the physical historic 
patrimony and the street vending which obscures and damages the buildings was 
probably the biggest challenge the municipality faced in revitalizing the historic 
center.  
The rapid growth of Quito combined with its economic decline since the 
1970s,34 had a significant impact on the informal economy, and therefore the historic 
center. Since the historic center is the first point migrants reach upon their arrival in 
Quito, as the central bus terminal was located in the center until 2009 and almost all 
long distance public transport passed through this terminal, combined with the out-
migration of wealthy residents, the historic center became home to an increasing poor 
migrant community. In addition, the earthquake of 1987 damaged a number of 
buildings and residences in the area. These buildings were later converted into storage 
buildings and shops, transforming a number of residential buildings into commercial 
properties. This poverty of the growing population has dictated a continued reliance 
on the informal economy for employment, where the majority is women and migrants. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the historic center of Quito had transformed into the one of 
the principal informal market areas of the city, which occupied the plazas, pedestrian 
sidewalks, and streets, making vehicular and pedestrian traffic congested (figure 8). 
The intense colonization of street space, particularly near the Ipiales and Tejar market, 
which are located in the heart of the historic center, was such that the streets no longer  
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 Quito’s economic decline in the 1970’s can be attributed to the closure of factories and local 
production as a result of globablization. 
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Figure 8: Location of Informal Markets in the Historic Center, Elaboration Lisa M. 
Hanley Source: AZC, 2008 
 
functioned as public space during the daytime, but rather as a string of makeshift 
market stalls generally constructed from plastic and wood materials. During the 
daytime streets in this area functioned under traders organizations, or essentially the 
“traders mafia,” where temporary market stalls are set up and then later taken down at 
the end of the day, with the products stored in a local storage building for the night. 
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According to Bromley, in the 1990’s there was an even greater intensification of 
commercial activity in the historic center, which was attributed to increases in both 
daily and periodic markets, invasion of additional streets, and the emergence of new 
market sites, for both daily and periodic markets (table 7) (Bromley, 1998, p. 254). As 
indicated in table 7, by 1992, 4 of the 5 very large markets in Quito were located in 
the historic center. 
 
Table 7: Number of Markets in Quito 
  Small Medium Large Very large 
Number of vendors < 100 100 - 299 300 - 499 > 500 
1972 - HC 4 2 5 - 
1972 - Quito (including HC) 13 5 6 - 
1992 - HC 2 4 2 4 
1992 - Quito (including HC) 17 7 5 5 
Source: Department of Markets, IMQ 1995 
 
Characteristics of the Informal Economy in the Historic Center of Quito 
Department of Markets 
Throughout out the 1970s and 1980s, the municipal government of Quito had a 
relatively tolerant attitude toward informal markets and street traders. Traders were 
occasionally fined, however a lack of clarity on the rules and regulations regarding 
street trading made this difficult and infrequent. The Department of Markets was 
created as a municipal institution to regulate informal trading and to manage 
municipal markets, including those in the historic center. Permanent traders often paid 
a small monthly fee, often less than $5, to the Department of Markets for the public 
space they occupied. The semi-sanctioning by municipal authorities of informal 
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trading in the historic district led to an ever increasing number of traders to occupy 
public spaces.  
The informal markets also cost the municipality large sums of money, 
particularly with regard to sanitation and trash collection. The municipality paid 
approximately $900,000 in 1995 to maintain the markets in the historic center. This 
figure includes the functioning of the Department of Markets, expenditures of the 
sanitation department (EMASEO) to clean the streets, and the metropolitan police 
presence in the area. However, the fees paid by the vendors, which include the fee for 
the occupation of public space and for sanitation, totaled approximately $400,000 
(IMQ, 1995, p. 5), resulting in an expenditure of approximately $500,000/year. 
Prior to 1996, the vendors and the municipality had a limited relationship. The 
Department of Markets issued authorizations for the functioning of various 
organizations which permitted the use of physical space in which the vendor may sell 
his or her products. However, the Department of Markets did not actually issue a 
permit for a specific space; rather the authorization was generally coordinated through 
the association and not with the individual vendor. The associations worked out 
amongst themselves who "occupied" what space. A number of municipal ordinances 
existed to regulate small commerce in public spaces. These ordinances specified 
growth of informal commerce in the historic center and placed specific limitations of 
the occupation of space, both public and the use of storage areas to 25% of the historic 
district. However, little was done to enforce these regulations. 
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Vendor Associations 
The vendors are organized in associations and federations. In 1998, there were 
96 associations35 of which 81 were registered in the Department of Markets. In 1998, 
approximately 65% were registered members of an association and 37% were not 
(Herrera and Cordova, 1998). The associations served to protect the rights to public 
space of the vendors, settle disputes between members, between members and other 
vendors, a liaison between the municipality and the Department of Markets, and also 
to extend credit or facilitate credit to members. The member must pay a monthly fee, 
which varied by association. Fees are often higher than those charged by the 
municipality and the Department of Markets, which can lead to corruption.  
In 1994, with the threat of removal from the streets of the historic district due 
to the looming rehabilitation project, 14 associations formed the Federation of Small, 
Autonomous Vendors of Quito and 11 associations formed the Federation of Small 
Free Vendors of Quito. Later 78 associations grouped together under a federation 
known as the "Frente de Defensa" or the Front of Defense led by Angelita Vega, and 
included the two federations above. The original discourse of the Front of Defense 
was the maintenance of the public work space of the vendors and a complete rejection 
of relocation of the vendors of the historic center. This federation later splintered, and 
the Front of the Autonomous Small Retailers of Quito, led by Marlena Manyay was 
created. These two federations of vendor associations played key roles in the 
negotiation process between the municipality and vendors.36 
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 The large number of vendor associations can be attributed to the organization of vendors along 
family or migration networks, city street blocks, and items for sale. The organizations functioned 
primarily informally, without formal registration with the state, which allowed for the proliferation of 
organizations as the costs of formation were low.  
36
 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of associations and the negotiation process.  
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Number and Characteristics of Informal Vendors in the CHQ 
The nature of informality makes an estimate of the vendors difficult. Different 
offices within the municipality have conducted various studies over a couple of 
decades. The first study in 1976 by the municipality estimated 10,246 vendors. 50% 
of the vendors at this time were born in Quito, and the remainder came from 
surrounding provinces. They demonstrated low levels of education, only 60% had 
completed primary school and only 1% had completed secondary school. Women 
were overrepresented, at 68% (IMQ, 1976). 
 
Table 8: Days worked by number of vendors in 81 Associations registered with the 
Department of Markets 
Work Days 
Number of 
Associations 
Number of 
Members Percentage 
7 Days 57 3,710 66% 
Tuesday and Saturday 13 1,281 23% 
Saturday and Sunday 4 142 3% 
Seasonal 7 505 9% 
Total 81 5,638 100% 
Source: Department of Markets (1998) 
 
The highest estimate is 13,500 from the Department of Markets. Of these 
13,500, 8,500 were members of an association and 5,000 were not (Department of 
Markets, 1998). The Administration of the Central Zone (AZC) estimated 10,000 
vendors; of these 7,500 were permanent vendors and 2,500 were seasonal (IMQ, 
1996). In 1998 the AZC estimated 8,220, of which 6,878 work on the street and 1342 
can be found in commercial centers. The latter two estimates are based on field work, 
where students counted stalls and vendors street by street. The first estimate by the 
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Department of Markets is based on registration in their office. For a variety of 
reasons, such as ability to incorporate more vendors into their space or to demonstrate 
a larger political and social organization, it was suspected that the associations 
frequently register more members than the actual number, often registering family 
members and friends who do not work in the historic center. What was clear is that 
there were a significant number of vendors working in the historic center. Second, the 
number of vendors had not changed dramatically in past years. This was in part due to 
self regulation on the part of the vendor associations, increased control by the AZC, 
and the already existing saturation of both space and vendors in the historic center. 
New vendors are generally not incorporated into the historic center, unless a space is 
abandoned or transferred.  
 
Table 9: Number of Street Blocks by Zone and Type of Vendors 
  Street block 
Zone Total 
Without 
Sales 
Fixed 
stalls and 
Roaming 
Vendors 
Only 
Roaming 
Vendors 
Historic Center except 
Ipiales 136 67 52 17 
Ipiales Area 48 6 42   
Avenida de Pichincha Area 15 3 9 3 
San Roque Market Area 21 9 7 5 
Alameda Park 30 22 8   
El Ejido Park 22   19 3 
Total 272 107 137 28 
Percent 100% 39% 50% 10% 
Source: Herrera and Cordova 1998 
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The majority of vendors in the historic center belonged to a vendor association 
or organization. This organization secured their place on the street and guaranteed that 
this space will be respected by other vendors. One variation is the association of candy 
sellers. This association forced their members to rotate periodically, so that all 
members benefit from the spaces that are considered the most lucrative. According to 
the Department of Markets, approximately 27% of the vendors have other forms of 
income or employment: 30% of roaming vendors and 25% of fixed stall vendors. In 
the historic center of Quito, 78% of the vendors are between 18-45 years age, at the 
most productive stage. Among the vendors, only 7% have technical education. 
However, almost 86% have some secondary education. Only 11% are illiterate.  
Women represent about 68% of the vendors, but children under 12 represent only 
2.3% (160 children), the majority working as shoe shiners. For decades, during the 
months of December and January, it was estimated that approximately 17,000 vendors  
work in the historic center, the increase due to the festivals of Quito and the 
Christmas and New Year holidays. Tuesday and Saturday the historic center was the 
most crowded with both vendors and buyers, as these are considered market days. The 
Direction of Markets estimated that the number of vendors can fluctuate by 
approximately 10%, especially on market days. In addition, 1300-1500 are wholesale 
vendors sold in the historic center on Tuesday and Saturday mornings (table 8) 
(Department of Markets, 1998).  
In 1998, in collaboration with the Catholic University of Ecuador, the ECH 
conducted a detailed survey of the vendors in the historic center. This was the study 
that was used in the project design for the relocation and modernization of vendors in 
the historic center. The ECH study counted 7,432 posts of street commerce in the 
district administered by the AZC covering a total of 272 blocks (Table 9). 
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Table 10: Number of Total Vendors by Zone 
Zone Total Fixed Stalls 
Roaming 
Vendors 
Historic Center, except Ipiales 1,333 959 374 
Ipiales Area 5,188 4,417 771 
Avenida de Pichinacha Area 176 134 42 
San Roque Market Area 181 86 95 
Alameda Park  66 42 24 
El Ejido Park  488 412 76 
Total 7,432 6,050 1,382 
Percent 100% 81% 19% 
Source: Herrera and Cordova, 1998 
 
Over half of the blocks and vendors working in this zone are concentrated in 
the nucleus of the historic center. Of the 7,432 vendors identified, 6,521 work in the 
nucleus of the historic center, covering 111 blocks of the historic center (table 10). In 
addition to the street vendors, the ECH study identified 1,192 informal vendors who 
work in enclosed commercial centers. Over 25% of the stalls in the commercial 
centers were empty at the time of the study (table 11). 
 The types of stalls used by the informal vendors can be divided into 4 
categories: a) stalls with a permanent structure, b) stalls with a non-permanent 
detachable structure, c) vendors without any structure (just a table or the products are 
displayed directly on the street or sidewalk), and d) roaming traders with no fixed 
space. The majority of vendors have a detachable structure which is set up each 
morning and removed at the end of the day (table 12). 
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Table 11: Number of Stalls in Enclosed Informal Commercial Centers 
  Number of vendors 
Zone 
Number of 
Stalls 
Occupied 
Stalls 
Empty 
Stalls 
Historic Center except Ipiales 52 39 13 
Ipiales Area 1,140 836 304 
Total 1,192 875 317 
Percent 100% 73% 27% 
Source: Herrera and Cordova, 1998 
 
Table 12: Number of Vendors according to Type of Stall  
  Number of stalls 
Zone Total Permanent 
Detachable 
structure 
Without 
structure Roaming 
Historic center 
except Ipiales 1,333 51 548 360 374 
Ipiales Area 5,188 7 4,183 227 771 
Total 6,521 58 4,731 587 1,145 
Percent 100% 1% 73% 9% 18% 
Source: Herrera and Cordova, 1998 
 
The merchandise and structure are generally carried away by cargadores 
(manual transporters) and stored in a warehouse. Those without a structure generally 
sell their wares on a corner or in between stalls. These vendors usually do not belong 
to an association. The roaming traders generally offer the same items as the fixed stall 
traders, but take advantage of their mobility to sell their products. They are sometimes 
affiliated with a stall. The majority of merchandise sold is clothing and shoes. Many 
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Table 13: Number of Vendors according to Merchandise  
Zone 
Historic 
center 
except 
Ipiales 
Ipiales 
Area Total Percent 
Manufactured goods 
(cosmetics, electronics, 
jewelery, etc.) 309 955 1,264 19% 
Clothes and Shoes 202 3,286 3,488 53% 
Crafts 180 632 812 12% 
Services 154 0 154 2% 
Misc. 121 30 151 2% 
Food with license 93 11 104 2% 
Food without license 274 274 548 8% 
Total 1,333 5,188 6,521 100% 
Source: Herrera and Cordova, 1998 
 
of these products are contraband goods from Colombia and Panama; however some 
textiles are produced locally. The electronics market around the 24 de Mayo street 
sells second hand electronics products generally known to come from questionable 
provenance. The 104 food vendors with a license are the candy sellers who are 
organized in a well run association (table 13). The variety of low cost products 
available in the informal markets, in addition to the services of the government 
buildings, as well as the concentration of primary and secondary schools draw 
approximately 320,000 visitors to the historic center daily. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 9: Street in Historic Center, 1999, Author image 
 
Transportation and Cong
Approximately 320,000 people travel 
attracted by the informal markets, as well as the administrative buildings. 
visitors use public transportation to arrive at their destination. 
travel from different parts of the city to the historic center: 42.5% from the South, 
30.6% from the North, and 3.7% from outside of the district
1998). The informal markets and the number of daily visitors make the historic cente
a congested place (figure 9). Streets which are occupied by markets often block 
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, as the sidewalk space and streets were used for 
makeshift stalls. However the vendors are not solely responsible for the congestion.
General abuse of parking rules blocks traffic, as well the concentration of schools and 
administrative buildings bring a large number of visitors daily. In an effort to reduce 
congestion, the municipality is attempting to work with the Ministry of Education to 
denctralize the high concentration of schools in the historic district. However, 
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according to Carlos Pallares, Director of FONSAL, little progress has been made 
(Pallares, 3/27/2008). 
 
 
Figure 10: Informal street vending in the historic center, 1999 Author images 
 
Visual Contamination 
The informal markets and general deterioration of the historic center in recent 
decades has lead to what the municipality refers to as “visual contamination.” This 
refers to the existence of exterior cables, signs, posters, billboards, and other 
propaganda that obstructs the urban landscape (figure 10). At least one third of the 
blocks in the historic center exhibit some type of visual contamination which impacts 
not only the landscape, but also damages the facades of historical buildings (Herrera 
and Cordova, 1998).  
IMPACT OF INFORMAL COMMERCE IN THE HISTORIC CENTER 
The informal commerce and markets that occupied the streets and public areas 
in the historic center until 2003 were considered to have had a detrimental effect on 
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the physical structure of the buildings, as well as on the visual landscape (table 14). 
For example, the fixed stalls generally attached into buildings causing structural 
damage, as well as obscuring the view of these buildings and monuments. 
Additionally, the vendors impeded the free movement of vehicles and pedestrians. 
Many of the streets in the historic center were only mildly affected, others were 
severely impacted. Approximately 41 blocks or 22% are considered to have been 
severely impacted by informal markets. These blocks were characterized by a total 
saturation of fixed stall vendors and roaming traders, blocking the entire sidewalk and 
some street space. In the Ipiales area, located in the middle of the historic district, over 
80% of the blocks were characterized this way. Medium impact is characterized by 
blocks where the presence of informal commerce is crowded, but allows a pedestrian 
to move about freely. Generally, the street had not been overtaken, allowing limited 
space for the passage of vehicles. Light impact is characterized by the lack of fixed 
stall vendors and a low presence of ambulant traders. Pedestrians and vehicular traffic 
could move about freely. The remaining 74 blocks showed no direct impact by the 
presence of informal commerce and markets. 
 
Table 14: Level of Impact according to Herrera and Cordova of Informal Commerce 
on Public Space in the Historic Center 
  Total Level of impact 
Zone   None Ligh Medium High 
Historic Center except 
Ipiales 136 68 47 19 2 
Ipiales Area 48 6 1 2 39 
Total 184 74 48 21 41 
Percent 100% 40% 26% 11% 22% 
Herrera and Cordova, 1998 
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INFORMAL VENDING AND WORLD HERITAGE 
Trash, sound pollution, contamination of the visual landscape, obstruction of 
pedestrian and vehicle traffic and the overall disorder of the historic center was 
caused, at least in part, by the location of several large informal markets. This was 
reason enough to consider a reorganization of commerce in this area. However, the 
additional burden of the historic center as a site of physical and cultural heritage, as 
well as a UNESCO World Heritage site, brought about increasing concern with regard 
to the physical state of the historic center.   
The vendors had overtaken a significant part of the public space, including 
plazas, sidewalks, and streets. Among the most congested sites were the Church of the 
Compania, Church of San Augustin, and the convent of La Merced. The presence of 
the informal traders not only obstructed the views and pedestrian and vehicular 
passage, but the buildings were often used as support for the daily assembly of the 
detachable market stalls. That is the stalls were directly assembled into or with the 
support of the surrounding buildings, causing structural damage to the facades.  
The nature of street commerce in the historic center, which required the daily 
disassembly of the market stalls also required storage of the products sold on the 
streets. Many of the historic buildings had been converted into warehouses that stored 
the vendor’s products over night. The original structure of the building was often 
altered, damaging the stability of the structure, the original characteristics, and its 
heritage value. This contributed to the overall declining image of the historic center. 
Once the center of the city’s residential, administrative, and commercial life, the 
historic center was converted into the center of limited administrative activities and 
informal trading.  
This “loss” of the historic center to the informal economy and a continuing 
deterioration of the built environment concerned a number of citizens, local officials, 
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and advocates of historic preservation internationally. The result was an initiation by 
the Municipality of Quito to recuperate the historic patrimony and revitalize the 
historic center. 
URBAN REVITALIZATION AND QUITO 
Since Quito’s designation as a world heritage site there has been considerable 
investment, both local and international, in the conservation and revitalization of the 
historic center. A general perception that a changed image of the historic center is 
considered crucial to the promotion of private sector investment and has prompted 
local government and citizens to begin to encourage a number of changes in the land 
use of the historic center, particularly public space. This also initiated the first 
controversy over the conflicting use of space in the historic center; in particular, the 
occupation of public space by informal markets, which is generally viewed as 
incompatible with a UNESCO world heritage site.   
Quito represents the dynamic struggle between the forces of planning and 
order imposed by the municipality and the spontaneous organization of the informal 
economy. In 1994 the IDB and the Municipality of Quito came to a loan agreement, 
guaranteed by the Ecuadorian Government, for 41 million US dollars to assist in the 
conservation and preservation of the historic center and since 1994, the rehabilitation 
project of the Historic Center of Quito has been underway. Issues of economic 
development, tourism, preservation of buildings and monuments, and the recuperation 
of a sense of national and local identity, are all cited as objectives of the multi-stage 
project (IDB, 1994). Rehabilitating and redeveloping colonial centers does not 
necessarily benefit all sectors of society, as residential and economic displacement 
often occurs. However, as cities compete for prestige, the need to sell cultural capital 
becomes increasingly important and mitigating displacement can easily be left aside.  
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The project description of this loan specifically stated that the current land 
uses of historic center, which were dominated by the informal economy and the 
presence and expansion of informal commerce in the historic center had displaced 
other forms of investment. According to the IDB: 
[In order] to restore its functional importance, revitalize traditional services 
and commerce by affording easier access to goods and services, these 
businesses will supply and foster the appropriate use and maintenance of its 
public and private buildings to make them more attractive to visitors. The 
program would also promote tourism, urban renewal and historic preservation 
and help halt spreading urban problems, such as traffic congestion, pollution, 
crime, and overcrowding…and promote private sector investment in the 
Historic Center of Quito (1994, p. 1).  
The IDB loan project description stated that the situation facilitates 
environmental deterioration and discourages investment, a principal requirement for a 
sustainable conservation process. In fact, one of the conditions for disbursements after 
the first 12 months of the project was “the implementation by the municipality of the 
revised version of the municipal ordinance that regulates street vending and the use of 
public space (IDB, 1994, p.20).” This regulated use of space implies that certain uses 
of the historic district are more important than others. In fact, one of the slogans of the 
campaign for rehabilitation was “Recuperating our identity.”37 The conversion of the 
use of public space, linked to the recuperation of identity, questions whose identity is 
being recuperated in this process. This recuperation led to a large scale modernization 
and formalization of the vendors who previously occupied the space, paving the way 
for potential increased tourism flows and improved real estate values. The next 
chapter examines the role of the historic center and informality in the municipal plans 
of the city of Quito.  
 
                                                 
 
37
 “Recuperemos nuestra identidad,” translation by autor. This slogan could be seen on print materials 
such as banners and posters throughout the historic center  in late 1990’s. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Municipal Responses through Planning: Perspectives of the Historic 
District 
The relationship between planning, the historic center, heritage, and the 
informal sector forms the focus of this chapter. It reviews the history planning, with 
an emphasis on municipal regulation. The various stages of contemporary planning in 
Quito have almost always given some consideration to the historic center. This 
chapter will analyze not only municipal planning, but also key international 
agreements, as well as an introduction to the IDB rehabilitation project. Information 
for this chapter was collected at various institutions. Municipal plans and ordinances 
were reviewed at the Department of Planning Library and Document Center, Quito 
and Fondo Quito, Ecuador. Documents related to the IDB loan were obtained at the 
INNOVAR/ECH Document Storage Center, Carapungo, Ecuador. IDB loan 
documents were acquired directly from the IDB in Washington, D.C.  
The notion of the historic center did not emerge until the 1940´s, when the idea 
of the colonial core as a historic district begins to appear in municipal documents. The 
master plans all clearly lay out the role of the historic center, albeit each with different 
visions. Plans and ordinances generally characterize the historic center as disorderly, 
dirty, overrun with informal commerce, and inhabited by a low-income population. 
However, documents clearly illustrate that the historic center has long been the 
principal site of commerce for the city and tensions between vendors and local 
government predate the modern city and can be identified as early as the 1880´s.  
Since the notion of the historic center’s inception, local, national and 
international visions have had to be reconciled, as all levels place claims both on the 
definition and use of the physical and cultural heritage of Quito. The reconciliation of 
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these visions over time has led to what is today a site of world heritage and a large 
scale international revitalization and rehabilitation project. The five master plans are 
characterized by three general themes regarding the reorganization of urban space. 
The first theme is concerned with attempts to control and reorganize commercial 
space, often regulated in the name of sanitation and hygiene; the second theme 
focused on using land markets to raise revenue, and the third dealt with urban limits 
and the expansion of the city. In addition to the five master plans, Quito also 
developed two additional plans: a special plan for the historic areas and one for the 
historic center.  
Through a review of planning and planning related documents, this chapter 
argues that the municipality of Quito has always been interested in controlling and 
reordering the urban fabric and the historic center; however, lack of resources and 
importance meant the historic center was a low planning priority for several decades. 
The plans illustrate a typical disjuncture between planning and implementation. The 
municipal plans are lengthy and comprehensive, however few projects are 
implemented or ordinances enforced. After 50 years of planning on paper with little 
implementation, this pitfall of planning becomes an obstacle to the municipality and 
the IDB rehabilitation project in the late 1990´s. Municipal employees are forced to 
invest time and effort to convince historic center stakeholders that a redevelopment 
process will take place and the typical rhetoric without implementation is a 
characteristic of the past.  
EARLY PLANNING: TRADING AND MARKETS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY IN THE 
HISTORIC CENTER 
Although the idea of the historic center does not appear until the mid twentieth 
century, it is important to understand the activities and uses of this area of the city 
prior to the emergence of the delimitation of historic center. As described in Chapter 
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3, prior to the delimitation of the historic core, this area was in fact still the center of 
the city at the turn of the century. It was a bustling city center with outdoor markets, 
incorporating government buildings, large plazas, and wealthy residences. 
In the 1880´s and 1890´s the Plaza of San Francisco was the unofficial trading 
and market site for the city. At this point in time, the municipality of Quito began 
lobbying the central government for funds for a central market place, as the current 
state of the outdoor market was considered disorderly, unhygienic, and backward. In a 
July 1887 address to the legislative body, the municipal council lamented Quito’s lack 
of a central marketplace as a measure of its backwardness in contrast to the other 
capitals of South America. Even worse was the embarrassment for Quito that 
Guayaquil, the coastal rival city had a market (IMQ, 1887).38 In 1887 President Flores 
issued an executive decree designating Plaza Santa Clara as the future site of the 
central market building for Quito. However, financial difficulties at the national level 
plagued the project and the city was left to finance the project on its own. The city 
proposed taxing the vendors that gathered in the Plaza San Francisco to finance the 
project in 1887. However, this proposal was abandoned due to the lack of fixed 
market stalls (IMQ, 1887). It was argued that it would be impossible to regulate 
taxation without fixed stalls. This was the first record of a municipal attempt to 
exercise a tax on the street vendors of Quito. The measure finally gathered support 
after the approval of the market’s site, leading to a temporary solution adapted in 
April 1893, by which a series of kiosks would be built to house the larger merchants 
in Plaza San Francisco and Plaza Mejía on the eastern edge of the city center. These 
would be rented out for up to a two-year period with the possibility for future renewal 
(IMQ, 1893). 
                                                 
 
38
 Described in the Municipal Gazette as, “Guayaquil mismo tiene plaza de mercado (Guayaquil itself 
has a market plaza)!” 
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These first attempts to regulate commerce in the city’s plazas represent the 
municipality’s early efforts to restructure commercial space. The measures sought to 
rid the historic center of unhygienic industries and restructure space under the rubric 
of sanitation (Kingman, 2005). This framework has persisted to the present day, and 
can be seen in the struggle between the vendors of the historic center and the 
municipality. Hygiene, sanitation, and spatial order all emerge as critical issues 
regarding the use of public space and vending in municipal documents and plans. 
Both the conflict of street trading and municipal regulation of commerce are not 
modern phenomena and predate the modern city. 
PLANNING AND THE HISTORIC DISTRICT 
Plan Jones (1942-1944) 
In 1941 the municipality requested the services of a Uruguayan architect 
named Guillermo Jones Odriozola to develop a master plan for Quito and in 1942 
Jones began work on the plan. The basis of the plan is the division of the city into 
three main zones: the north, the south, and the center. The north would be 
characterized by a residential area dominated by the elite. The south would be the 
working and middle class region. The center, Jones envisioned a mixed income 
neighborhood dominated by administrative functions and potentially tourism. This 
plan creates a bi-nodal division which still exists today, splitting the central part of the 
city into two parts: the old historic center and the new Mariscal neighborhood to the 
north. This was an important aspect of the plan, and brought attention to the 
longitudinal spatial division, also characterized by a north-south class division (IMQ, 
1945). Eduardo Kingman observes that the north-south class division that still 
characterizes contemporary Quito was solidified by this plan, as well as the role of the 
center as a contested space (Kingman, 2005).   
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The plan provides a first reference for the limits of the historic center. Jones 
proposed legislating commercial and residential zoning, as well as the preservation 
and enhancement of the city center, including a provision to maintain the city’s 
monuments and colonial buildings. Jones envisioned a historic center which 
encompassed the municipal center, religious and colonial art, and a historical 
framework for the city characterized by the typical colonial house. He refers to the 
center as the “colonial city” and provides a vision of the colonial city composed of 
and represented by historical and religious monuments, a municipal center, 
presidential palace, and the colonial house. However the plan does not encourage a 
level of preservation that goes beyond individual buildings and monuments (IMQ, 
1945).  
The effects of the plan can be witnessed through a series of municipal 
ordinances that ensued. For the historic center, these ordinances required the owners 
of property in the historic center paint the facades and clean the streets, focusing on 
external aesthetics and hygiene (IMQ, 1945). It also marked the beginning of the 
monumentalist period of conservation ideology for the historic center. This period 
focused on the restoration of monuments. It was also characterized by enhancement of 
value of the monuments in order to attract tourism and convert the monuments into a 
form of income. This introduced tourism as a valid reason for rehabilitation and grew 
out of movements in Europe, as well as the promotional campaigns from UNESCO 
(Mutal, 2001). 
Plan Director de Urbanimso (1967) 
By the 1960s, the Plan Jones was out of date due to the enormous growth of 
the city. The Plan Director was approved in 1967 and was conceived as a technical 
plan which divided the city into four main units: the south zone, the historic center, 
the center of general services, and the north zone. The plan focused on the physical 
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city and proposed to order land use, institute a general zoning scheme, and improve 
the urban transportation network. The plan was designed for a 30 year time period, but 
by the late 1970s, actual growth had already far exceeded predictions in the plan 
(IMQ, 1967). 
The plan included a special study of the historic center, which formulated a 
guide for general land use, as well as designating the buildings and corresponding area 
which belonged to the historic center as subject to new zoning laws. The special plan 
established a scheme for valuing heritage and focused on the adequate use of historic 
buildings and monuments, which could be used as tourist attractions. The section 
dedicated to the historic center begins with the subtitle The General Problem of the 
Historic Center, describing the systematic destruction of monuments and patrimony 
due to lack of planning, political will, legal action, and economic resources (IMQ, 
1967, p.16). The plan calls for the control of the systems of commerce and the street 
traders that block and damage both the monuments, as well as the vehicular and 
pedestrian traffic (Ibid, p.20). The historic center is described in this plan as a 
disgraced area, lamenting the destruction of monuments and the concealment of 
churches and historic buildings by advertisements, electrical wires, and loud speakers. 
The plan focused on two themes for the historic center: first, the zoning and regulation 
of commerce and second, the regulation of vehicular traffic, focusing on how to 
incorporate the historic area into the modern city through traffic regulation.  
The Plan Director 1967 introduces a period of regulation in the city, especially 
with regard to the historic center. The first ordinances concerning the historic center 
are approved. Ordinance 1125 (1966) delimits the historic center and creates a 
municipal commission for the historic center with clearly defined functions and 
responsibilities. Ordinance 1130 (1966) charges the commission for the historic center 
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with determining which buildings and balconies are in need of painting and 
rehabilitation, as well as detailing the time lines for such renovations.   
The special attention given to the historic center in the Plan Director is no 
accident. There was much discussion at the international level with regard to heritage 
and tourism. In December of 1967 the Organization of American States (OAS) 
organized a meeting in Quito with specialists in heritage, art, and museum studies 
with the intention of analyzing the potential utilization of cultural monuments as a 
tourist attraction. The results of this event are synthesized in the document known as 
the Normas of Quito (1967). This document focuses on the economic valuation of 
monuments and its related function to tourism. It also proposes international 
cooperation and financing for conservation programs.  
Both the Jones Plan and Plan Director focus primarily on the physical aspects 
of the city and how to modernize and beautify the physical assets. Neither examines 
closely the socio-economic aspects. In addition both plans lay out costly projects 
which the municipality was in no position to implement. These plans began a long 
tradition of planning in Quito; the development of extensive and detailed plans with 
little implementation. However, both provide valuable insight into how the historic 
center was viewed and what role was envisioned for this part of the city during their 
time period.  
Plan Director: Quito y su Area Metropolitana (1973-1993) 
Quito continued to grow rapidly and without much regulation, regardless of 
the limits placed on the city through the two previous master plans. In 1973, the 
department of planning presented the second Plan Director. This plan set out to 
stimulate development in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, improve zoning, 
improve density of land use, and lastly a decentralization of services. It also identifies 
the polarization of the north-south axis as a planning problem (IMQ, 1973). 
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The historic center is not mentioned explicitly in this plan as it is in the prior 
two plans, including in a discussion of tourism development. Rather, with regard to 
tourism the plan focuses on the valleys, lakes, and other natural sites within the 
metropolitan area that could be of interest to tourists. This plan is dedicated to a 
diagnosis of urban development and growth of the metropolitan region. In this sense, 
the historic center is described as the receiving point for the new migrant population 
and this plan documents the changes in the urban form. The new migrants were 
perceived as displacing economic activities to the north of the city, as well some 
administrative offices at both the local and national levels. However, religious and 
political power remained concentrated in the historic center. In addition, the growth of 
a strong informal commercial sector pushed the residential population to the 
surrounding neighborhoods such as Toctiuco, El Placer, La Colmena, La Libertad, and 
El Panecillo.  
The ordinance 1727 of 1975 emerged out this plan, as the municipality found 
little regulatory power over the historic center. The ordinance demarcated the area and 
created a regulatory framework to control the explosion of informal commerce and 
migrants in the area. Although the ordinance provided a regulatory framework, the 
municipality lacked the resources and political will to enforce the ordinance. It is 
important to note that this plan was never approved by the City Council and never had 
the authority of law. Although this plan pays little attention to the historic center as a 
site of heritage, the idea of the historic center was still important to the municipality 
and the nation as demonstrated by the 1977 Coloquio of Quito and subsequent 1978 
UNESCO designation.   
Coloquio de Quito (1977) and World Heritage (1978) 
The Coloquio of Quito emerged out of a collaborative effort between the 
Municipality, UNDP, and UNESCO. A project was initiated that intended to 
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implement housing rehabilitation in the historic center, called Regional Project of 
Andean Cultural Patrimony. The document explicitly notes that although it strives to 
preserve the patrimony, it must also strive to respect the current inhabitants of the 
historic center. The document also begins to define the historic center as a living 
museum, a settlement conditioned by its physical structure that comes from the past, 
representing the evolution of a civilization.This inter-institutional collaboration also 
led to what is known as the Coloquio of Quito, and could be considered a land mark 
event for historic centers in Latin America. The Coloquio set out to define the historic 
center in Latin America, outline the problems confronting historic centers, and 
provide an integrated solution to their preservation (UNDP and UNESCO, 1977).  
In 1974 the Ecuadorian national government ratified UNESCO´s Convention 
on the Protection of Natural and Cultural World Heritage (1972). A few years later in 
1978 in Washington DC, the world heritage committee considered 27 proposals for 
recognition in the first list of world heritage sites. Of these 27, the committee named 
12 sites, among them the historic center of Quito as a site of cultural world heritage. 
In July 1979, the Director General of UNESCO confirmed this declaration in the city 
of Quito. His remarks emphasized collective action for conservation and development 
that not only values history and its cultural products, but also the future as part of a 
new vision of Ecuador and its role in the region. After Quito’s declaration39 as a world 
heritage site, the Republic of Ecuador passed the Law of Cultural Patrimony on July 
2, 1979. The law charges the National Institute of Cultural Heritage (INPC) with the 
inventory, conservation, preservation, exhibition, and promotion of the cultural 
heritage in Ecuador. 
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 The Galapagos Islands were also included on the list as a site of Natural World Heritage. 
  
 
127 
These two events initiated a new discussion of what is the historic center at the 
municipal level and marked the end of the monumentalist period. The second period, 
from the 1970’s -1980’s is a period of reflection, and began to incorporate ideas of the 
historical process and urban development. This lead to the last period of heritage 
development recognized as the “historic city” (Mutal, 2001). UNDP and UNESCO 
defined a historic center as “active human settlements strongly conditioned by a 
physical structure originating in the past and recognizable as a representative of the 
evolution of its people (UNDP and UNESCO, 1977).” This definition recognizes that 
urban cultural patrimony is dynamic and part of a living, breathing city; not a museum 
held in time.  
Plan Quito - Esquema Director 1980 (1981): (Plan Quito - Master Scheme 1980)  
Urban growth had continued unabated throughout the 1970s, and a new 
planning approach was undertaken in this document which for the first time looked at 
the entire Quito “micro-region.” The plan made general recommendations regarding a 
territorial organization by districts, but did not contain any specific regulations (IMQ, 
1981). Although the 1981 general plan was officially in effect, Quito continued to 
grow under the obsolete legal-regulatory framework included in the land use 
ordinances that emerged out of the 1967 Plan Director. 
Plan Quito includes an important study for the demarcation of historic areas, 
not just the historic center. It calls for the identification and recognition of 
preservation areas which should be graded and categorized in each zone. The historic 
center is one of the identified zones.40 The plans call for incentives for the public to 
become engaged in preservation activities. It also calls for a decentralization of 
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 Other identified zones are Guapulo, Cotocollao, and Chillogallo.  
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activities, to aid in decreasing what was considered an overuse of the preservation 
areas.  
Given the concern with overuse and deconcentration of activities, the issue of 
informal commerce is discussed in detail. It mandates that the municipality find a way 
to integrate this sector of the population and to control the permanent deterioration 
caused by their activities (IMQ, 1981, p. 666). The plan recommends confronting the 
problem through formation of an organization where alternatives could be discussed 
and agreed upon (Ibid). It also declares that markets and vendors should be strictly 
controlled through legislation, with regard to where and when they are permitted to 
work. The plan suggests that a reorganization of commerce could help revitalize the 
historic center in conjunction with a pedestrian plan (Ibid, p. 577-580).   
Although no ordinances emerged regarding informal commerce, a new 
ordinance was issued regarding historic areas. Ordinance 1727 (from Plan Director) 
was revised in ordinance 2342 of 1984. The revision extends the idea of heritage 
beyond the historic center to a metropolitan concept, expanding the definition of the 
protected areas and valuation of architectural categories to the entire canton of Quito 
(Ibid). The categorization that arose out of this plan still serves as a reference today. 
Quito: Cultural Heritage of the Nation 
In 1984 the director of the INPC declared the historic center of Quito and its 
urban landscape a heritage site of the nation. Quito was bestowed this recognition due 
to the series of municipal ordinances that clearly demarcated the area, the creation of 
the committee of the historic center, and of course the recognition by UNESCO as a 
site of World Heritage. The Committee of the historic center was charged with 
ensuring the fulfillment of the duties associated with this declaration, according to 
article 42 of the Law of Cultural Heritage. However, no additional funds were 
  
 
129 
transferred to the local government to ensure the preservation and conservation of the 
site. 
On March 5, 1987 Quito suffered a devastating earthquake which damaged a 
number of buildings and monuments in the historic center. In order to create a fund to 
finance the rehabilitation the National Congress passed the Law of the Creation of the 
Fund for Salvation of Cultural Patrimony (FONSAL) in 1987 (Law No. 82). The law 
created an economic fund for the restoration, conservation, and protection of physical 
and cultural heritage in Quito. The economic fund consists of 3% of ticket sales for 
public events in the historic center, 10% of the National Fund for Emergencies and 
Donations, and lastly 6% of the municipality’s tax income. Although this law was 
passed at the national level, the municipality was charged with its management. Even 
though the law was passed in 1987, it was not until 1989 that a technical team was 
hired to execute its mandate. Since then FONSAL has been responsible for the 
rehabilitation of over 500 buildings and monuments in the historic center. The 
creation of FONSAL and its income as a percent of taxes, as well economic autonomy 
from the municipality granted in 2001 ensures the long term sustainability of projects 
in the historic center. FONSAL has played an integral role in the rehabilitation of the 
historic center. Unlike the INPC, FONSAL’s tax income guaranteed through federal 
law has ensured a significant operations and project budget. With regard to the issue 
of informal commerce, FONSAL intervenes as an institutional actor and as a 
contributor of financial resources. However its mandate does not charge them with 
managing the issue of informal commerce, although currently it is responsible for the 
oversight and financing of the Unit of Popular Commerce. 
Master Plan for the Integral Rehabilitation of the Historic Areas of Quito (1992) 
The late 1980´s give way to another perspective of the historic center, that of a 
political and governance problem. This idea is first introduced in 1992 in the Master 
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Plan for the Integral Rehabilitation of the Historic Areas of Quito. This plan was 
produced through collaboration between the Department of Planning and the Spanish 
Cooperation. Over 40 professionals worked on the plan over two years from 1989-
1991. It marks a process of planning focused on the agreement between public and 
private interests and pays attention to both the social development and territorial 
organization of the city. The plan focused on four main areas: social aspects, history, 
architecture, and urbanism (IMQ, 1991).  
The most important outcome of this plan was an inventory of physical 
patrimony, which carefully cataloged over 5,000 buildings and monuments of 
historical interest. This plan also marked a departure in municipal thinking about the 
historic center. Previous plans focused on the issue of patrimony and the preservation 
of monuments, paying little attention to the issue of informal commerce. Informal 
commerce was always considered a problem in the historic center in the prior plans, 
however, those plans tended to treat the issue as something that would eventually 
disappear or simply go away, which did not affect the physical projects. This plan 
begins to consider informal commerce as an integral part of the historic center and an 
obstacle to rehabilitation. In this sense the municipality is obligated to take into 
account the reality of the informal vendors, at the same time considering the 
development of the city center.  As a result, the municipality begins to intervene in the 
economic activities of the historic center, in particular with regard to the control of 
public space and the sale of perishable products. These interventions have in mind the 
preservation of the physical patrimony, the care of public space, and the improvement 
of sanitary conditions in the historic center.  
The plan led to an emergence of municipal ordinances regarding the historic 
center and the use of space. One of the most important ordinances was 2796 of 1990; 
though the plan was not finalized until 1992, this ordinance is an outcome of the 
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development of the 1992 plan. This ordinance regulates informal commerce in public 
space. It divides the vendors into three categories: permanent vendors who occupy 
public space all year, cyclical vendors who occupy public space during certain 
festivals, such as Christmas, and roaming traders who circulate in the public space 
without a permanent place of sale. Permissions were to be regulated by the 
Department of Markets to individual traders, however in reality permissions were 
issued to vendors associations and this practice was frequently cited as corrupt and 
unfair by a number of municipal officials and vendors. The regulation of the vendors 
fell upon a number of authorities at this time, including the Department of Markets, 
Department of Planning, the Metropolitan Police and later the AZC. However, the 
lack of coordination among these authorities resulted in numerous ordinances and 
little regulation. In addition, the issuing of permits through traders associations 
consolidated the power of certain associations.  
The ordinance 3050 of 1993 is perhaps one the most important and is still in 
use today. It clearly references the importance of the physical and cultural heritage in 
the historic center and its contribution to Quito’s designation as a world heritage site. 
It encourages a rational and adequate use of space, attempting to regulate the amount 
of space vendors occupy in the historic district, by limiting the occupied area to 25% 
of the public space. The following year ordinance 3125 of 1994 was issued, which 
attempted to regulate exterior publicity on buildings, as the municipality considered 
the present state a visual contamination of the landscape.  
The Master Plan is the largest and most comprehensive plan with regard to 
historic areas of Quito, including the historic center which takes a primary role in the 
plan. The inventory is perhaps the most important piece of this work, cataloging for 
the first time all buildings and monuments and analyzing their state and conservation 
needs. A number of projects supported by FONSAL and other municipal institutions 
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emerged out of this plan. However, the plan was large and ambitious, preventing the 
implementation of most of the recommendations due to the limited resources of the 
municipality. Regardless, this plan still serves as the primary reference point for 
historic areas in Quito.  
Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito (2003) 
The Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito was developed with the 
collaboration of the Junta de Andulucia and the Municipality. This plan focuses solely 
on the historic center and presents a strategic update highlighting the social aspects of 
the historic center. In particular, the plan focuses on the relationship between 
stakeholders, physical territory and legal framework. It is not concerned with 
rehabilitation and physical structures, as the previous plans are (IMQ, 2003). 
Although by the time this plan was published in 2003 the issue of informal commerce 
was primarily been resolved, this plan raises the issue on a number of occasions.  
According to the Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito the magnitude 
of the informal commerce activities in the historic center forced the municipality to 
respond to the multiple and competing interests in the historic center. These include: 
(1) the historic center as a site of cultural patrimony and world heritage site, (2) the 
function of the historic center in the global urban structure (3) the development of 
income initiatives to ensure the sustainable future of the historic center (4) the 
existence of social organization in defense of informal commercial activities, and (5) a 
public opinion which is generally adverse to the proliferation of informal activities. It 
defines a number of problematic aspects of the historic center, including visual 
contamination of heritage by signs and street commerce, commerce that generates 
access problems of vehicles and transportation and congests public streets and 
sidewalks. It also notes the lack of enforcement of the norms and laws controlling the 
use of space (IMQ, 2003, p. 56).  
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The Plan outlines five principal strategies which can assist in resolving these 
issues: (1) development of interventions which will generate positive synergies from 
the inside of the historic center outwards, (2) the strengthening of priority zones and 
the creation of recuperated spaces, (3) development of the residential capacity of the 
historic center (4) improving accessibility and mobility of both vehicles and 
pedestrians, and (5) revaluation of public space, taking advantage of its potential and 
symbolic richness (IMQ, 2003, p. 63). What makes this plan unique is it provides 
information on social aspects and the residential and working population of the 
historic center. However, like other plans the implementation of the project and 
strategies is slow and incomplete.   
Plan Equinoccio 21 (2004) y Quito hacia el Bicentenario 2005-2009  
At the turn of the 21st century, the municipal authorities begin to take a 
different view of the city of Quito. Municipal politics are oriented towards placing 
Quito in a global dimension. The Plan Equinoccio was introduced in 2004 under 
Mayor Paco Moncayo and outlines a strategic plan for the next 20 years, until 2025. 
The Plan Bicentenario is part of the Plan Equinoccio, but outlines a shorter program of 
specific projects and orients the goals over the next four years. These plans try to 
locate Quito in a global context, a significant change from the previous plans. The 
strategic plan focuses on four main areas: political, social, economic, and territorial 
conditions of the city. It discusses at length the importance of the deconcentration of 
activities and creation of various central areas within the city, including administrative 
services and retail. The historic center is only mentioned briefly in this plan with 
reference to revitalization as an essential element for the local identity (IMQ, 2004 p 
.44). A brief section is dedicated to the potential of the historic center as the engine of 
economic growth and symbolic node of the city. The plan notes the need for 
residential recuperation, its functional integration into the city as a whole, and the 
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value of its public spaces and heritage assets (Ibid, p.44). Although the informal 
vendors had transferred to the new markets at this point, the maintenance of the new 
markets and future projects are not mentioned in this plan. Informality is discussed 
briefly in terms of underemployment (Ibid, p. 21), as well as the need to integrate the 
informal economy into the city (Ibid, p.46). The Plan Bicentenario discusses some 
specific projects for the historic center, primarily as a part of “Plan Q”, master plan for 
tourism and the Plan for Management and Development. Although the larger strategic 
plan discusses the issues facing Quito on a metropolitan scale, the projects developed 
in the Plan Bicentenario give significant attention to the historic center. 
Plan Q outlines a project, “Network of Tourist Services Q” to be managed by 
the Metropolitan Tourism Corporation that would improve the tourism services of 
museums, hotels, restaurants and bars through the creation of a calcification system. 
The plan for management and development includes a number of projects focusing on 
improving transportation and parking in the historic center, urban regeneration and 
image improvement of emblematic neighborhoods, as well as the construction of 
1,000 residential units. The projects will be carried out by INNOVAR and FONSAL.  
The strategic plan and the project plan place Quito in the global scale. The 
historic center is portrayed as a critical object in terms of the cultural property that 
constitutes one the principal resources for the development of both the city and the 
nation.  
Informality, the Municipality, and the New Constitution 
Municipal plans and ordinance illustrate periods of tolerance and intolerance 
towards informality. Throughout out the 1970s and 1980s, the municipal government 
of Quito had a relatively tolerant attitude toward informal markets and street traders. 
Traders were occasionally fined, however a lack of clarity on the rules and regulations 
regarding zoning made this difficult and infrequent (Farrell, 1983). In the 1970s and 
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1980s, the plazas of the historic center were sites of active and thriving economic 
activity. The image of the plaza as a symbolic urban space for leisure and pastime 
activities had disappeared. In the 1990’s, municipal authorities started to become 
increasingly concerned with re-imaging the historic center as a whole. This prompted 
municipal action, which resulted in the ban of trading in the plazas and squares of the 
historic center, which have been free of informal commerce by the early 1990s, 
maintained only though police presence (Bromley, 1998). The broader policy 
concerns combined with new perceptions of public space, conservation planning, 
which came about in the 1990s, and the continuing expansion of informal markets 
caused the municipality to take a less tolerant view of informal commerce. This new 
attitude is most clearly demonstrated through municipal plans starting in the mid-
1990s. Most plans demonstrated a high level of intolerance toward informal traders, 
however little action was taken to restrict or regulate their activities.  
The current attitude of intolerance towards street vending could become 
problematic for the municipality in the future. In 2008, Ecuador ratified a new 
constitution which contains a right to work clause.  Article 33 states that: 
Work is a right, a social duty, and an economic right, a source of personal 
development and an economic base. The State shall guarantee workers full 
respect for their dignity and decent living wages (Ecuadorian Constitution, 
2008).  
Article 325 goes on to clarify that: 
The State guarantees the right to work. It recognizes all types of work, 
dependent or independent, subsistence work and human care … (Ecuadorian 
Constitution, 2008) 
Alberto Acosta, President of the National Constitution Assembly, interprets 
this to mean that those seeking to make a living in the informal sector, like street 
vendors, can no longer be harassed, fined, or have their goods confiscated by local 
authorities (Lucas, 2007). Municipal ordinances cited above which have been 
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designed to regulate informal activities are technically invalid. However, as later 
discussed in Chapter 6, the municipality still makes an effort, regardless of the new 
constitution, to regulate street vending in the historic center. 
The control of street vending, at least in the historic center, is a critical element 
to the redevelopment and re-imaging of the historic center. The creation of a new 
urban image was a priority for the municipality; it was also considered a crucial 
component to creating new economies in the historic center. In order to create this 
new image, external financing was required. 
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE REHABILITATION OF THE 
CHQ  
In Quito, the financing of the historic center has been converted into one of the 
key elements of municipal action. As demonstrated by the municipal plans, the 
historic center began to take a key role beginning in the 1940´s. However, its 
importance as a local, national, and global piece of heritage began to become 
dominant in the late 1970´s and early 1980´s. By the early 1990’s, Quito had 
developed a master plan for the historic center, FONSAL was created and charged 
with the mandate to invest its resources in the conservation of the principal colonial 
buildings. It soon became clear to the municipality that the local resources provided 
through FONSAL and limited interaction with international organizations would not 
be sufficient to fulfill the local and international visions of the historic center.  
In the early 1990´s the municipality approached the IDB about financing a 
large scale rehabilitation of the historic center. The IDB felt that what was lacking in 
order to fully restore the historic center of Quito was the involvement of the private 
sector and civil society (Rojas, 1999, p. 2). In January of 1994 the municipality 
delivered a solicitation for credit to the IDB to rehabilitate the historic center in the 
amount of 24.6 million loan and a 6.2 million contribution from the municipality 
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(IMQ, 1994). The solicitation focused primarily on the tourism-conservation link. 
However, as the IDB and the municipality began to prepare the project, it became 
clear that tourism development would only be able to justify a minimum part of the 
investment required to conserve the historic center. The IDB considered that the 
conservation of the historic center was, in fact, a vast urban rehabilitation. The project 
would require careful planning and full involvement of the private sector for its 
successful implementation. 
The loan was approved later that year in September for an amount of 41 
million and a municipal contribution of 10.3 million, in land, buildings, and cash, for a 
total investment of 51.3 million for the historic center. The project titled “The Quito 
Historic Center Rehabilitation,” was completed in September of 2003. The borrower 
is the Municipality of Quito, and the guarantor is the Republic of Ecuador.  
The loan proposal begins with a history and evaluation of the actual state of 
the historic center. The historic center is described as suffering decades of 
deterioration and an accelerated process of informalization in the area. These 
processes have impacted the functional value of the historic center, as well as 
prevented the conservation of architectural infrastructure and monuments. The history 
of informal commerce continues along the same line of thought of the municipal 
plans. It describes its growth in recent decades and attributes the loss of the historic 
center’s place in the city and its value to the trading activities (IDB, 1994).  
The long-range objective of this project was to preserve and rehabilitate the 
Historic Center of Quito as a cultural treasure, restore its functional importance, 
revitalize traditional services and commerce by affording easier access to the goods 
and services, and foster the appropriate use and maintenance of its public and private 
buildings to make them more attractive to visitors. This program comprises 
rehabilitation of historic buildings, upgrading of sidewalks, installation of signs and 
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other street facilities, construction of five parking garages, establishment of a 
rehabilitation fund, creation of a semi-public firm to promote private investment in the 
historic center, as well as the administrative, technical and managerial strengthening 
of the executing agency, the Municipality of Quito. The program also promoted 
tourism, urban renewal and historic preservation to help halt spreading urban 
problems, such as traffic congestion, pollution, crime, and overcrowding. The 
institutional strengthening of the executing agency, the municipality, will assist it to 
develop its managerial capacity and provide funds for studies. Before any of the above 
objectives could be accomplished, the issue of informal trading had to be dealt with.  
A central element of this project is the establishment of a mixed capital 
corporation, using proceeds of the loan. The creation of the Historic Center 
Development Corporation (ECH), a semi-public corporation, to execute the programs 
and, using the rehabilitation fund to promote private-sector investment in the historic 
center of Quito. The ECH was created in 1994 with the objective of promoting the 
integral rehabilitation of 154 blocks corresponding to the nucleus of the historic 
center. The IDB loan financed investments in public spaces for which the municipality 
is responsible and provided risk capital for the company. The ECH executed 
investments in public spaces (under contract with the municipality), and is engaged in 
a variety of rehabilitation projects for its own buildings. It has also forged partnerships 
with private owners and investors. The real estate owned by the ECH as a result of its 
activities is to be sold in the market and the proceeds of the sales used to finance new 
ventures. 15 million of the loan was allocated for joint ventures with the private 
sector. 
The IDB’s experience indicates that a key feature of successful 
implementation mechanisms is the ability to efficiently distribute benefits and risks 
among public and private actors. According to the IDB, the institutional mechanism 
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objective of the mixed capital corporation (public and private) was to carry out 
investments to preserve historic centers. In this type of organization, equity comes 
from private investors and public sector entities, and representatives of both sectors 
share control of the corporation in proportion to their contributions. In most of the 
international examples of this type of organization, the public sector has a majority 
share, reflecting the fact that the community is the main party interested in preserving 
heritage. The private sector is usually represented by civil society organizations, 
which benefit by participating in these corporations because it expands their sphere of 
action and influence, and by private real estate investors, who want preferential access 
to information and business opportunities in the historic centers, which from a real 
estate perspective are often new and untapped markets. The presence of the public 
sector in mixed-capital corporations offers guarantees to private investors because it 
signals the community’s commitment to heritage conservation and it can facilitate the 
relationship with regulatory bodies, thereby lowering the transaction cost of 
investments. In addition, the public sector can share with the private sector the 
inherent risks of investments that are often breaking new ground in local real estate 
markets. In short, the presence of public capital mitigates the real or perceived risks 
for private investors who venture into deteriorated historic districts. It also allows the 
community to capture part of the benefits generated by the improvements once the 
process takes off and becomes lucrative. In addition to providing money for real estate 
investments, private investors in mixed capital corporations bring knowledge of the 
real estate market and efficient mechanisms for selling the restored buildings. 
According to the IDB, this marriage of convenience is the best guarantee for the 
success of heritage conservation efforts involving public and private actors. Barcelona 
is a good example of this type of organization, where mixed-capital corporations 
organized to rehabilitate the historic center of Barcelona.  
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Based on Barcelona's successful rehabilitation of a large section of its historic 
center spearheaded by a mixed capital company, the municipality of Quito as part of 
the IDB loan created a new, semiautonomous, non-profit development corporation, 
the ECH. The ECH was the first such public-private urban development entity in 
Latin America for heritage management. It was given funds and properties previously 
purchased by the municipality of Quito and, in 1994, the Inter-American Development 
Bank approved a US$41 million loan to help finance its first six years of operations. 
Creating the company was a critical step as it made it possible for a public authority to 
work closely with the private sector. The company operates in many ways like a 
private company, using streamlined contracting and procurement procedures to create 
new business enterprises within the historic centre. ECH’s mission is to entice private 
investors by taking the up- front risk in the rehabilitation of public spaces and 
contributing to the rehabilitation of buildings for private use through joint ventures 
with owners and private investors. After completion, the company sells its share in the 
buildings to free up capital for new projects and further rehabilitation. Not all of the 
ECH's projects, however, have a commercial dimension.  
In Quito, the ECH was charged with carrying out the objectives of the IDB 
loan, among them environmental improvement, social sustainability, and the 
economic reactivation of the historic center. In order to achieve these goals, the ECH 
commissioned studies related to the above topics, including a Plan for the 
Reorganization of Informal Commerce. One of the strategic objectives of the IDB 
loan, as well as the municipality was the recuperation of public space for the use by all 
citizens, making a reorganization of street vending a top priority. A multidisciplinary 
team was formed from various municipal institutions including FONSAL, ECH, the 
Department of Planning, and the AZC to design and implement a plan for the 
relocation and negotiation with the vendors, as well as the construction and in some 
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cases rehabilitation of the buildings destined to house the vendors. The modernization 
of informal commerce is still on going, but the progress made with the informal 
vendors is considered by the ECH to be the most successful component of the 
recuperation of the historic center so far (ECH, 2004, p.4). 
CONCLUSION: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The plans and ordinances illustrate the vision of local government and 
planning over time. Since the 1940´s, the historic center was viewed as a potential 
tourist destination with a monumentalist approach. It was not until the 1980’s that the 
failure to achieve an internationally recognized tourist destination was attributed to an 
issue of governance, rather than failure to conserve the physical architecture. The 
1990’s and original solicitation to the IDB still illustrated a focus on tourism, but also 
recognized the importance of dealing with the social and governance problems facing 
the historic center and the municipality. However, the final loan agreement with the 
IDB portrays a shift from tourism to an integrated vision for the historic center that 
includes real estate and business development, along with the development of social 
programs for its users.  
As indicated in the plans and ordinances, planning in Quito was characterized 
by several decades of lengthy plans and ordinances combined with little 
implementation. Failure to implement the visions described in the plans and the 
ordinances that would regulate and control urban growth and activities can be ascribed 
to lack of financing and a weak institutional structure. In 1994, this changed as a 
major donor appeared and institutional strengthening became a priority. The ability to 
foster a new period of implementation was challenged by the population’s perception 
of the municipality as all words, no action. In order to change this, the next decade of 
planning in the historic center was characterized by four factors that came together in 
the early 1990´s: 1) local initiative and international catalyst, 2) local citizen 
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participation, and 3) the development of a semi-private agency and 4) an improved 
image of the historic center. 
Though Quito received international recognition in 1978, interventions in the 
historic center were limited and plans demonstrate a singular vision, that of a tourist 
destination. It was not until the municipality developed a relationship with IDB, and 
later secured financing, which proved the catalyst for various interventions in the 
historic center. The time between 1978 and the early 1990´s are also characterized by 
municipal leadership with a lack of vision for the historic center. Though it took 
decades for the municipality to seek and secure financing, it is unlikely that this 
financing would have been made available without the UNESCO designation. A new 
era of municipal leadership in combination with international recognition paved the 
way the rehabilitation project.  
The development of the ECH, as discussed above, provided the flexibility and 
financial freedom of local government bureaucracy, particularly given the complex 
nature of the project. The inclusion of civil society in the planning process ensured 
that stakeholders in the historic center had reached at a minimum a consensus, and in 
other cases direct benefits from the rehabilitation. Lastly, the importance of improving 
the image of the historic center locally, nationally and internationally can not be 
overlooked. Efforts to improve the image of the historic center have led to significant 
changes in perception not only by tourists, but locals alike. This has contributed to the 
revitalization efforts by increasing local pride and securing citizen support for the 
dramatic changes taking place. However, creating a new image is a lengthy process. 
Residents, tourists, and investors still cling to old ideas and images of the historic 
center, regardless of the tangible and intangible changes in the last decade.  
  
 
143 
CHAPTER 5  
Does Urban Rehabilitation Always Mean Exclusion? The 
Reorganization of Informal Vendors in the Historic District of Quito  
After the IDB and the Municipality of Quito signed the final loan agreement in 
1994, the large scale project for the rehabilitation of the historic center began. Before 
major physical renovations could take place, the municipality needed to create a 
solution with regard to the approximately 10,000 informal vendors who worked in 
historic district, the majority utilizing sidewalk and street space to sell their products.  
The IDB loan project description stated that the situation of the street vendors 
facilitated environmental deterioration and discouraged investment, a principal 
requirement for a sustainable conservation process. The loan also provided funds, US$ 
100,000 to develop an action plan and investment program for the reorganization of 
public markets, since the “occupancy of street traders” was considered a risk which 
could jeopardize the execution of the project (IDB, 1994, p. 17). In fact, one of the 
conditions for disbursements after the first 12 months of the project was “the 
implementation by the Municipality of Quito of the revised version of the municipal 
ordinances that regulate street vending and the use of public space (IDB, 1994, p. 
20).” 
Under pressure from the IDB, UNESCO, as well as a public movement to 
recuperate the historic center, the municipality began to seriously consider a plan to 
remove or relocate the street traders of the historic center. This chapter examines the 
negotiation process that led up to the relocation of street traders into municipal 
markets in 2003. The negotiation process opened new political spaces for dialogue 
and the transfer from the street to the market created new forms of informality. The 
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Quito case is interesting because it provides another example (as with Mexico City) of 
the ways in which informality can become semi-formalized in a municipal led project.  
The negotiation centered on the use of public space in the historic district, 
which for the last 40-50 years had been occupied by informal vendors. As discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, the municipality and vendors both have incentives and disincentives 
to formalize. The negotiation that took place from 1996-2003, demonstrates a peaceful 
resolution to what is often a violent and forceful eviction of vendors.41 It also 
illustrates the creation of a political space for street vendors, where they exercised 
new found citizenship rights, as they participated in local politics. At the same time, it 
reveals a complex hierarchy of actors in the informal sector, ranging from the 
ambulant street trader without primary education to traders who have won public 
elections for the town council and congressional representatives. This chapter argues 
that the convergence of international and local interest in the historic center created 
the political and economic space for dialogue and resulted in a semi-formalization of 
the fixed post vendors. It also exacerbated existing conflicts between vendors 
associations; encouraging some associations to become more politically engaged, 
while others became more distrustful of the municipality. However, a new found 
political importance of the vendors allowed them to open up spaces of negotiation 
(Hanley, Ruble, and Garland, 2008); permitting coalition building and claims making, 
not only on public spaces, but also on the city (Mollenkopf, 1983; Lefebvre, 1981; 
Sassen, 1996).  
The information for this chapter was obtained through author interviews with 
association leaders, vendors, and present and past municipal employees. I identified 
informants through secondary sources and a reputation method to ask interviewees to 
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 Lima is an example of a forceful removal of street vending in the historic area (see Dias 2001). 
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supply the name of other potential informants relevant to the research. The semi-
structured interviews illustrate the variety of attitudes of the relocation project and the 
experience of the vendors and municipal officials. Addition information was acquired 
through documents at the AZC archive, Quito and INNOVAR/ECH archive, 
Carapungo. Plans for the relocation of vendors, meeting minutes, municipal bulletins, 
and other documents were collected and reviewed. In addition, videos of the meetings 
were obtained from the AZC. These methods allowed for a reconstruction of events, 
as well as provided insight into the dynamic nature of the negotiation process.  
INFORMALITY AND PLANNING: INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES TO FORMALIZATION 
As indicated in the plans and ordinances discussed in Chapter 4, the 
municipality of Quito has attempted to manage and control street commerce in Quito, 
particularly in the historic center for decades. The municipality’s efforts have included 
formalization of vendors by requiring permits and other forms of authorization. 
Incentives for officials to formalize street vendors through these measures can be 
strong. Requiring vendors to pay a tax in return for their use of public space, for 
example, can generate a substantial amount of revenue for the municipality, 
particularly in districts where thousands of vendors occupy the streets. Imposing a tax 
can also provide officials with a mechanism to control the number of vendors on the 
streets and provide a justification to expel those who evade the tax. Permits and 
authorization requirements help officials enforce other policies that attempt to 
formalize vendors; for example, officials can deny permits or threaten the confiscation 
of authorizations from vendors who fail to comply with regulations. Limiting 
authorization to a finite number of vendors in a given area can control the entry of 
newcomers to already crowded streets. Permits can also provide elected officials with 
an inexpensive way to buy the votes of vendors who live in the same district in which 
they work. There are often strong incentives to offer vendors inducements to comply 
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with formalization measures rather than relying on force for their implementation. 
Benefits for vendors who pay taxes and hold permits can make compliance with 
formalization measures more likely and can encourage vendors to develop 
enforcement procedures themselves to make sure that they avoid losing their 
privileges. Self-regulation among vendors in turn helps alleviate the administrative 
costs of regulation for the municipality, and it can prevent costly confrontations 
between the two sides. 
However, officials also face disincentives for implementing formalization 
measures. By charging a tax for the use of public space, officials also cede vendors 
who pay it the right to occupy the streets, though officials, at least in theory, still 
control its use. Granting vendors this right can encourage them to resist additional 
policy measures that interfere with occupancy rights. It can also make it more difficult 
for officials to justify expelling vendors with the use of force, particularly when there 
is some degree of public sympathy for vendors. Thus, a tax can both inhibit and 
support the municipality’s ability to enforce formalization measures. Even though the 
tax can be abolished, it may constrain the choices of formalization measures available 
in the future. Incentives against requiring permits and other forms of authorization can 
be compelling. Implementing a permit program effectively would generate substantial 
administrative costs, particularly if the government is committed to minimizing fraud 
and ensuring individual compliance with formalization measures. It can also 
legitimate claims to public space and constrain the ability of policy makers to remove 
those who hold authorization. 
Offering vendors inducements and concessions in exchange for their 
compliance with formalization measures also clearly imposes limits on a 
municipality’s ability to develop and implement the full range of policy options. For 
example, if officials grant vending organizations the right to participate in policy 
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decisions as a way of encouraging compliance, certain options for controlling public 
space, such as prohibiting vendors altogether from working on the streets may no 
longer be viable due to their legally recognized presence. Incorporating vendors into 
the policy process further legitimates their presence in the streets which in turn can 
exacerbate public policy problems if taxation and licensing mechanisms are 
ineffective. 
Municipal officials responsible for managing street vendors often face 
problems of congestion, noise, crime, and threats to public health that are severe 
enough warrant intervention in the street vending sector. However, implementing full-
scale formalization measures may not always be the best option. Rather, governments 
face conflicting incentives to selectively implement certain elements of formalization 
under certain conditions. Street commerce remained disorderly in Quito because the 
municipality chose not to regulate it. This was not due to lack of ordinances and 
regulations, but rather failure to enforce ordinances and an authorization program that 
was poorly executed by the department of markets. 
The fact that local government issues an endless number of regulations and 
ordinances to control street commerce, does not guarantee that those regulations are 
followed or enforced. Indeed, de Soto’s study of the informal economy in Peru argues 
that excessive bureaucratic regulations create strong incentives for citizens to avoid 
compliance with the state’s legal framework (1989). In the case of street vendors, the 
excessive costs of registering one’s business, paying taxes, and complying with a 
multitude of regulations may discourage vendors from formalizing their businesses, 
indicating a need to simplify regulation. According to this perspective, street vendors 
choose to evade regulations. Street commerce therefore may remain chaotic because 
vendors oppose formalization measures and intentionally avoid regulations meant to 
govern them. However, fixed stall vendors may have an incentive to comply with 
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certain regulations, particularly those that grant them permission to vend from fixed 
posts in the street in exchange for compliance. If taxes are to be paid in exchange for 
the right to occupy public space, vendors who pay the tax would not face the threat of 
police expulsions, at least in theory.  
The incentive to obtain a secure workspace can far exceed the disincentives to 
evade the tax. Fixed post vendors therefore may have a strong incentive to support 
local policy measures that require permits. Authorization can serve two purposes, both 
of which protect vendors who already have fixed posts in the streets from potential 
threats. First, permits can protect vendors from arbitrary treatment on the part of the 
municipality, as long as vendors hold proper authorization. The police cannot 
arbitrarily expel them from the streets. Second, permits can also limit the number of 
competing vendors who are authorized to vend in a particular area and provide some 
order. The prospect of limiting competition can be attractive enough to encourage 
vendors to support formalization measures. In Quito, vendors self regulated in an 
effort to limit the number of vendors on the streets. Complying with regulations can 
also earn vendors certain types of benefits and concessions that they may not 
otherwise obtain, such as policy participation at the local level, in the hopes of 
incorporation into the decision-making process, which could encourage effective 
agreements. Oftentimes, street vendors are excluded from such engagement because 
they lack power and/or organization. 
Vendors face incentives to evade formalization measures as well. The 
requirement to pay daily taxes on their use of public space clearly imposes a monetary 
cost, and for vendors who may only earn a small profit each day, such taxes can be 
burdensome. In addition, paying taxes in theory should protect vendors from arbitrary 
expulsion by granting them the rights to use public space. However, governments may 
benefit from an asymmetrical power relationship that would allow them to expel 
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vendors unilaterally. Perhaps more significantly, it also can imply substantial 
bureaucratic costs of the sort that de Soto argues can drive street vendors away from 
the legal system (1989). Simplified regulation for small retailers could resolve these 
differences. 
While inducements and concessions, like policy participation, can offer street 
vendors an unusual opportunity to influence the decision-making process, they can 
also limit the autonomy of vending organizations. If participation is limited to 
representatives of vending federations and associations, leaders must select a handful 
of representatives from vending federations and/or associations to participate. 
Granting these representatives the authority to speak on behalf of all vendors in a 
given area requires rival leaders to sacrifice their own ability to strike separate, 
bilateral accords with local officials. Ceding negotiating authority to federations can 
be an unattractive option for leaders who have fundamental disagreements or rivalries 
with those who are selected to be representatives. Street vendors thus face conflicting 
incentives to comply with individual formalization measures. Conflicts between 
vendors and governments do not reflect a uniform desire on the part of vendors to 
remain informal; rather, they reflect the difficulty for both sides to reach stable 
agreements that account for a variety of conflicting incentives. 
The vendors in the historic center of Quito are a heterogeneous group of 
actors, some with more political and social capital than others. The long negotiation 
that resulted in a semi-formalization of fixed post vendors illustrated the pros and cons 
of formalization measures from both sides. As is the case with all negotiations, there 
are some winners and some losers. Quito is no different; however what is unique is 
the long process of consensus building regardless of pressures from international 
institutions to push the project ahead. A number of key actors and municipal 
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departments were involved in the process, which took place primarily from 1996-
2003. 
THE MUNICIPALITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMAL VENDORS 
The development of a relocation plan, the complex process of negotiation, and 
the management of the relocation required an inter-departmental effort, coordinated 
among a variety of divisions and offices of the municipality of Quito. The primary 
municipal departments engaged in the process were: AZC, ECH/INNOVAR, 
Department of Markets, the Department of Territorial Planning, the Metropolitan 
Police, FONSAL, the Executive Unit of Popular Commerce (UECP), and the Mayor’s 
office.  
Department of Markets 
The Department of Markets did not directly participate in the negotiation or 
relocation process of the vendors. However, this institution provided key information. 
They held the registries of individual vendors and traders associations. Prior to the 
creation of the AZC, the Department of Markets was responsible for issuing permits 
for street vending in the historic center. This department is now known as the 
Department of Commercialization and is responsible for the management of three 
municipal markets not located in the historic center, including the wholesale market. 
The wholesale market (Mercado Mayorista) located in the south of Quito is occupied 
by former historic center traders, who worked previously on the streets during the 
market days of Tuesday and Saturday. In 1994, in conjunction with the creation of the 
AZC, the management of street vendors was decentralized to the zonal 
administrations.  
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Administration of the Central Zone - AZC 
The Administrator of the AZC has delegated authority from the mayor to 
manage the central zone of Quito, which geographically includes the historic center 
and surrounding neighborhoods. The AZC was the principal department designated to 
manage the issue of street vending and to negotiate with the vendors beginning in 
1996 until 2001, when the UECP was created and took over this responsibility. The 
AZC still remains in charge of controlling the use of public space in the historic 
center. Since 1996, four administrators were in charge: Rosario Proaño, Monica 
Moreira, Lourdes Rodriguez, and Ines Paz Miño (Table 15). After 2003, the 
responsibility of negotiating with vendors was returned to the AZC from the UECP.  
ECH/INNOVAR 
As the primary executing agency for the IDB loan, the ECH/INNOVAR, 
managed the funds for the project. Although representatives from the 
ECH/INNOVAR generally did not directly participate in the negotiation process, they 
were part of the inter-departmental meetings regarding the vendors. The 
ECH/INNOVAR also provided the funds (from the IDB loan) for the study of 
informal vendors in the historic center, training for municipal employees and street 
vendors, as well as financed the later construction of the municipal markets.  
Department of Territorial Planning 
The Department of Territorial Planning participated directly in the negotiation 
process at some key moments. However, this department primarily provided 
assistance with planning related aspects, such as the location of activities, circulation 
of traffic, provision of public services, and development of plans.  
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Table 15: Mayors of Quito and Administrators of the AZC 1992-2008 
Year Mayors of Quito Year 
Administrators 
of the Central 
Zone 
Main 
Accomplishments 
1992-
1998 
Dr. Jamil Mahuad 
(Christian 
Democratic Party) 
1996-
1999 
Rosario Proaño Initiated negotiation 
with vendors. Removal 
of some temporary 
vendors from plazas 
1998-
2000 
Roque Sevilla 
(Christian 
Democratic Party) 
1999-
2000 
Monica Moreira Negotiation with select 
vendor associations; 
some signed 
agreements 
2000-
2008 
General Paco 
Moncayo (Party 
of the Democratic 
Left) 
2000-
2003 
Lourdes 
Rodriguez 
Continued negotiation 
and agreements, in 
coordination with 
newly created Unit for 
Popular Commerce 
(2001) 
2003- 
2008 
Ines Paz Miño Relocation of Vendors 
and continued 
negotiation with 
associations who did 
not relocate in original 
project 
 
The Metropolitan Police 
The metropolitan police have a special role in the historic center. They carry 
out three principal activities in the historic center. First, is the enforcement of 
pedestrian Sundays where the police are charged with maintaining a vehicle free 
historic center. Second, since 1996 the unit of tourist police is available to assist 
tourists and provide information about the city. They also accompany the municipal 
tours in the historic center, providing security to the tourists and guides. Lastly, the 
metropolitan police coordinate with the AZC to control the public space in the historic 
center and keep the streets of the historic center free of informal commerce. They 
achieve this primarily by fining illegal vendors and confiscating their goods. 
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Perishable items are donated to charities operating in the historic center and non-
perishable goods can be collected by the vendor after the appropriate fine is paid.   
Salvation Fund (FONSAL) 
Like the ECH/INNOVAR, FONSAL has primarily provided financing for the 
project, rather than participate directly in the negotiation. FONSAL’s primary 
responsibility is the conservation of buildings and the coordination of cultural events. 
The presence of informal commerce made the execution of this mandate difficult. 
Since FONSAL’s budget is autonomous from the municipality, and guaranteed by 
federal law, FONSAL contributed a significant amount of financing. In addition, 
FONSAL finances and manages the Executive Unit of Popular Commerce (UECP), as 
the municipality lacks funds in the municipal budget to finance this department.  
 
Executive Unit of Popular Commerce (UECP) 
This unit was created in 2001. Its main responsibilities included taking over 
the process of negotiation with the vendors from the AZC from 2001 until 2003. 
Today, the UECP is responsible for managing the new commercial centers. The 
UECP is managed and financed by FONSAL, mainly due to the availability of funds. 
The first director, General Carlos Cobos (2001-2003) played a key role in the 
negotiation. The second director, Colonel Luis Montalvo (2003-2008) was responsible 
for executing the final relocation in accordance with the agreements reached with the 
vendor associations, managing the new markets and ensuring that the vendors remain 
inside the markets and do not return to the streets.42 
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 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the new markets 
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Mayor’s Office 
Mayor Sevilla and Mayor Moncayo were directly engaged in the process of 
negotiation with the vendors, sometimes attending meeting themselves. During Mayor 
Moncayos’s administration, Diego Carrion, Secretary of Territorial Development, 
represented the mayor at weekly meetings of the team in charge of negotiating with 
the vendors, providing a direct link to the mayor’s office. This team was composed of 
representatives from the AZC, FONSAL, ECH/INNOVAR, Department of Territorial 
Planning, and UECP. Occasionally, town council members were also involved. The 
institutional coordination and direct involvement of the mayors were key factors in the 
success of dialogue and negotiation.   
THE STREET VENDORS: ASSOCIATIONS TO FEDERATIONS 
Prior to the creation of the AZC and UECP, the Department of Markets 
required that all organizations of vendors that utilize public space register. Once 
registered, the organizations are prohibited from increasing their membership, in an 
effort to control the number of street vendors. However, in practice, not all 
organizations were registered, many inflated their membership numbers, and others 
increased their membership since original registration.  
The number of organizations registered with the Department of Markets has 
fluctuated over the years, as they consolidate, deregister, dissolve, or form new 
organizations. In 1993 there were only 58 organizations registered. However, by 1994 
there were 105 and in 1995 only 81. In 1996, the leaders of the informal vendor 
associations claimed that in reality, there existed 96 organizations, of which only 81 
were officially registered with the Department of Markets. It was estimated, at this 
time, that the vendor organizations represented approximately 65% of the vendors in 
the historic center (IMQ, 1996). In addition, of these 96 associations, less than ten 
were legally registered with the national government. In order for organizations to 
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receive any type of government assistance, municipal or federal, they must be legally 
recognized by the national Department of Economic and Social Inclusion. This 
process requires a lawyer and the payment of various fees, which is why the majority 
of associations were not legally recognized by the state at the time of the negotiation 
(Estrella, 4/24/2008).  
The associations serve to protect the rights of their members to work in public 
areas, settle disputes between members, as well as between members and other 
vendors, as a liaison between the municipality and the Direction of Markets, and also 
to extend credit or to facilitate credit to members. Associations also provide security 
and protect the right of the member to work on the street. In exchange for these 
protections, members pay a monthly fee, which varies by association. Vendor 
Associations are often viewed as corrupt by the municipality in part because the 
membership fees are frequently higher than amount charged by the municipality and 
the Direction of Markets. Credit is often extended through informal means, which is 
exceptionally expensive in comparison to traditional forms of credit.43 The 
associations in the historic center of Quito are geographically formed, mostly 
representing certain street blocks; others may represent an extended family or can 
sometimes be formed on the basis of a product category. These small organizations 
are concerned with obtaining permission for their members to use certain street 
locations, from both the municipality and through the internal regulation of the street 
vendors themselves.  
The vendors have substantial disruptive capacity, given their numbers and 
level of organization. Many have been vending in the streets for decades and were 
unwilling to concede their space and relocate to other areas of the city as proposed by 
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 Although it is difficult to estimate the rates charged by informal creditors, some evidence in 
municipal documents indicated that annual interest rates of 40-60% are typically charged (IMQ, 1996).  
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the municipality during the early stages of the IDB project. In reaction to the 
municipal proposals, the vendors organized protests on numerous occasions with the 
primary goal of defending their space in the streets, no matter what cost.  
Associations or Mafias? 
During the negotiation, the municipality became aware that street space was 
being sold and traded between vendors and associations. This was the foundation for 
municipal authorities to regard many of the associations as fraudulent and their 
leaders as swindlers. The local press and municipality often referred to these 
organizations as mafias. The most famous was Mama Lucha, who was considered the 
owner of Mejia Street in the historic center. She charged two US dollars a day per 
market stall for rights to work in this area (Cobos, 5/52008). Other organizations 
functioned under similar conditions. Municipal representatives stated that some street 
spaces had been traded for as much as US$500, and market stands for over $3,000 
(Estrella, 4/24/2008 and Moreira, 3/10/2008). These transfers and sales of public 
space had no standing in law and were perceived by the municipality as legitimizing 
permission to occupy the space, when in reality it did not. The municipality viewed 
this as a form of corruption and abuse by the association leaders of their members. 
Federations and Fronts 
Although a number of associations could be considered mafia or criminal type 
organizations given their illegal activities, they also provided a means for contact and 
negotiation for its members in the political arena. With the constant threat of the loss 
of the work space, many organizations joined together to defend their rights to work 
on the street. These higher level organizations are called federations or fronts and 
group together already existing associations, rather than individuals. The decision of 
association leaders to join a federation is often based on three factors: the personal 
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relationships of the association leaders, the perception of political conditions, and the 
strategic situation of the federation or front. In the historic center of Quito, the 
association leaders tend to be more educated than the average vendor and are 
frequently politically engaged. More importantly, regardless of charters that require 
yearly elections or rotation of the directors, association leaders do not change 
frequently. Given the long term tenure of association leaders, they tend to develop 
friendships or rivalries with other leaders, which play a key role in an associations’ 
ability to unify against potential threats. In addition, vendor associations often traded 
their political support for the protection of their work spaces. The possibility of the 
relocation into markets brought about a new political dimension, as some traders 
offered their political support in return for promises of spaces in municipal markets, 
while others continued to offer their support in return for promises of remaining on 
the streets.  
In 1994, 14 associations formed the Federation of Small Autonomous Vendors 
of Quito and 11 associations formed the Federation of Small Free Vendors of Quito. 
Later, 78 associations grouped together under a federation known as the "Frente de 
Defensa" or the Front of Defense led by Angelita Vega, president, Marlena Mañay, 
vice-president, and José Gualichico, secretary, and included the two federations 
above. The original discourse of the Front of Defense was the maintenance of the 
street as the work space of the vendors and a complete rejection of the potential 
relocation of the vendors of the historic center. Politically, the Front of Defense was 
aligned to the right. However, the organizations and associations that were members 
of the Front were not homogeneous in their interests. The Front was more concerned 
with strategic issues with regard to defending the work space. Lower level 
organizations were often concerned with interests that had to do with day to day 
business.  
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The Front later splintered, and two new federations were formed. The 
Federation of Small Autonomous Vendors led by Marlena Manyay, and the Collective 
of Wholesale Organizations, led by José Gualichico. Both of these federations were 
politically aligned with the socialist party. The fracture of the vendors into three 
federations occurred due to differences in strategy and vision. Angelita Vega and the 
Front began to support the possibility of relocation into markets in 1999. Ms. Manyay 
and Mr. Gualichico maintained the original position of defending their space on the 
street. This split the relative unity of the majority of the vendors, causing a long and 
difficult negotiation. This also allowed associations and federations to pursue their 
own individualized strategies in the negotiations with the municipality. It also shifted 
the balance of power, as some vendors aligned with the municipality, and others 
fought to stay on the streets. 
Another key organization was the El Salvador association; this was an 
unusually large association, representing approximately 500 members, led by Luis 
Cuenca. This association was politically aligned to the right and never joined a 
federation. Given the size of the association, they played a key role in the 
negotiations, and often collaborated with Angelita Vega and the Front of Defense.  
The pending rehabilitation of the historic center and the consolidation of 
associations provided the opportunity for street vendors to create political alliances. It 
also opened a space for the leaders to speak out on issues concerning street vending 
and open political spaces with the municipal administrations, either through the 
Mayor’s office or with town council members of similar political affiliation that never 
existed before. These leaders, Luis Cuenca, José Gualichico, Marlena Manyay, and 
Angelita Vega played key roles in the negotiation with the municipality.  
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Key Leaders 
Although various association leaders participated in the dialogue with the 
municipality, a few had more prominent roles in the negotiation than others. 
According to interviews and meeting minutes, four association leaders emerge as key 
points of contact during the negotiation. At the close of the negotiation period, three 
of these leaders were also able to leverage their political influence with both vendors 
and the municipality to allow them to manage the municipal markets where their 
members were relocated.   
Luis Cuenca – El Salvador Association 
Luis Cuenca is president of the El Salvador Association, and along with the 
Front of Defense, was the first to engage with the municipality and sign an agreement. 
The El Salvador Association originally consisted of about 500 members, but at the 
time of relocation only 430 members entered the project. Due to disagreements, 70 
members left the association. The Association has existed for 45 years, and Luis 
Cuenca has been president for 22 years (Cuenca, 4/24/2008). Mr. Cuenca, together 
with Angelita Vega and Front of Defense, were the first two associations to support 
the project and saw it as an opportunity to improve the life and working conditions of 
the street vendors and their association members. Mr. Cuenca and the El Salvador 
Association supported Roque Sevilla in his 2000 mayoral campaign. Mr. Cuenca is 
now the administrator of the Granada commercial center where his association was 
relocated. 
José Gualichico - Collective of Wholesale Organizations 
José Gualichico leads an organization which represents 12 associations of 
wholesale vendors. Wholesale vendors traditionally sold on the streets of the historic 
center only on Tuesday and Saturday mornings. The wholesale vendors primarily sell 
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Table 16: Principle Organizations, Leaders, and Commercial Center Managed  
Association or 
Federation Leader 
Commercial Center  
Managed by Leader 
El Salvador Association Luis Cunca Granada Commercial 
Center  
Collective of Wholesale 
Vendors 
José Gualichico Wholesale Commercial 
Center and Andean 
Businesses (Cablec) 
Front of Defense Angelita Vega El Tejar 
Federation of Small 
Autonomous Vendors 
Marlena Manyay N/A (relocated to 
Hermano Miguel as a 
vendor) 
 
their products to the street vendors. Many of the street vendors are actually 
indebted to the wholesale vendors, as they receive credit to purchase products to sell 
in their stalls. Originally the wholesale vendors were not included in the project and 
were not approached by the municipality under Roque Sevilla’s administration. 
However, during Paco Moncayo’s administration, Mr. Gualichico was able to 
negotiate relocation for his association of wholesale vendors. Today Mr. Gualichico is 
the administrator for the wholesale market in the south of Quito, known as the 
Wholesale Commercial Center and Andean Businesses (Cablec).  
Marlena Manyay – Federation of Small Autonomous Vendors  
Marlena Manyay’s history in the historic center dates back to her childhood. 
Her father was a vendor in the historic center, and a member of the trader 
organization, 6 de Diciembre. She recalls being on the streets as young as 6 years old. 
Before becoming President of the Federation of Small Autonomous Vendors, Manyay 
was both secretary and later president of the 6 de Diciembre association, the 
organization her father previously led and vice-president of the Front of Defense. Ms. 
Manyay states that the original reason for organizing was to “fight for the work post in 
the street,” as the municipality was always a threat and sometimes the national police 
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also intervened, often inciting violence (Manyay, 3/13/2008). Although the 
organizations are known to self regulate the number of vendors working on the streets, 
Manyay claims her association always accepted new members in the name of 
lowering crime and providing work opportunities to all who wish. Like many vendors, 
Manyay acknowledged that she never believed in the plan for relocation, particularly 
in the first years of negotiation with Roque Sevilla’s administration. The long history 
of conflict, force, confiscation of goods, and sometimes imprisonment made her and 
her association members wary of claims of relocation by the municipality. As time 
went by, the municipality continued to try to create confidence in the vendors that the 
project was mutually beneficial; that the move indoors would improve the quality of 
life, especially given that working on the streets was not easy. She herself grew up 
playing on the street and sleeping under the display table, as her father worked. She 
notes that the municipality over the years tried to convince us to move into a 
commercial center, have a roof over our head and a dignified place to work, not to 
mention to offer to our children a better situation than ours. Manyay and her 
federation entered the process in 1998. It took 3 years, until her organization began to 
consider the municipal proposal of relocation. A formal agreement was not reached 
until 2002. 
Manyay stated that many of the leaders are corrupt (Ibid). She claimed that 
that Roque Sevilla promised to deliver all the markets to one leader, Angelita Vega, 
on the land that was occupied by her federation, the plaza Hermano Miguel. She 
stated that the land where the market Hermano Miguel was built always belonged to 
her organization. It was turned over to the vendors under Mayor Alvaro Perez (1978-
1982) and 391 stands were built, the majority of which are used as storage space 
(Soria, 2005). In 1996, this area was invaded by the police and her association was 
required to defend their space. The fight to defend their space also resulted in some 
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advantages for her association, as the municipality wanted to build the largest of the 
municipal planned commercial centers on their plaza. This allowed her an edge in the 
negotiations, as well as the ability to request the relocation her group into the 
Hermano Miguel commercial center, the most sought after of the markets.44 Ms. 
Manyay and Ms. Vega both acknowledged their falling out and the eventual fracturing 
of the Front due to strategic differences. However, they also both admitted the need to 
join forces and collaborate once Ms. Manyay and her organization agreed to the 
relocation, in order to gain the best possible conditions for their members in the 
negotiation.  
Angelita Vega – Front of Defense 
Angelita Vega began working in the historic center markets in 1988. A friend 
of her mother-in law passed away, and this woman was a vendor in the association 
Eugenio Espejo in the historic center. Angelita Vega joined the association Eugenio 
Espejo and took over this woman’s stall in the Mejia Street. She was later elected 
secretary of the association and witnessed a lot of oppression and cheating of the 
association members (Vega, 4/23/2008). After one year as secretary, she was elected 
president of the association Eugenio Espejo. Later, she was also elected secretary of 
the Federation of Small Retailers and then president. In 1994, this federation became a 
part of the largest vendor organization in the historic center, the Front of Defense, 
which represented approximately 2,500 vendors after the split in 1999. Vega states 
that “I had another mentality, another vision of improvement, a better life, better 
prospects without fights and punches, but with dialogue, with comprehension, 
understanding, this was always my point of departure until the end, until God 
permitted (Ibid).” The Front supported Roque Sevilla in his mayoral campaign in 
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 Vendors desired relocation in the Hermano Miguel because it was the largest market built in the 
historic center and they felt it would recreate the ambience of the street.  
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2000. Ms. Vega is now the administrator of the El Tejar commercial center where 
many of the Front of Defense vendors were relocated. Due to the size of the Front, 
members were also located in other commercial centers both within and outside of the 
historic center.  
MUNICIPAL PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF INFORMAL COMMERCE IN THE 
HISTORIC CENTER 
The plans developed for the re-ordering of informal commerce in the historic 
center demonstrate contentions over formalization. The issues that arise are centered 
on authorization, permits, sanitation, and participation. In 1996, the AZC created the 
first plan for the organization of street markets and the control of informal commerce 
in the historic center (IMQ, 1996). At the same time, the ECH also financed a study, 
which was later finalized in March 1998, known as the Master Plan for Informal 
Commerce, developed by consultants Nelson Herrera and Cristian Cordova. This 
study examined the situation of informal commerce in the historic center,45 and 
produced a plan for the modernization of informal commerce in the historic center. In 
1999, the Operative Plan of Informal Commerce was developed by the Department of 
Planning and this would serve as a basis for the later negotiations with the vendors. 
1996 AZC Plan 
This first plan proposed the creation of a modernized system of commerce 
which would offer a variety of products at competitive prices. The objectives of the 
project were to: (1) recuperate public space, (2) preserve the historic center, (3) 
relocate and decentralize the street commerce to commercial centers, (4) sell stalls in 
the commercial centers under horizontal property agreement (condominium 
association), and (5) create a secure environment in the historic center which would 
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promote and develop tourism as a major income source for the municipality. The 
strategy was community participation of all social actors and a dialogue and 
negotiation with the informal vendors. The municipality offered eight alternatives to 
relocate 6,000 vendors, 7 located in the center of the city, and 1 to the south in order 
to create new centers of commerce and decentralize the commerce in the historic 
center. The project was estimated at US$11 million: 4.1 would come from the IDB 
loan and the remainder would be financed by the registration payment and later sale of 
the stalls to the vendors. The stalls would be sold at 50% of cost with 24 month 
payment plans and no interest. The registration cost would be 20% or S/ 250,000 and 
the vendors would have 24 months or until January 2000 to pay off the debt. The 
municipality calculated that each vendor would save S/ 240,000 a month, as the cost 
of a transporter (locally known as a cargador) is S/ 8,000 a day to take out and put 
back the products. In addition each vendor would save S/ 70-90 million a year with 
regard to cost of storage space rental. These savings did not include the additional 
costs paid by the informal vendors to associations or local organizations which 
controlled the street space and provided security. 
The social benefits of the project would include: improvement of quality of 
life for the vendor and his family, stability and ownership of work space, and 
improved sales. The commercial centers would eliminate problems of weather, 
improve the security of vendors and their clients, provide basic services and child 
care, and eliminate corruption by leaders, inspectors, intermediaries, mafias, and 
others who, in the municipality’s opinion, abuse the situation of the vendors. In order 
to participate, each vendor would need to prove he/she is a vendor in the historic 
center. 
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The Master Plan and the Modernization of Informal Commerce (1998) 
The analysis carried out by the Master Plan provided the foundation for the 
Modernization Plan for Informal Commerce, the second part of the master plan. The 
objective for the consultants who elaborated this plan were to propose strategies to 
limit street trade, create alternatives for removing street traders from public places in 
the historic center, and to identify other parts of the city where they could be relocated 
(AZC, 1997). The main aims were to ‘rationalize and organize informal commerce’ 
through the exercise of control over street sales, to limit the scope of informal 
activities that contribute to the negative effects in the historic center, and to recover 
the urban space which was occupied by the informal traders. The starting point for the 
analysis was “to identify the characteristics of the negative impacts which the 
presence of the informal traders produce in the streets and squares in the Historic 
Centre of Quito (Herrera and Cordova, 1998, p.1).”  
Given the starting point for this plan, solutions suggested were not acceptable 
to the informal vendors. The plan called for a relocation of the vendors outside of the 
historic center, in the old Camal in the south of Quito, as well as in the northern part 
of city known as Ofelia. In addition, the plan proposed relocating some of the vendors 
in vacant stalls of the municipal markets as well as the creation of kiosks in peripheral 
streets of the historic center and other parts of the city. The plan offered 4,200 spaces 
for the vendors. However, this plan only offered relocation, not the sale of the market 
stalls, and the vendors would in essence become renters and the municipality the 
owner. The vendors out right rejected this plan and refused to negotiate (Burbano, 
4/242008; Proaño, 4/28/2008).  
Operative Plan for Informal Commerce (1999) 
Given the rejection of the Master Plan, the municipality created the Operative 
Plan for Informal Commerce, under the management of Architect Fierro, the head of 
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the Department of Planning. The plan outlined a two year time frame to reorganize 
and modernize the informal commerce of the historic center. The policies outlined 
were similar to the other plans and included: the improvement of work conditions for 
both vendors and clients, recuperate public space, preserve the historic center, relocate 
and decentralize the historic center street commerce both within the historic center 
and to the south of the city, sell the market stalls to the vendors under the law of 
condominiums (horizontal property), and to create a secure and adequate environment 
to develop tourism as the major economic function of the historic center (IMQ 
Department of Planning, 1999). The strategy to achieve these goals included 
community participation, dialogue, negotiation, and agreement with the vendors, and 
the sale of subsidized market stalls which would motivate the vendors to vacate the 
streets. The plan prohibited the circulation of roaming traders in the historic center 
and temporary traders such as the Christmas market traders. The significant difference 
between the Master Plan was a return to the idea of ownership and sale of the market 
stalls to the vendors, as originally proposed in the 1996 plan. Another noteworthy 
difference with the 1996 plan was the proposal to relocate the traders to other parts of 
the city, both the north and south. According to the plan only 1728 fixed post vendors 
would be able to remain in the historic center, 1400 in commercial centers and 328 in 
municipal approved street structures or kiosks. The remainder would be located in 
markets constructed in other districts, in order to decentralize commerce, bring the 
products closer to the consumer, as well as alleviate congestion in the historic center. 
 This plan was used as the basis to initiate the dialogue with the vendors 
between 1999 and 2003. It resulted in signed agreements with a number of trader 
associations and the eventual relocation of over 5,000 small traders into commercial 
centers within the historic center and other parts of the city. However, the dialogue 
brought about significant changes to the original plan, because the vendors found the 
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original plan unacceptable. In 1999, the municipality began to implement this plan 
with a vision of consultation, negotiation, and consensus among the stakeholders.  
The first phase of negotiation focused on achieving an agreement with the 
vendors to leave the streets. The second phase focused on the prices, size, and location 
of the markets. The last phase focused on the process of verification, provisional 
location of the vendors during the construction process, and the final relocation of the 
vendors into the finished commercial centers. 
PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE 1996-1998 
Jamil Mahuad served as mayor for two terms beginning in 1992. It is under his 
leadership that the IDB loan was signed in 1994. It is important to note during his 
campaign he promised the traders the right to work and remain in the streets (Manyay, 
3/12/2008). However, once elected Mayor, he set up a commission with 
representatives from various municipal departments to examine the problem of street 
vending in the historic center. The 1994 IDB loan required the municipality to deal 
with the issue of street vending in the historic center. Some vendors were aware of the 
potential changes in the historic center, and actively sought municipal engagement, as 
they did not want to be forced out or left out of the decision making process (Hanley 
2000; Cuenca, 4/24/2008; Vega, 4/23/2008).  
During the Administration of Mayor Jamil Mahuad, architect Roasario Proaño 
was the Administrator of Central Zone from 1996-1999. Under Ms. Proaño’s 
leadership an evaluation of informal commerce in the historic center was undertaken. 
When the AZC created its first strategic plan, one of the principal priorities was the 
recuperation of public space in the historic center. During Ms. Proaño’s tenure as 
administrator, she notes approximately 70% of the streets, plazas, and sidewalks in the 
nucleus of the historic center were considered to be overrun with what the AZC 
considered the misuse of public space (Proaño, 4/28/2008). According to Proaño, the 
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removal of the vendors by force or with violence was never an option, and the 
fundamental base for success was the creation of a dialogue, which she notes was, 
during her management, quite fragile (Ibid).  
The AZC initiated the process by trying to create a list of actors through a 
registration of the vendors. This was not easy, as there was resistance among the 
vendors to register with the AZC. Vendors were hesitant to register individually,46 as 
they felt if they provided the municipality information it may be used to evict them 
from the streets later on (Manyay, 3/122008). Therefore the AZC created a unit of 
people’s commerce so that there was always a municipal unit dedicated to this 
program and place for dialogue between the vendors and the municipality. Beginning 
in 1997 the AZC issued permits to vendors and associations who had worked in the 
historic center for at least five years. The objective of the permits was to legalize the 
situation, collect and update information regarding the vendors, control the number of 
vendors and markets, as well as serve as a base for initiating discussions.  
The Christmas Market Vendors and Temporary Traders 
The AZC decided to tackle the issue of the Christmas market vendors first, 
which could increment the number of traders in the historic center by almost 20% 
(IMQ, 1996). The AZC began by organizing meetings with the relevant vendor 
associations. The meetings were all video taped, as a need for a record of agreements 
was necessary before the final official minutes could be drafted and signed. Ms. 
Proaño considered the first meetings difficult and discouraging, as “the cultural 
background of them (referring to the traders) in the first place with all the diversity, I 
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can affirm that in that moment they seemed culturally poor and economically not well 
off (Proano, 4/28/2008).”  
In the dialogue, the municipality offered space in both municipal buildings and 
on municipal land for the use by the Christmas market traders. Vendors were required 
to register with the AZC and they would receive a permit and a designated space to 
sell their products. The AZC financed a marketing campaign, by radio, newspaper, 
and the distribution of flyers informing the public of the relocation of the Christmas 
traders. They decentralized the vendors in the north and south of city, primarily the 
south, as studies indicated the majority of clients came from the south (IMQ, 1996). 
The objective was to alleviate congestion and crowding in the historic center, as well 
as to bring the markets closer to their clients. The AZC worked with the associations 
which represented the Christmas market vendors. These meetings eventually resulted 
in the reorganization of temporary plaza markets in 1998. 1200 stalls were offered to 
the Christmas market vendors in two locations, the Camal to the south, and the 
parking lots of the Carolina Park in the north. The same procedure was applied toward 
the Easter markets and other temporary vendors. From 1998 until the time of research 
in 2008, the plazas of the historic center remained free of temporary markets. 
Moving on to Fixed Stall Vendors 
Mayor Mahuad then formed a committee to develop a comprehensive strategy 
to deal with the presence of fixed stall and roaming informal commerce in the historic 
center and declared that street vending would no longer be tolerated in the historic 
center. According to Mayor Mahuad, the municipalities previous interventions had 
been too small, not enforced, and in some cases legitimized street commerce (AZC, 
2/17/1998). The first priority would be a relocation of the vendors of the historic 
district, publicly initiating a complex process to recuperate the public spaces of the 
historic district. Mayor Mahuad made public the intention to reorganize informal 
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commerce. This resulted in a marketing campaign known as “Recuperate our history” 
and initiating a long process of resistance, dialogue, and negotiation between the 
vendors and the municipality. Ms. Proaño, like many in the municipality, considered 
“the issue of informal commerce, I believe is the most representative, not just from 
my management, but from the other administrations as well, of the recuperation of our 
patrimony (Proaño, 4/242008).” 
In August 1998, Mayor Jamil Mahuad resigned from his position as Mayor, as 
he was recently elected president of Ecuador. The vice-mayor, Roque Sevilla took 
over the remainder of his term from 1998-2000. Mayor Sevilla began the process of 
officially engaging the fixed stall vendors in a dialogue with the municipality. 
THE NEGOTIATION: PART 1 (1998-2000) 
The negotiation model used to reach agreements with the Christmas traders 
later served as a model and starting point for the process that the AZC, and later the 
UECP, would carry out with permanent fixed stall vendors until 2003. The subsequent 
meetings that took place were between the Administrator and 2-3 staff members, as 
well as the leaders of the vendor associations and some or all members. Occasionally 
representatives of the Metropolitan Police, the ECH, FONSAL, and the Department of 
Planning participated. The staff of the municipality was trained over four months in 
negotiation seminars, as well participatory development short courses, and 
communication financed by the ECH as part of the IDB loan under the category of 
institutional strengthening. Some meetings were open to members; others were just 
between the municipal staff and the association president or leader. According to Ms. 
Proaño, the coordination with other municipal entities was a key component of the 
success and eventual relocation of the temporary traders, and was strengthened in the 
next phase of negotiations with subsequent administrators (Proaño, 4/28/2008). The 
AZC was primarily responsible for the social aspect of the dialogue. However, the 
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AZC coordinated with the Department of Planning to design the urban strategy and 
the financial resources came from the ECH and FONSAL.  
The Front of Defense was formed with the original objective of organizing the 
street vendors to prevent their eviction from the streets by the municipality due to the 
pending rehabilitation project. The vendors originally rejected any notion of 
negotiation or contemplation and clearly stated that they would not leave the streets 
(Manyay, 3/12/2008; Vega, 4/23/2008). The organized nature of the vendors, the 
semi-legality of their street occupation, and the political influence of some vendors 
convinced the municipality that the path needed to be of negotiation and agreement, 
and not of confrontation (Proano, 4/28/2008; Estrella, 4/24/2008). The negotiation 
during Mayor Sevilla’s term can be divided into two parts. The first part consisted of 
an engagement with vendors and dialogue regarding the proposal in the 1999 plan. 
The second began with a presentation of a new plan that incorporated many of 
vendors ideas proposed to the municipality in the first phase and a negotiation over 
these new terms.  
The Initial Engagement (February 1999 – March 1999) 
In 1999, architect Monica Moreira assumed the position of Administrator of 
the AZC. Ms. Moreira came from the ECH, where she had worked previously. The 
formal negotiation began in February 1999 and focused on achieving an agreement 
about the need to recuperate public space, change the tradition of the vendors to sell 
on the streets, and look for solutions together to relocate. Approximately 50 meetings 
took place in this phase (AZC, 1999). At this stage, the municipality learned of the 
irregularities and rules of street vending. Many vendors complained of paying for the 
space and for security when working on the streets (Ibid; Moreira, 3/12/2008; Proano, 
4/28/2008). In essence, vendors paid private citizens for the right to work on public 
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space. The municipality then realized the need to put into place mechanisms that 
would prevent the replication of this system in the new markets.  
The first meeting of this phase took place on February 3, 1999. 
Representatives from the following associations attended: El Salvador, Associacion 
Ciudad de Quito, Valle del Chota, Front of Defense, and 22 de Julio (AZC, 2/4/1999). 
The AZC presented the 1999 plan to the associations present. The vendors rejected a 
number of notions in this plan, primarily the decentralization of the markets. This 
meeting resulted in an agreement to form a team of AZC representatives and vendors 
to tour the historic center in search for alternate sites of relocation within the historic 
center (Ibid). A municipal team was later established that toured the historic center 
with the vendors in order to discuss the relocation and potential locations for the 
municipal markets. The original plan included two options not located within the 
historic center, one commercial center in the north and one in the south. However, it 
soon became apparent to the municipality that vendors would not voluntarily relocate 
outside of the historic center and selecting or forcing vendors to leave the historic 
center would prove difficult (Moreira, 3/10/2008). The vendors requested a new study 
that would increase the possibilities within the historic center and the municipality 
accommodated this request. The vendors also put forth a proposal stating that the 
stalls should not cost more than S/5,000,000 or US$424. The vendors also demanded 
that if they do move off the streets, the municipality must ensure that no one will take 
their place. Although the vendors at the time objected to the possibilities outside of the 
historic center, the municipality continued to plan these centers, as well as look at 
more alternatives in the historic center, as requested by the vendors (Soria, 2005; 
Moreira, 3/12/2008). The municipality added additional options in the historic center 
to the original proposal, making seven commercial centers available in the historic 
center: El Tejar, Hermano Miguel, Ipiales, Granada, La Merced, Montufar, and 
  
 
173 
Sanguña. The AZC agreed to attempt to relocate the majority of vendors in the 
historic center. Those that were located west of Garcia Moreno Street would be 
relocated in the historic center, as these were considered older markets and traders 
with longer tenure in the historic center. Those working in the newer stalls located 
east of Garcia Moreno would be located outside of the historic center. A follow-up 
meeting took place on February 8, 1999 to inform the vendors of the potential 
relocation sights (AZC, 2/8/1999).  
The municipality planned to register the vendors individually, not by 
association. At this stage, the costs were tentative and the registration was only a 
formality, not a contract. According to Ms. Moreira, only a few individuals began to 
register indicating their interest to participate in the relocation project and the 
municipality realized that they had not made significant progress (Moreira, 
3/10/2008). The municipality decided to launch a publicity campaign in order to 
create more interest among the vendors, as well as among the general public. 
Televisions spots and newspaper ads were dedicated to informing the public, 
including the vendors, about the historic center and the problems of informal 
commerce. This generated a number of street protests by the vendors in defense of 
their work spaces. On February 5, 1999, the informal commercial activity in the 
historic center and other parts of the city came to a stand still. The Front organized a 
protest and approximately 14,000 people gathered in the historic center with anti-
Sevilla posters to pressure the municipality against any changes (AZC, 2/6/1999). 
Although no violence was promised by the municipality, the vendors were cautioned 
by the Mayor that lack of cooperation could result in the use of force (AZC 2/5/1999; 
2/19/1999). A number of groups continued to oppose the project and attempted to 
protect their place on the street, shouting in protest, “blood will run, but we will not 
leave the streets (Manyay, 3/12/2008).” The publicity campaign encouraged protests, 
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but it also produced a series of meetings with the vendors and the municipality. It was 
at this stage that the division between the traders interested in cooperating and 
relocating and those who wanted to stay on the streets deepened, causing fractures 
among the organizations. Some vendors expressed the need for more information and 
details, the majority stated that the tentative costs presented would exclude the 
majority from the project, and others did want to see any changes. 
Later in March, the AZC invited the Federation of Small Autonomous 
vendors, led by Marlene Manyay, to begin to address critical points of the relocation, 
as this was a federation of associations with which the municipality had not achieved 
any progress (AZC, 3/1999). Negotiations collapsed between the municipality and this 
association, as they demanded free stalls that were twice the size proposed by the 
municipality. Manyay stated that her demands were so high, because she never really 
believed in the relocation; interaction with the municipality over the past decades was 
so tense and negative, the idea of relocating in a newly constructed building did not 
seem possible (Manyay, 3/12/2008). This federation, the second largest after the 
Front, continued to take a firm stance of not leaving the streets and no progress was 
made until after the election of Paco Moncayo in 2000 (Moreira, 3/10/2008; Manyay, 
3/12/2008).  
Part II: Presenting the New Plan (April 1999 – August 2000) 
After the municipal representatives and vendors agreed on some tentative 
locations, and the tensions from the protest in February subsided, the new plans were 
discussed with the vendors and the preliminary designs were presented to the 
association leaders on April 20, 1999 in the Salon de la Ciudad in the municipal 
building by Mayor Sevilla. Over 500 association leaders and representatives attended 
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this meeting. Mayor Sevilla reinforced his proposal for a peaceful relocation, not an 
eviction, referring to what had happened recently in Lima (AZC, 4/22/1999).47 Many 
vendors were aware of the Lima situation, and were fearful of a forced eviction 
(Manyay, 3/12/2008; Vega, 4/23/2008).  
The discussions over the proposals were tense and in many cases were 
interrupted by yelling and shouting (Moreira, 3/10/2008; Soria, 2005). The tensions 
arose out of two principle factors: first, the tentative costs, which were presented in 
US dollars, and second, the vendors wanted a third party that would serve as an 
intermediary during and after the proposed relocation. The first point was logical, as 
the municipality communicated the real costs of the project and the tension arose out 
of the fact that a number of vendors would not be able to participate due to the cost. 
The municipality decided on presenting the figures in dollars to prevent the 
fluctuation in prices, as the Sucre was still in use at this time, a relatively unstable 
currency.48 The second point, related to a mediator, demonstrated the lack of 
confidence the vendors had in the municipality. The vendors proposed the addition of 
a mediator between the municipality and the vendors, as they felt an independent third 
party would ensure their participation, continued dialogue and guarantee that their 
opinions and suggestions be incorporated into the project planning. No mediator was 
ever incorporated into the project. Some associations hired lawyers to negotiate on 
their behalf, but the municipality would only negotiate directly with the associations 
(Estrella, 4/24/2008). 
After this meeting, the municipality displayed the models, design, and plans 
for the commercial centers in the Casa de los Presidentes in the historic center. The 
exhibition lasted three weeks, from April 23 – May, 5 1999. The exposition of the 
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 Ecuador would not dollarize until later in 2000. 
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plans were visited by only a few vendors in the beginning, but slowly more and more 
came to familiarize themselves with the project and the dates for the closure of the 
exhibition were extended multiple times (Moreira, 3/10/2008). By May, at least 3,000 
vendors visited the exhibition and an additional 40 meetings took place (AZC, 
5/6/1999). The exhibition of the plans produced a very tense moment. Although some 
groups showed interest, many vendors protested, demanding that the street posts be 
respected by the municipality. Ten additional meetings took place to resolve the four 
fundamental issues that arose out of the exhibition: the design of the centers, size of 
the stalls, prices, and forms of payment.  
The majority of associations continued to meet with the AZC. After a period 
of little progress, some vendors proposed to the municipality that the mechanism of 
co-management used in the neighborhood committees be applied to the construction 
of the markets, with the objective of decreasing the costs. Co-management implied 
that the vendors would contribute their labor, in an effort to reduce costs. This model 
was used by the municipality with regard to housing assistance and many of the 
vendors had participated in their neighborhood associations and were familiar with 
this type of project. In addition, they demanded a more participatory process with 
regard to the design of the buildings and interior stalls. The meetings between the 
vendors and municipality resumed, focusing on the costs of each stall and the size of 
the stalls. The vendors desired larger stalls. However the municipality felt that a large 
stall contradicted the municipal vision of the markets for small scale vendors. In 
addition it would increase the cost, another point of tension (Moreira, 3/10/2008). In 
the end an agreement was reached with the majority of associations, and the proposed 
stall size was a 4.32m² (2.40m x 1.80m). The issue of costs remained unresolved. The 
vendors proposed unrealistically low prices, arguing that the municipality needed to 
reimburse the vendors to recuperate their work space (Ibid). The municipality 
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proposed a combination of a subsidy and payment by the vendors. These meetings 
resulted in an extension of the proposed loan period from 24 months to 36 months, as 
well as a municipal subsidy of 50% of the purchase price.   
The Front of Defense requested the possibility to carry out the interior work of 
the market stalls themselves to reduce costs, under the co-management principle 
(Moreira, 3/10/2008; Vega, 4/23/2008). In some cases, the municipality agreed to 
construct only the building structure or what was referred to as roof and floor and 
allowed the association and vendors to complete the interior with their own labor and 
materials. After the municipality publicly announced these new terms on May 31, 
1999, a new registration period began on June 17, 1999 and lasted until the end of 
August 1999. 4,700 vendors registered (AZC, 8/1999). This registration was to 
formalize interest in the project, but did not require a bank deposit or an obligation to 
participate.   
After months of negotiations, on August 11, 1999, the municipality arrived at 
an agreement with two key organizations, the Front and the association El Salvador. 
The agreement was publicly signed on August 17, 1999 by the mayor and the 
association leaders, Angelita Vega and Luis Cuenca. Convincing these two leaders 
and their association members of the benefits of the project was a turning point. The 
Front of Defense was the largest umbrella organization of vendors and the association 
El Salvador represented about 500 vendors. Luis Cuenca and Angelita Vega explained 
to their members the advantages and disadvantages of the relocation and convinced 
the majority of their members to participate (Cuenca, 4/24/2008; Vega, 4/23/2008). 
They also promised the municipality the cooperation of their members with regard to 
the relocation. This broke the prior unity of the associations, splitting the vendors 
between those who wished to relocate and those who preferred to stay on the streets. 
When other associations heard of these agreements, this initiated a new stage of 
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negotiations, which resulted in a number of formal agreements between the 
municipality and vendor associations. The next issue that arose out of these meetings 
was which association would occupy which markets. 
The Proposed Municipal Markets 
After the first two phases of negotiation the municipality and the vendors 
agreed on a variety of options both within and outside the historic center that would 
house approximately 6,000 vendors (See Figure11 and 12). Some of the options were 
old markets which would be renovated, others would be made out of newly 
expropriated buildings, and others would be built completely new. 
 The La Merced and Ipiales are two markets which already existed at the time 
of the municipal proposal. The municipality proposed redesigning the interiors, 
improvements to the infrastructure, and expansion to make them larger. The La 
Merced market was previously constructed with the assistance of the federal Ministry 
of Social Welfare and the Municipality of Quito to create an alternative to street 
commerce for the association Mideros, whose members are mostly senior citizens. 
The market was originally just one floor, the market stalls were 4.5m², and the 
municipality charged a monthly rental fee of S/ 6,000 to the vendors (IMQ, 1996). 
However, in reality, 90% of the stalls were used as storage units, not as retail locations 
(IMQ, 1996). The project was considered unsuccessful, as only a handful of vendors 
used the stalls as a space to sell their goods. The Ipiales market was constructed over 
20 years ago and many of the original vendors were wholesale vendors.  
These vendors (48 in total) were required to relocate to the South, as wholesale 
vending, which normally took place on Tuesday and Saturday, is no longer permitted 
in the historic center (Lopez, F. 4/11/2008). Additional floors were added and the 
interior remodeled to fit the style of the other markets.Hermano Miguel was the  
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Figure 11: Location of Municipal Markets, Elaboration Lisa M. Hanley, Source: 
DMQ and AZC, 2008  
 
largest proposed market, with over 1500 market stalls. The Hermano Miguel 
was a small plaza which was occupied by vendors for decades. A piece of this land 
was ceded to the association Libertad, Paz, and Justicia by Mayor Perez. In 1986, 
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the administration of Mayor Herdoiza moved the monument of Hermano Miguel to 
the San Blas neighborhood, essentially making more space for the vendors and 
validating their right to work in this plaza. This market, due to its large size and 
location, was the most desired market for relocation. Almost all vendors wished to 
relocate in the Hermano Miguel and the municipality had great difficulty assigning 
these spaces.  
 
Figure 12: Location of Markets in Historic Center, Elaboration Lisa M. 
Hanley,  Source: DMQ and AZC, 2008  
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The Tejar market would be constructed above an already existing parking 
garage and would have 740 stalls and 2 floors of parking. The Granada market would 
be created out of 3 buildings which the municipality would expropriate and would 
house 430 vendors. The Montufar was originally designed as a parking garage in the 
rehabilitation plan for the historic center. However, it was added to the proposal to 
house the vendors that sold in the surrounding streets with 430 stalls that would be 
built above the parking garage. To the south of the city, the municipality proposed a 
large market with 1480 stalls in the old Camal, to be called Chiriyacu. In addition, the 
San Martin market was added, as well as a market in the north, Ipiales del Norte, and 
one in the south, Ipiales del Sur. Lastly, the wholesale traders were relocated in an old 
factory building known as Cablec in the south.  
The Sanguña Passage was also in the original proposal. The Sanguña Passage 
is an interior passage and represents a situation where the municipality legalized the 
occupation of this passage by the vendors and semi-permanent stalls were built (figure 
13). The municipality proposed improving the stalls and building a more permanent 
structure, with 420 stalls. This area is a closed path of vendors who primarily sell 
home electronics. The municipality was never able to reach agreement, and remained 
in negotiations with these vendors at the time of research. Video taped meetings with 
these vendors indicate that they never believed the project would take place, and 
therefore refused to participate (AZC, 1998-2000). At the time of research, meetings 
between this association and municipality indicated a new interest of Sanguña vendors 
to move ahead with the construction of a market, however the municipality no longer 
has funds to subsidize and the vendors would have to pay for the full construction 
costs, basically paralyzing the negotiation (Paz Miño, 1/29/2008). 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 13: Sanguna Passage 2008, Author Image
 
Summary of Agreements and Meetings 
By May 2000, the municipality had come to agreements with 4,500 of the 
approximately 6,000 fixed 
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In addition to financing part of the construction costs, the ECH, with funds 
from the IDB loan, financed 125 workshops to train the vendors in administration, 
marketing and sales, and accounting. Approximately all 6,000 vendors participated in 
the workshops (ECH, 1999). These seminars helped sell the project to vendors, as it 
reinforced the notion that they would transform from informal vendors to small 
business owners supported by the municipality (Estrella, 4/24/2008). This approach 
reinforced the idea that the vendors were not adversaries of heritage, but rather the 
people who could assist in opening the path and the opportunity to promote the 
cultural heritage of Quito, by clearing the streets, and at the same time benefit from a 
municipal subsidized project.  
During Roque Sevilla`s administration, at least 310 meetings took place with 
the vendors, of which he personally attended at least 14 (AZC, 1999-2000). By 
August 2000, 77 associations of the 96 registered with the municipality had reached 
formal agreements of intent to participate, consenting to vacate public space and 
transfer to the commercial centers. In addition significant progress had been made 
with the banks, in particular the Banco Solidario, which had agreed to give credit to 
the vendors. Roque Sevilla, in his short two years as mayor, accomplished significant 
advancements with the vendors. He notes: 
I initiated the reorganization of small street vendors and public space in the 
historic center because I was always convinced of the invaluable patrimony 
and tourist potential of this gem. The relocation project of the vendors was 
carried out in the next municipal administration, but was at an advanced stage 
during my tenure, and never before had a mayor decided to take on the 
challenge of this complex issue. We initiated the negotiations with the 
vendors, obtained the financing for the construction of the commercial centers, 
completed the construction of some, and as a mature and responsible 
government, transferred these political advancements to the next 
administration which was concluded successfully by Mayor Paco Moncayo 
(Sevilla, 4/25/2008).  
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THE NEGOTIATION: PHASE 3 (2000–2003) 
The Transition 
On August 10, 2000 Paco Moncayo began his term as Mayor of Quito. He 
would win re-election in 2004 and remain mayor until 2008. As noted by Mayor 
Sevilla, it is under his administration that the successful relocation of fixed stall 
informal street vendors was carried out in 2003. By the time Paco Moncayo began his 
administration, the negotiations were well underway, and the Front of Defense and El 
Salvador associations were active in keeping the discussion and dialogue with the 
municipality regarding relocation open. Mayor Moncayo stated that “the framework 
of transparency would continue and be mandatory for all organizations, as well as a 
continuation of the dialogue (AZC, 9/6/2000).” Mayor Moncayo also enforced the 
decentralization and relocation of temporary traders, requesting the assistance of all 
administrative zones in managing these markets to keep the historic center free of this 
type of commerce (AZC, 11/17/2000). The major problem with the transition was, as 
Ms. Moreira and Paulina Burbano, Director of the ECH during Sevilla´s leadership, 
that some formal agreements made under Roque Sevilla’s administration were not 
honored (Burbano, 4/24/2008; Moreira, 3/12/2008). 
The first year of Moncayo’s administration this project was not a priority. 
According to Ms. Estrella, a consultant since the project’s inception in 1996, there 
was also pressure from the IDB and UNESCO for Moncayo’s administration to 
continue with the negotiations. The IDB threatened to withhold transactions if the 
negotiations stalled, and UNESCO advised that the world heritage status could be in 
danger if the vendors were not relocated (Estrella, 4/24/2008). Pressure from 
international institutions escalated and vendors interested in the relocation project 
brought about a change in the administration’s thinking. In 2001 the Executive Unit 
for Popular Commerce was created (UECP). 
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During this period, some associations, primarily those that occupied the plaza 
Hermano Miguel, had not come to any agreements during the last administration and 
continued to protest against the project in hopes of eliminating the progress made with 
Mayor Sevilla (Manyay, 3/12/2008). The one year Mayor Moncayo did not prioritize 
the relocation project also convinced many vendors, in particular Ms. Manyay’s 
association, that the municipality was not serious about a relocation project (Estrella, 
4/24/2008; Manyay, 3/12/2008). Ms. Rodriguez, the new Administrator of the AZC, 
commented that the most difficult task was picking up the negotiations with the 
vendors from the plaza Hermano Miguel, due to their complete distrust of the 
municipality (Rodriguez, 4/30/2008).  
The Conflict Over the Plaza Hermano Miguel 
Many of the vendors proposed a super-commercial center which would house 
all the traders of the historic center, instead of being split up among different markets 
both within the historic center and other parts of the city. However, the municipality 
was not capable of offering a market that would house 5,000 or 6,000 vendors in the 
historic center. The closest was the proposed commercial center, the Hermano Miguel, 
which would be located on the plaza Hermano Miguel. Originally this building would 
have housed only a few hundred traders, but after negotiations the proposal included 
spaces for 1,602 vendors. However, many of vendors who occupied the plaza and the 
surrounding streets were not interested in the municipal proposal and refused to 
relocate in order to allow construction to begin. Some vendors belonged to the Front 
of Defense, and were in favor of the project. However, the majority were members of 
the Small Autonomous Vendors, and other independent associations who did not 
favor relocation and caused significant conflict among the vendors.  
According to Ms. Rodriguez her principal task as Administrator was 
negotiating with the vendors who occupied the Plaza Hermano Miguel, including Ms. 
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Manyay´s Federation of Small Autonomous Vendors, who had protested, as 
negotiations under Roque Sevilla fell apart. The association Libertad, Paz, y Justicia 
had obtained legal rights to a piece of the land, and the Small Autonomous Vendors 
considered their long term occupation of the plaza as a legal right (Portilla, 3/7/2008; 
Manyay, 3/12/2008).  
The case of Libertad, Paz, y Justicia, led by Carlos Portilla, is unique as the 
municipality had formally ceded part of the land of the Plaza Hermano Miguel to this 
association. According to Lourdes Rodriquez, it took more or less 30 meetings to 
come to an agreement. One of the major obstacles was where to locate this association 
during the construction period. This association did not want to be relocated on the 
street; they requested to be temporarily relocated in a house. The AZC offered them a 
number of houses in the historic center as potential sites of relocation, but the only 
house they were willing to relocate to was the Casa de los Alcaldes. This was a 
historical building where the town council member offices were located. Ms. 
Rodirguez had a lot of difficulty convincing the Mayor to allow this house to be used 
as a temporary relocation site for the vendors of Libertad, Paz, y Justicia. However, as 
Ms. Rodriguez stated, “I said (to the Mayor), in reality this is the only one, if they do 
not leave, we can not do anything (Rodriguez, 4/30/2008).” In an agreement with the 
municipality, the association returned their ownership rights in exchange for market 
stalls in the Hermano Miguel Plaza at the reduced price of US$60 for their association 
members and a temporary relocation in the Casa de los Alcaldes. The association felt 
they should not pay, but a small price had to be agreed upon, as without payment, 
their ownership would not be recognized by Ecuadorian Law (Portilla, 3/7/2008). 
According to Ms. Rodriguez, the day this association vacated the Plaza Hermano 
Miguel was a pivotal moment. On September 14, 2000, the vendors were relocated. 
When the vendors in the surrounding areas saw this association move, they 
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understood that the municipality was serious about the relocation (Rodriguez, 
4/30/2008). 
Although an agreement with Libertad, Paz, y Justicia was reached, a complete 
breakdown of negotiations between the Small Autonomous Vendors and the 
municipality occurred (Manyay, 3/12/2008; Rodriguez, 4/30/2008). The Front’s desire 
to see the project through resulted in a violent confrontation between the Front and the 
Small Autonomous Vendors before the Department of Public Works arrived to raze 
the small market stalls and other permanent structures (Manyay, 3/12/2008; 
Rodriguez, 4/30/2008). The Front forcibly removed the uncooperative traders to allow 
the construction of the Hermano Miguel to move forward. After the plaza was vacated 
by the vendors, the Department of Public Works spent three days destroying and 
removing the 381 stalls and other structures that occupied the plaza. After these three 
days, the construction of the Hermano Miguel commercial center began immediately, 
to prevent a re-occupation of the plaza. This confrontation illustrates in a physical 
manner the heterogeneity of the interests of the vendors and lack of solidarity among 
the different associations.  
Final agreements were not reached with the many vendors. Although many 
had indicated their willingness to relocate, the details of the relocation proved difficult 
to attain. Mayor Moncayo was under pressure from international institutions to re-
energize the negotiations and bring about the final relocation. Given the multiple 
responsibilities of the AZC, the Mayor decided to create a new municipal department 
dedicated to dealing with the informal vendors and their relocation. 
The Creation of the Executive Unit of Popular Commerce (UECP) 
In August 2001 the Executive Unit of Popular Commerce was created with the 
mission of permanently coordinating, in collaboration with the ECH, the construction 
of the commercial centers, continuing the negotiation with vendors (taking over from 
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the AZC), the verification process, and the coordination of training seminars for the 
vendors. The AZC then took charge of a publicity and communication campaign to 
inform the residents of Quito of the pending changes in the historic center (Rodriguez, 
4/30/2008; Soria, 2005). In essence, the municipality finally created a unit whose sole 
responsibility was managing the project with the informal vendors of the historic 
center. The first director was General Carlos Cobos, a specialist in negotiation who 
had previous experience negotiating settlements in Chiapas, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. General Cobos had trained with Roger 
Fisher, a well known Harvard Law professor specializing in conflict management and 
negotiation.  
At the time General Cobos took over the negotiations, the principal topic of 
discussion was the price of the stalls. Some of the markets had been completed at this 
stage, but the vendors would not agree to relocate. The physical location of each 
association in the commercial centers was also a tense topic. According to General 
Cobos, several organizations wanted to construct their own commercial center for 
their members only. Many selected buildings in the historic center and contracted 
architects to present the plans to the municipality. Other vendors were against being 
grouped together in different buildings. According to General Cobos and Cecelia 
Quishpe49 the majority wished to be grouped into one mega-commercial center, which 
would house all of the vendors of the historic center instead of being divided into 
different commercial centers (Cobos, 4/30/2008; Quishpe, 5/7/2008).  
The approach General Cobos took was to put on the table what the 
municipality offered: property at a highly subsidized cost, which the vendors would 
                                                 
 
49
 Cecelia Quischpe was a town council member at the time of relocation. At the time of the interview 
she was a congressional representative in the provincial congress of the province of Pichincha. She is 
also historic center vendor. She owns a market stall in the non-municipal market, La Merced.  
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legally own and be able to pass on to their children. One of the tense points was the 
request of the vendors to assist with already existing debts. The other was to make 
public the conditions and prices to the vendors, as there were many contradictions in 
communication with the association leaders (Rodriguez, 4/30/2008; Moreira 
3/10/2008; Ribandeneira 5/7/2008; Cobos 4/30/2008).  
The UECP needed to arrive at agreements regarding major issues and 
formalize those agreements with the associations. Some included the costs and 
financing of the stalls, the verification process, to ensure the vendors registered were 
actually informal vendors in the historic center, the location of the associations and 
individuals in the new commercial center, and the date of relocation. The municipality 
also needed to make an agreement with the SRI (Internal Revenue Service), in order 
to allow the vendors to continue to avoid paying value added tax. The issue of the 
wholesale vendors and roaming traders also needed to be dealt with, as both groups 
were not a part of the on-going negotiation. In addition, the issue of illegal and stolen 
goods, as well as a plan with how to deal with associations and mafias after the 
relocation needed to be designed.  
The Obstacles to Relocation 
Roaming Traders 
In May 1995, the municipality carried out a two day count of roaming traders 
in the historic center, that is those who sell without a fixed street stall. The AZC 
counted 5,767 traders among the streets of the historic center, of which 3495 were 
women. The roaming traders were poorly organized and often not affiliated with 
associations. The first municipal proposal was to organize these vendors into 
sanitation collective that would be responsible for cleaning the new commercial 
centers. According to Monica Moreira, this proposal was rejected, as the traders  
 
  
 
 
Figure 14: Roaming Traders in Historic Center, 2005 Author Image
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 The roaming traders’ integration into the project was unrealistic for two reasons. The municipality 
was not in a position to increase 
traders were economically not well off. The traders 
from the municipality and that was not possible due to budget constraints. 
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women traders from the historic center, the majority have abandoned the historic 
center and dispersed to different parts of the city, where street trading is not restricted 
in the same way it is in the historic center. Colonel Montalvo, the current director of 
the UECP when asked about the roaming traders commented, “well, they disappeared 
(Montalvo 3/3/2008).”  
Although the activity of roaming traders in the historic center has been 
reduced, they have not completely disappeared (figure 14). In 2008, the AZC was still 
attempting to create a solution for the roaming traders. According to the AZC, they 
estimated at the time of research, that there were approximately 2,600 vendors 
organized into 21 associations selling both perishable and non-perishable items in the 
historic center. According to Ines Paz Miño, the Administrator of the AZC since 2003, 
the municipality must prioritize public space and the agreements made with the fixed 
stall vendors. The municipality had promised to keep the streets clean of all informal 
street commerce. The persistence of roaming traders is considered a breach of this 
agreement. Ms. Paz Miño and Lorena Barazueta, head of the Department of Public 
Space at the AZC, have indicated that the disorganization and irregular work hours of 
the traders have made it difficult to arrive at a solution directly with the associations. 
Some NGO´s, such as Aldeas Infantiles SOS and Plan International work with these 
traders and the AZC is trying a new strategy of coordinating with these NGO’s in 
hope of reaching a successful agreement. Ms. Barrazueta and Ms. Paz Miño believe 
that most of these traders are single mothers who are exploited by their associations 
(Paz Miño 1/29/2008; Barrazeuta, 3/11/2008).  
Wholesale Vendors of Tuesday and Saturday 
According to General Cobos, the most difficult negotiation was with the 
wholesale vendors, who traditionally sold only on Tuesday and Saturday in the 
historic center. These difficulties can be attributed to a variety of reasons. The 
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economic situation of the wholesale vendors is, in comparison to the majority of the 
other street traders, superior. The organization of the wholesale vendors was strong 
and unified in one federation and their subsequent bargaining power was increased 
due to their political alliance with the Mayor’s party. Jose Gualichico was the leader 
of this organization called the Collective of Wholesale Organizations. Originally, 
under Roque Sevilla, the wholesalers were not to be included in the relocation, as they 
are not small scale street retailers and many of them are producers and manufacturers 
(Estrella, 4/24/2008; Gualichico, 1/15/ 2008). They sold their products exclusively in 
bulk two days a week in the historic center. According to Mr. Gualichico, they were 
vendors in the historic center, just like everyone else and had a right to enter the 
project. They also wanted to be located in the historic center; the municipality would 
not consider relocation in the historic center. After many meetings, General Cobos 
and the negotiation team of the UECP were removed from the negotiation process 
with the wholesale vendors. In the end Mr. Gualichico negotiated directly with the 
mayor and the town council (Cobos 4/30/2008; Estrella, 4/24/2008; Gualichico, 
1/15/2008). Mr. Gualichico and his association were politically aligned with the 
Socialist party in Ecuador and Mayor Moncayo’s party, the Democratic Left, had 
strong ties, allowing the wholesalers a special political space. Mr. Gualichico 
proposed the expropriation of an old building known as Cablec, located in the south of 
Quito. The agreement arrived at required the wholesale vendors, approximately 1,800, 
to purchase the property. This required an investment of US$2,150 per vendor. Mr. 
Gualichico’s association arranged bank financing as well as assistance from the 
National Financial Corporation. The municipality and the ECH co-financed the design 
and construction of the new building, which has 2083 market stalls. The project was 
finally approved in May 2003, construction began in October, and the building opened 
for business on August 9, 2004. This is one of the few instances where the vendors 
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feel their sales have increased and their economic situation has improved (Gualichico, 
1/15/2008).51 
According to Ms. Estrella, allowing the wholesalers to participate altered the 
project and should not have been permitted. As a group, they are not economically 
poor, and many are manufacturers. They also extend informal forms of credit to the 
small vendors. Ms. Estrella felt that including the wholesalers distorted the project. At 
the time of research, the wholesalers sold seven days a week, instead of two, as well 
as not exclusively in bulk. Small vendors find this unfair and believe the municipality 
should reduce their sale days to two days a week, as before. Their relocation and 
ability to sell daily has disrupted the original order in the markets. The UECP was 
trying to settle the dispute; however there is little legal recourse. One of the 
unanticipated consequences of the relocation was a restructuring of the unwritten rules 
of the informal vendors. The small vendors feel that the wholesalers disregard the 
code of conduct that was respected before relocation.  
Illegal Goods 
The issue of stolen and illegal goods was also a problem faced by the 
municipality. According to Lourdes Rodriguez, there were 2 or 3 associations who 
dealt in the re-sale of stolen goods. The municipality did not want to include these 
associations in the relocation project. They were aware of the associations, and 
requested receipts for the products if the vendors wanted to be included. The one 
instance of municipal force took place on September 23, 2001. The municipality 
removed 70 street stalls from the 24 de Mayo area. This was due to the fact that the 
municipality was informed that items sold in this area were illegal in nature, mostly 
stolen products, and the municipality decided not to engage in negotiations with 
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 See chapter 6 for a discussion of the economic situation of the markets 
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vendors or associations who dealt in stolen or illegal goods. There are indications that 
the vendors of the Montufar commercial center today are dealing in stolen goods; the 
municipality was not successful in excluding all of the vendors of stolen or illegal 
goods from the negotiation process entirely (Carrion F., 11/9/2007; Lopez S. 
5/6/2008; Montalvo, 3/3/2008). A recent operative by the national police resulted in 
the confiscation of over 1,500 cellular phones, laptops, computers, radios, and other 
electronics that were determined to be of unknown origins in the Montufar 
Commercial Center. In addition, a number of stalls were closed until the problem of 
stolen goods can be resolved in this commercial center (El Comercio, 10/22/2009).  
Dealing with the Mafias  
One of the principal goals of the municipality was to break the mafia 
organizations. These organizations threatened several municipal officers engaged in 
the negotiations (Cobos, 3/30/2008; Moreira, 3/10/2008; Rodriguez, 4/30/2008; 
Chacon, 4/22/2008; Estrella, 4/24/2008). According to Lourdes Rodriguez, “the 
occupation of public space by the informal vendors who were organized in 
organizations which had non-democratic forms of functioning, more or less of 
extortion…the most difficult task was to break these chiefdoms, the control of these 
people (Rodriguez, 4/30/2008).” According to some municipal representatives, the 
municipality was aware of over-charging by the association leaders for their members’ 
participation in the relocation project (Ribandeneira, 5/7/2008; Estrella, 4/24/2008; 
Cobos, 4/30/2008). Rocio Estrella stated, “… suppose the cost was 200 USD, the 
leaders charged 220 USD, the margin for the directive, we knew but it was one of 
those things that was permissible because in reflection it was, how much is the historic 
center worth? Do we lose the historic center or recuperate it (Estrella, 4/24/2008)?” 
One of the conditions of the new commercial centers is the prohibition of associations 
to charge their members association fees; this has resulted in the breakdown and 
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dissolution of many associations. In addition, the municipality prohibits the sale of the 
stalls for seven years. This had two objectives. First, was to prevent creditors from 
possessing the stalls. The second was to prevent a sale and then a return to the streets 
(Montalvo, 3/3/2008). Many of the municipal administrators of the commercial 
centers continue to have problems with the mafias, but mostly in the form of creditors 
(Lopez F., 4/11/2008; Davila, 3/12/2008; Lopez S., 5/6/2008; Marin, 5/6/2008).52  
Verification Process 
In October, 1999 the AZC began a process of verification, to ensure the 
vendors had occupied public space in the historic district. This continued through 
Paco Moncayo’s administration with the assistance of the Commission for the Civic 
Control of Corruption, to oversee and verify the process. This was critical, as there 
was a great deal of controversy over the registration of vendors and allocation of 
stalls. Vendors were asked to register with the AZC and identify their association or as 
independent if not affiliated. In order to verify that the registered vendors had worked 
in the historic center for at least three years, the municipality compiled a book of 
vendors by association called the Padron de Commerciantes. Meetings were held with 
each association called recognition assemblies. During these assemblies, the names 
listed in the Padron were called out loud and members were asked to verify the 
membership of each individual. In many instances, association leaders had registered 
family members and friends who did not work in the historic center. In some cases 
these names were removed, in others the municipality found it difficult to prove that 
they did not work in the historic center, as they feel association members were 
pressured into not identifying false registrants (Cobos 4/30/2008; Estrella, 4/24/2008; 
Moreira 3/10/2008; Rodriguez 4/30/2008; Ribandeneira, 5/9/2008). When there was a 
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doubt the person was asked to present themselves at a recognition meeting and the 
entire organization would have to verify his or her membership. According to Ms. 
Estrella, the principal reasons the vendors did not identify false registrants was fear 
and second in the world of informality everyone protects each other. Catholic 
University students were trained and paid to verify the vendors in their street stalls 
(Cobos, 4/30/2008). Over 5,100 vendors were verified in this process by May 2001. 
Moncayo’s administration put new regulations on who could register. The vendors 
had to be actually working in the streets of the historic center at the time of the 
negotiation for a minimum of three years and they could not have other market stalls, 
offices, or any other type of work in order to qualify. The AZC created a database and 
cross referenced the list with other public institutions. They discovered that registered 
vendors had other retail locations, were no longer in the country, were dead, or that 
entire families were registered (Arregui 5/15/2008; Cobos, 4/30/2008; Rodriguez, 
4/30/2008). Some associations petitioned the municipality to exclude false 
inscriptions, others went along. The Independent Mideros Association, which has 88 
members and was concerned about exclusion from the Hermano Miguel Commercial 
Center, stated “The 88 members (of our association) paid to enter the Hermano 
Miguel and we were being left out and in our place were going to be people who were 
owners of other stores or who have stalls in other commercial centers. We demanded a 
new revision of the lists (Informant 5, 2/5//2008).” In the end, in order to move the 
project forward, the municipality had to accept that certain associations registered 
members who were not really vendors in the historic center (Cobos, 4/30/2008; 
Rodriguez, 4/30/2008).  
In addition it is believed that many false associations proliferated during the 
last phases of the negotiation. According to Arregui and Cobos, vendors denounced 
false association leaders who were attempting to charge for market stalls that did not 
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exist or that they did not have the right to sell. According to Washington Gomez of the 
Union of Independent Associations of Pichincha, his organization received many 
complaints from individuals who were tricked into paying false inscription fees 
(Gomez, 3/7/2008).  
Distribution of the Market Stalls 
The majority of the market stalls were assigned in blocks to associations in 
corresponding commercial centers in accordance with the agreements signed with the 
municipality. In most cases, the vendors were located in the market closest to their 
street retail location. The associations were then responsible for using a lottery system 
to designate the location of the members within the assigned stalls of the market. 
Many irregularities in the lotteries were discovered by the municipality and vendors. 
Some vendors solicited the help of the municipality to revise the allocation of stalls. In 
some cases the municipality was able to intervene, in others no. Vendors reported that 
the lottery system did not function as intended. The most attractive spots (for example 
near an entrance or on the first floor) are occupied by the association board, family 
members or were given to members willing to pay a fee to the association leadership 
in exchange for a particular location.  
New Ordinances 
Given the custom of Quiteños to shop in the streets, the vendors requested a 
revision to ordinance 29, which regulated informal commerce in the historic center. 
The revision included a new clause that would not only penalize the vendor, but also 
the client for purchasing products from street vendors. The revision was approved in 
January of 2002, and would be effective from the date of relocation onwards. Like 
other ordinances discussed in Chapter 4, it is rarely enforced (Barrazueta, 3/11/2008).  
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SRI – Internal Revenue Service 
An important aspect of the project was a municipal agreement with the SRI 
(Servicio de Rentas Internas – Internal Revenue Service), a federal agency, that would 
allow the vendors to remain small informal retailers. The objective of the project was 
not to formalize the vendors and collect value added tax, but rather to recuperate the 
public space, improve the work conditions of the vendors and at the same time 
maintain their status as small scale retailers. At the time of research vendors did not 
report any earnings or pay any tax to the SRI (Montalvo 3/3/2008; Ribandeneira, 
5/7/2008). However, at the national level, the laws were changing in 2007 due to a 
constitutional assembly. On December 29, 2007, the Internal Tributary Regimen 
approved a fixed payment for small scale retailers and vendors with sales less than 
60,000 US dollars and 10 employees, known as the Simplified Tax Regimen (RISE). 
Each industry requires a different tax. Table 17 shows the new taxes for small 
businesses, who as of January 1, 2008 are now obliged to register with SRI and pay 
the RISE tax. As indicated in the table, small retailers, the category which includes the 
historic center vendors, contribute significantly less than service, manufacturing, 
construction, and hotels and restaurants. They contribute similarly as transportation 
and agriculture and mining. According to the SRI, the payments are different for each 
industry in accordance with profitability, as well social and political criteria discussed 
in the national constitutional assembly (SRI, 2009).  
The RISE tax does not withhold taxes, does not require the vendor to create a 
receipt with each sale or pay the standard value added tax of 15% and there is no 
obligation to implement an accounting system. The only requirement is registration 
with the SRI and the payment of the monthly tax in accordance with the vendor’s 
declaration of gross monthly sales. Business owners who begin to pay the RISE tax 
are eligible for social security, state health services, and retirement. In addition, the 
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state has created an evaluation system that would allow the owners to collect points 
that would increase their access to micro credit. Lastly, they are eligible for training 
and technical assistance. Although this is a federal law, the municipality at the time of 
research organized information sessions for the vendors in the commercial centers 
about the changes taking place (Montalvo, 3/3/2008). In addition, 92% of the vendors 
I spoke with are positive about the changes. The tax payments are small, due to heavy 
lobbying at the constitutional assembly by vendor associations, and in exchange for 
the small payments they receive access to services they have been excluded from for 
decades. Most feel as long as the payments remain reasonable, they are willing to 
participate in the tax scheme.  
The AZC estimated in 1996 that the majority of traders earned between 
US$100 and 215 dollars a month (IMQ, 1996, p. 21). Although the vendors’ incomes 
were low, the municipality estimated that the vendors would save approximately 
US$200 a month in storage and transport costs (cargador) by relocating to permanent 
stalls. In addition they would save time in setting up and taking down the stall each 
day (AZC, 1999).53 
Regardless of the proposed savings, developing a cost and financing scheme 
that was affordable for the majority of vendors was difficult. The majority of vendors 
are heavily indebted, mostly with informal forms of credit which are very expensive. 
In addition, given their informal income, they are not eligible, under traditional terms, 
for bank credit (Montalvo, 3/3/2008). The original cost structure during Roque 
Sevilla´s administration was presented to the vendors in dollars. After some 
negotiation, the vendors and municipality agreed on a new cost structure that was later  
 
                                                 
 
53 Most vendors would arrive in the historic center between 4am and 5am to have the stall ready by 
7am (Hanley, 2000). 
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Table 17: RISE Tax Structure for Small Retailers 
  Tax obligation to SRI USD by Industry 
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0 - 5,000 0 - 417 1 3 1 3 5 1 1 
5,001 - 
10,000 
 417 - 
833 3 16 5 11 19 2 2 
10,001 - 
20,000 
833 - 
1,667 6 32 10 23 38 3 3 
20,001 - 
30,000 
1,667 - 
2,500 11 60 18 43 66 4 5 
30,001 - 
40,000 
2,500 - 
3,333 15 91 25 61 105 13 8 
40,001 - 
50,000 
3,333 - 
4,157 20 131 32 95 144 27 12 
50,001 - 
60,000 
4,167 - 
5,000 26 180 45 135 182 49 15 
Source: SRI, n.d.54Costs and Financing 
 
publicly disseminated through a pamphlet distributed to the vendors in Sucres (table 
18).The registration fee was S/ 200,000 ($16.97) to reserve a stall. In addition, fees for 
the property deed were S/ 600,000 ($50.90) when paid with cash or S/ 1,000,000 
($84.85) when paid with credit.  
The credit prices indicated in Table 18 include the interest paid over 36 
months. Although the municipality was able to arrange formal forms of credit with 
local banks, the banks found the vendors to be a high risk group, even with municipal 
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 This pamphlet was disseminated in 2008 
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backing, resulting in high interest rates and an almost doubling of the purchase price 
after 3 years. In an effort to encourage vendors to relocate outside of the historic 
center, the municipality offered the Camal market, located in the south of Quito, at a 
significantly lower rate than the historic center markets. 
The Front of Defense signed a loan agreement with Banco Solidario for S/ 
5,350,000 to finance the construction of their members’ interior stalls of the 
commercial centers El Tejar, Hermano Miguel, Ipiales, La Merced, and Montufar. 
The municipality proposed a subsidy of the real cost of the stalls by 50% and arranged 
for financing of up to 24 months. The down payment required for participation was 
250,000 sucres. However, the vendors later negotiated a 36 month financing scheme. 
However, with a new mayoral administration, and dollarization in January 
2000, these prices were no longer valid. Mayor Moncayo enlarged the project, adding 
three commercials centers to the original proposal, as well as a market for the 
wholesale vendors: Ipiales del Sur, Ipiales del Norte, San Martin, and Cablec for the 
wholesale vendors.55 The municipality, through financing from the ECH and 
FONSAL, invested USD$ 11,630,000 in the construction of the commercial centers 
with 5,410 spaces (table 18). In addition, the ECH contributed US$ 245,809 in 
promotional campaigns to inform the public about the changes in the historic center.  
The final prices paid for the market stalls are not public information; Mayor 
Moncayo negotiated different prices with different vendor associations (Estrella, 
4/24/2008 and Moreira, 3/10/2008).56 The lowest price paid by the association 
                                                 
 
55
 The Sanguna commercial center, part of R. Sevilla’s original proposal, was never constructed, as the 
vendors and the municipality never arrived at an agreement. At the time of research the AZC was still 
negotiating with this group. 
56
 Mayor Moncayo’s administration did not publish the stall prices publicly. The author found limited 
references to prices in AZC meeting minutes and UECP internal documents which revealed that 
different associations paid different prices for similar stalls. In addition, municipal representatives and 
vendors verified that the prices paid varied by association. Unfortunately a clear list of prices by 
association was not made available to the author during the research period.  
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Table 18: Cost of Stalls 1999 in Sucres and USD (Exchange Rate 1999 $1 = S/ 
11,786) 
Commercial Center Price - Cash Price - Credit 
El Tejar S/ 7,800,000  S/ 13,000,000 US$ 661.80 US$ 1,103 
  
    
Hermano Miguel S/ 7,800,000 S/ 13,000,000 US$ 661.80 US$ 1,103 
  
    
Granada S/ 6,600,000 S/ 11,000,000 US$ 559.98 US$ 933.31 
  
    
Montufar S/ 5,340,000 S/ 8,900,000 US$ 452.96 US$ 755.13 
  
    
La Merced S/ 4,800,000 S/ 8,000,000 US$ 407.26 US$ 678.77 
  
    
Ipiales-Mires S/ 9,000,000 S/ 15,000,000 US$ 763.62 US$ 1,272.7 
  
    
El Camal S/ 4,200,000 S/ 7,000,000 US$ 356.35 US$ 583.92 
  
    
Sanguna S/ 10,200,000 S/ 17,000,000 US$ 865.43 US$ 1,442.39 
Source: AZC, 1999 
 
Libertad, Paz, y Justicia, was US$60. In the Sevilla administration, the prices 
for the stalls were public and non-negotiable. Many vendors complained that the 
prices for the stalls were negotiated by association, and similar stalls were sold at 
different prices. Ms. Estrella stated, “The criteria changed, that happened in the 
change of administration, the philosophy of the project and the people of the former 
administration were firmer with the issues. The first standard that they achieved was 
  
 
203 
that everything would be equal, but later there were associations who were sold stalls 
for US$70 and others who paid over US$1000 (Estrella, 2008).” According to General 
Cobos there was no other way to reach a consensus. General Cobos recognizes that 
this admittedly was not fair; however the priority of the municipality was a 
recuperation of public space, not fairness (Cobos, 4/30/2008). General Cobos notes 
that the costs were still subsidized around 50% and financing was available for 36 
months (Ibid).  
 
Table 19: Commercial Center Actual Construction Costs and Number of Stalls 
Commercial Center Cost in USD Number of Stalls 
Hermano Miguel 5,500,000 1,602 
El Tejar 200,000 1,114 
La Merced 400,000 185 
Nuevo Amanecer 20,000 185 
Ipiales Mires 300,000 209 
Granada 1,500,000 430 
Montufar 500,000 411 
San Martin 1,300,000 185 
Ipiales del Sur 1,500,000 346 
Chiriyacu 380,000 593 
Ipiales del Norte 30,000 150 
Source: IMQ, 2008 
 
Many of the vendors were prohibited from obtaining bank loans due to their 
credit history. In many cases, the municipality provided financing for the market 
stalls. Given the credit history of the vendors, the banks served as a collection place 
for the vendors to make payments, but in the end the municipality was primarily 
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responsible for the payments, as the banks considered the vendors too risky 
(Montalvo, 3/3/2008). As the construction phase was coming to a close, many of the 
vendors still had not made initial payments on the stalls. At this point, the 
municipality needed to decide whether to wait for the vendors to make payments or to 
relocate the vendors and try to collect the payments after their relocation in the 
commercial centers (Ibid). Given the importance of recuperating the public space, the 
municipality decided to move ahead with the relocation, regardless of the state of 
payments (Montalvo, 3/3/2008).  
RELOCATION MAY 2003 
From August 2000 until May 2003, approximately 1400 meetings took place, 
of which Mayor Moncayo personally attended 80 (AZC, 2003). Agreements were 
reached with all 96 associations and all vendors who wished to participate were 
offered a space in one of the eleven new markets. However, arriving at an agreement 
for the official relocation proved difficult. 
 The municipality had organized everything for a relocation beginning in 
December 2002. However the vendors refused to relocate around the Christmas 
holiday. After Christmas, came Valentine’s Day, Carnival, among other holidays and 
the vendors did not want to relocate, as they feared sales would decrease. After 
significant negotiating with the vendors, the date of May 24, 2003 was agreed upon 
for the relocation into the new municipal markets. The vendors agreed that they all 
needed to move inside the commercial centers at the same time. The reasons were to 
ensure that everyone relocated and vacated the area and that no one would be left on 
the streets, giving advantage to certain vendors. Some vendors still dissented from the 
final decision, as Ipiales del Sur, Ipiales del Norte, Chiriyacu, and San Martin were 
not completed. Ipiales del Sur and Chiriyacu were completed in December 2003. San 
  
 
205 
Martin was completed in August 2005 and Ipiales del Norte was still under 
construction at the time of research in 2008.  
 The Front of Defense was the first organization to accept the date of May 24, 
2003. Acceptance by this organization made the negotiation and later acceptance by 
other associations easier, as the Front represented the most vendors (Cobos, 
4/30/2008). The mayor and other municipal officials toured the new commercial 
centers on May 21, 2003 to ensure that everything was ready for the relocation.  
The municipality relocated the vendors by association into the new 
commercial centers or temporary locations for those whose markets were not 
completed over two weeks. The vendors received the keys to their stalls on this day, 
as the Mayor and other municipal officials inaugurated the new markets, known as 
Discount Commercial Centers (Centros Comerciales del Ahorro), or by the slogan 
“Good, nice, and cheap (Bueno, bonito, y barato).” 
As the streets were vacated, the Department of Public Works began work 
immediately on the streets and sidewalks, and FONSAL began to construct 
scaffolding on historic buildings (figures 15 and 16). These measures were taken to 
ensure that vendors do not return to occupy the space (Cifuentes, 4/11/2008; Pallares, 
3/27/2008).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 15: Streets after the relocation in the commercial centers
Metropolitan Police, May 2003
 
 
Figure 16: Scaffolding after relocation in commercial centers, 
Metropolitan Police, May 2003
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Language of Control and Responsibility  
The municipal vision of the historic center, of a clean, informal commerce 
free, tourist destination was supported and encouraged both financially and 
ideologically by international agencies, including, but not limited to, the IDB and 
UNESCO. The municipality acted in what they believed was the public’s interest, 
combining an effort to clear the streets of the historic center with a relocation project 
for the informal vendors, particularly since the vendors provide a service to the 
Quiteño public, low cost goods in a relatively central location. Municipal studies 
indicated that the public that generally shops in the historic center come from the 
south of Quito, an area that is considered economically poor (IMQ, 1996; Herrera and 
Cordova, 1998). The social, cultural, and economic differences between municipal 
authorities and the vendors was a clear point of tension during the negotiation. The 
municipal authorities felt that the traders simply could not understand the damage the 
street markets caused not only to the physical structure but also to the overall 
ambience of the historic center. The municipality believed that if the traders could 
understand this, then they would be more willing to cooperate and participate in a 
relocation project.  
In an effort to assist the traders in recognizing the municipal vision of the 
historic center, a language of civic responsibility was used. Municipal officials took 
the traders on tours of the historic center, pointing out sites of patrimony in an attempt 
to make them understand the historical importance of this physical space (Moreira, 
3/10/2008). They held meetings at luxury hotels to teach them about basic manners 
and social conduct (Cobos, 3/30/2008). The language used in the pamphlets and flyers 
distributed to the vendors and the public in the marketing and publicity campaigns 
included phrases such as: 
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 “Remember public space pertains to all citizens. Support the work of the 
recuperation of the historic center. The colonial city is a reflection of our 
identity (AZC, 1999).” 
“Below the inclement weather, with insecurity, disorder and lack of sanitation, 
and exploited by mafias…New commercial centers, comfortable stalls, with 
security, order, and sanitation (IMQ, 2005).” 
“Through training, you become the protagonist of change (IMQ, n.d.).” 
“The People’s Commercial Centers are yours, defend the project, think about 
your future (Ibid).”  
“You, Mr. Vendor are disserved by selling in the street. Due to lack of a 
dignified work space, there are constant fights between vendors…your illegal 
location is taken advantage of (Ibid).” 
“To recuperate the historic center so that it is alive, happy, touristy, and 
marketable, so that it may become a source of integrated development for all 
social sectors, including informal vendors (Ibid).” 
These public printed declarations by the municipality illustrate a paternal 
attitude. They indicate that the vendors themselves are unaware or unwilling to change 
their situation; however with municipal assistance the vendors can transform from 
undignified street traders to proper urban citizens. The transformation of the vendors 
into small retailers working in municipal supported commercial centers will allow the 
municipality to transform the historic center into a happy space, since the presence of 
the street vendors created a gloomy and cheerless environment. 
The municipality viewed its role as defending public space, as well as 
socializing the vendors into civilized citizens that cared about the city, not only their 
economic well being. From the municipality’s perspective, the traders were difficult 
and unwilling to listen to their perspective. The socialization campaign was 
successful, as interviews with traders suggested an interest in helping the municipality 
and contributing their part to preserve the historic center, only not at the expense of 
their economic well being. From the vendors’ perspective, the municipality did not 
understand their economic situation and failed recognize their economic and social 
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needs. However, after several years of negotiation, their visions were reconciled in a 
project that satisfied both parties at the time of relocation. The participatory model 
that characterized the negotiation was successful in reaching a consensus. However, a 
drawback of many participatory projects is poor project design due to consensus 
building which eventually distorts the role of technical planning and evaluation and 
implementation of studies intended to assist in a design of a project with long term 
success. Although both vendors and the municipality were satisfied at the time of 
relocation, the long term viability of the project could be considered flawed, 
particularly due to failure to incorporate market study research in an effort to achieve 
consensus.57  
No Control – No Regulation  
The street vendors are a heterogeneous group, with different socio-economic 
backgrounds and degrees of informality. The organizational structure is not uniform, 
and different types of traders have different interests, as witnessed in the fracturing of 
unity among the associations and organizations. As described in chapter 3, fixed stall 
vendors are not typical informal workers. They represent a highly organized group 
with intricate rules. In fact, the municipal engagement with the vendors revealed that 
fixed stall street vending in the historic center is characterized by self regulation and 
an intricate code of conduct. However, the relocation indicated a breakdown of these 
rules, which were no longer uniformly respected in the new commercial centers.58  
The presence of street vendors in the historic center produced a set of policy 
problems that attracted municipal intervention for decades. Vendor associations of the 
historic center have been engaged in a constant process of negotiation over their terms 
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 See chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the present and potential problems of the project. 
58
 See chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion.  
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of formality (or informality), as the municipality attempted to create order and control 
in this sector of the city. When vendors are united behind the implementation of 
formalization measures, they can play a critical role in those measures’ enforcement. 
Leaders of vending organizations help enforce policies by encouraging compliance. 
However, if leaders oppose formalization measures, they can encourage members not 
to comply. Without the consent of vending organizations, local officials may 
encounter tremendous difficulty enforcing formalization measures, especially given 
the disruptive capacity of the vendors in the form of protests which shut down city 
streets. 
These different interests were reflected in how the vendors were organized and 
how they negotiated with the municipality. Originally the traders came to the table 
with a unified perspective that they can do as they wish in the historic center, with no 
controls or regulations. As some associations saw the benefits of semi-formalization 
and relocation into the commercial centers this unity dissolved.  
Although the lack of unity contributed to a long negotiation process, it also 
created a space for dialogue that might not have materialized if the vendors remained 
united behind a policy of remaining on the streets. This fracture allowed the 
municipality to negotiate with associations individually, instead of as a group. In 
particular, during Paco Moncayo’s administration, it permitted the municipality to 
reach different relocation conditions with different associations. Each association had 
a different set of terms and conditions, as well as thresholds for reaching an 
agreement. Once the municipality was able to win over key associations and a critical 
number of the vendors, the remaining associations were clamoring for a space at the 
negotiation table, in fear of being displaced and/or completely left out of the project. 
The vendors that entered the negotiation later or after relocation often did so under 
poorer conditions, for example without the municipal subsidy. However, only with the 
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support of the majority of vendor associations and the municipal government was a 
comprehensive re-organization, modernization, and relocation of the fixed stall street 
vendors possible. This was critical, because the vendors who had come to early 
agreements with the municipality had clearly stated their relocation depended on the 
streets clear of informal commerce. If a significant number of vendors refused to 
participate, a forceful eviction of the remaining vendors would probably have been 
necessary. The acquisition of the support of the majority of vendors through a two 
way dialogue allowed the municipality to avoid a potential forced eviction and 
resulted in a peaceful relocation of the street vendors of the historic center of Quito. 
However, local officials had to support that formalization regime; if instead they 
chose a strategy of partial or selective enforcement, they would have generated 
substantial opposition among vending organizations. In addition, the municipality 
needed to demonstrate the political will and patience to negotiate in what was a very 
long process. Without the will of the municipality to find a non-violent solution, at 
whatever cost, both time and financially, the relocation would not have been possible.  
In the historic center of Quito, different cultural, social, and economic interests 
came into conflict over this space. The struggle for space in the historic district was a 
struggle for power. It was also a struggle over basic needs and wealth in a local, 
national, and global context. The city center that was abandoned by the upper classes 
to the urban poor had been reevaluated for its heritage and potential income 
generating opportunities, such as tourism and improved real estate values, for the 
municipality. International organizations considered the space special, and worth 
international recognition and financing. Although street markets were deemed 
incompatible with the new vision of the historic center, the municipality found that 
some traders possessed high levels of organization and political influence that did not 
allow for simple authoritarian removal from the historic center. In fact, the local 
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politicians needed to integrate the fixed post traders into their agenda and campaign 
promises. Mayor Mahuad, Mayor Sevilla, and Mayor Moncayo all recognized the 
importance of the vendors’ votes, and employed this in their campaign promises, 
offering either promises to remain on the street or promises of new work spaces. 
Although the informal vendors lost the rights to work in public space, they were able 
to levy the international financing to create new work spaces which include access to 
benefits not available to them on the streets.  
However, prior to the newfound political importance of the fixed stall vendors, 
the history of the relationship between the traders and the municipality was 
characterized by control and regulation not participation and engagement. Although 
the municipality often lacked the resources to enforce the ordinances and regulate the 
vendors, municipal plans indicate that the authorities found street vending a serious 
problem. In 1994, this changed as the municipality obtained US$51 million IDB loan 
to rehabilitate the historic center. The relocation of the vendors became a priority 
under the loan conditions, and several million were dedicated to relocation and 
modernization of the vendors. The loan made available financing for a relocation 
project and paid, in part, for both the construction of the commercial centers and 
training workshops. Without this financing, a participatory process probably would 
not have occurred, as financial constraints would have prohibited the multi-million 
dollar investment made in the relocation from the streets. The municipality attempted 
to engage all vendors, but found that roaming vendors lacked the organization 
necessary to integrate them into the project and the municipality lacked the political 
will given their disorganized state. The fixed stall vendors, who operated under 
intricate rules and regulations of their own, were organized and vocal about their 
vision for a relocation project. When both parties arrived at the negotiating table it 
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was inevitable that they brought different assumptions which reflected their prior 
interactions and their different visions of the historic center.  
A Meeting of the Minds: From Independence to Paternalism 
Bringing these two perspectives together took over 5 years, as many 
associations resisted the changes to their traditional vending structure. It might have 
been easier for the municipality to revert to control and oppression to bring about the 
recuperation of public space. However, both the municipality and the traders reflected 
on their own interests during the negotiations, bringing about a real and meaningful 
discussion between these two groups. The fundamental lesson to be learned is that the 
reordering of informal markets and public space can result in inclusive and 
participatory planning which benefits not only the municipality and international 
organizations, but also the street vendors when a process of meaningful dialogue takes 
place. 
Quito provides an exemplary case for cities struggling with how to manage 
and re-order informal commerce, particularly, but not exclusive to heritage sites. 
However, the fact that the historic center of Quito is a world heritage site made the 
availability of the funds necessary to carry out a relatively expensive project possible. 
This might not be the case for other cities. Nevertheless, the municipality of Quito 
was, at the time of research, attempting to replicate the process from the historic 
center and modernize informal commerce in other parts of the city. For example, the 
Cumanda bus station was recently relocated to the south of the city, and the informal 
vendors who worked in this area were incorporated into a modernization of informal 
commerce linked to this project. Although the same type of financing is not available, 
the municipality was still attempting to develop similar projects on a smaller scale.  
Although the municipality considers the overall relocation a great success, 
they also recognize some mistakes made along the way. Rocio Estrella, who remains a 
  
 
214 
consultant to INNOVAR on modernization of informal commerce in other parts of the 
city commented that they attempt to engage all vendors in the dialogue process instead 
of working primarily with the association or federation leaders. Ms. Estrella noted that 
they no longer negotiate over the list of vendors; if the municipality believes a name is 
falsely registered, the vendor is removed. They do this to avoid the inclusion of non-
vendors, such as family and friends, from participating in the process. Lastly, they no 
longer negotiate over the relocation space. The municipality makes a decision 
regarding an appropriate location from a planning perspective. This is done to avoid 
the multitudes of proposals and long drawn out negotiations over which group is 
located where (Estrella, 4/24/2008).  
The municipality learned that open dialogue was crucial, although it may 
result in a lengthy negotiation. In addition, convincing a small number of associations 
of the benefits of relocation produced a snowball effect which eventually brought 
almost all vendors into an agreement with the municipality. However, new 
negotiations limit the points of negotiation and have allowed for a swifter process. 
The municipality also hopes to limit deceptive practices that occurred in the historic 
center, such as the registration and participation of non-vendors and fraudulent fees 
sometimes charged by associations and their leaders, through a stricter approach to 
negotiation.  
The transformation of the fixed stall street vendors into semi-formal small 
scale retailers provides an interesting example of a compromise between formality and 
informality. The original agreement with the SRI made the vendors feel that they were 
not being offered modernization in exchange for future taxation purposes. The 
subsequent RISE tax in 2008 provides the vendors the opportunity to participate in 
social programs in exchange for a small tax that does not require expensive 
accounting methods and receipts. The eradication of mafia type fees and assistance 
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with formal forms of credit could assist vendors in escaping the viscous cycle of 
poverty that many experience. The potential of property ownership could contribute to 
an accumulation of wealth, rather than a monthly rent which would only drain 
resources.  
The case of Quito demonstrates that a peaceful, non-forceful relocation of 
street vendors is possible. It also illustrates that there are compromises between 
informality and formality when the political will exists at the local and national level. 
Quito represents a case where the political will to recuperate public space was more 
important than the potential tax revenue of formalization; not all cities may experience 
similar circumstances and modernization of informal vendors may represent a scheme 
to increase state revenues.  
The associations which were once financially and economically independent 
have weakened and dissolved in favor of groupings by commercial center. Each 
commercial center now exhibits its own strengths and weaknesses, and the vendors 
have unified behind their current location, rather than their previous loyalty to an 
association. Today the relationship between the municipality and vendors could be 
referred to as paternalistic. The municipality takes care of the traders in an effort to 
keep them in the markets and off the streets. Many traders believe it is the 
municipality’s responsibility to take care of them, as they gave up what they view as 
their economically lucrative spaces on the streets for mediocre or low sales in the 
markets. Chapter 6 describes the current state of the commercial centers and the 
relationship between the municipality and the relocated vendors at the time of 
research in 2008. 
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CHAPTER 6 
From the Streets to Commercial Centers: The Road to a New 
Historic Center 
The completed commercial centers were inaugurated on May 24, 2003. 
Although the vendors remain indoors various matters of concern remain for both the 
municipality and the vendors. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the municipality moved the 
vendors regardless of the payment status of the vendor; many of them had not made 
initial payments in 2003 and remained delinquent in 2008. The municipality needed to 
find ways of encouraging the vendors to make payments in order to transfer 
ownership of the individual stall and the administration of the commercial centers to 
the vendors, a principal objective of the project. In the interim, the municipality is 
responsible for the management, as well the maintenance and operating costs. This 
chapter examines the state of the new commercial centers in 2008 and argues that the 
transfer from the street to indoors has created new forms of informality. This chapter 
also argues that the goal of cooperative governance of the commercial centers is 
flawed and may contribute to the eventual failure of the project. The last part of the 
chapter analyzes the progress of the economic development component of the 
rehabilitation project since the relocation in 2003. 
The analysis with regard to the vendor relocation is drawn largely from two 
sources: (1) a survey carried out by the SDS consultancy for INNOVAR of 1,492 
vendors in April 200859 and (2) 54 interviews by the author with vendors from 
January to May 2008 in the nine commercial centers. In addition three vendors who 
will relocate to the Ipiales del Norte market were interviewed. I also interviewed nine 
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 Surveys completed per commercial center: Ipiales del Sur (182), Granada (203), La Merced (36), 
San Martin (60), Hermano Miguel (307), Ipiales Mires (100), Chiriyacu (231), El Tejar (241), Montufar 
(185) 
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managers, one from each commercial center, the director of the UECP, Luis 
Montalvo, and UECP legal advisor and professor of planning at the University Central 
of Ecuador, Marcelo Ribandeneira.  
DEGREES OF INFORMALITY 
This new form of informality is characterized by ownership, or at least the 
potential ownership, of a market stall. Working conditions have improved, as well as 
access to social services has been provided through the municipality. However, the 
income earning characteristics of the vendors remain, at least in part, precarious and 
only slightly above subsistence levels. In essence, the earnings and precariousness of 
the work remain informal, but the work conditions and services available appear more 
formal.  
According to Beneria and Floro, the informal economy, as with the household, 
performs a vital function in social reproduction of labor. Informal vendors and traders 
provide goods and services at very low prices. They do this through low profit 
margins and sometimes losses on the products for sale as well little or no wages for 
their labor. This helps reduce the cost of living for lower-income workers thus 
lowering the cost of social reproduction. Thus, the vendors in Quito, for the most part, 
are an example survivalist or subsistence work rather than a process of accumulation 
(Beneria and Floro, 2003). Subsistence work often represents the poorest social 
groups and women are often over represented in this sector. In Quito, 68% of the 
market stalls are registered to women. The costs of working in the informal sector 
often imply long hours of work and high degrees of vulnerability and risk.  
Through ownership, the municipality hoped to transform the informal vendors 
from vulnerable workers into small entrepreneurs. The project aimed to increase 
vendor income through the reduction of costs such as association and cargador fees 
and street space rental. However, research indicates this transformation has not taken 
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root in the new commercial centers and the majority of vendors still earn low profits 
and carry high debt.  The design of the project has in part contributed to stagnating 
sales; however, other external factors have also contributed to the low earnings of 
vendors, such as new forms of competition.  
NEW MANAGEMENT, NEW RULES 
The relocation of the street vendors into commercial centers created new forms 
of rules and regulations, quite different from those on the streets. The eventual 
management under the law of horizontal property was a key point of negotiation and 
agreement between the municipality and the vendors. The vendors’ desired self-
management and project was designed to transfer this responsibility after a temporary 
period of municipal management. However, the manner in which co-operatives and 
mutual associations are governed can be problematic; the occurrence of a variety of 
problems such as mismanagement, financial scandals and the failure of democracy has 
lead to the quality of cooperative governance being questioned (Lees, 1995; Lees and 
Volkers, 1996). Serious concerns have been raised about the democratic legitimacy of 
boards due to low levels of member participation and their effectiveness to manage 
administrators, as well as protect the interests of members and other relevant 
stakeholders. Many of these problems can already be witnessed, as the municipality is 
attemtping to bring into effect board management, many of these problems. 
Additionaly, the commercial centers of the historic center of Quito will likely revert to 
street level governance, which was characterized by many of the drawbacks of 
cooperative governance, if a complete transfer of management responsibilty under the 
laws of horizontal properts is carried out as intended in the project design. 
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Governance Structure of the Commercial Centers 
 Each commercial center is managed by a municipal appointed administrator, 
or in the cases of Granada and El Tejar, the managers are former vendors, respectively 
Luis Cuenca and Angelita Vega.60 The manager is responsible for overseeing the day 
to day functioning of the commercial centers and management of the vendors. The 
rules of the streets no longer apply; vendors must attend their stalls a minimum of five 
days a week. The commercial centers have opening hours and delivery times which 
must be respected.  
On the streets, vendors opened their stalls when they wished and worked the 
hours desired. This is no longer permitted, and lack of attendance can result in 
penalties as well as ineligibility to continue to participate in the project. Stall workers 
must be the owner or family members; only under certain circumstances may the 
vendor hire an employee. In certain cases, an employee has been authorized for 
vendors who are ill or too old to work daily. A petition may be submitted to the UECP 
and an evaluation of each individual case is made. The administrator is responsible for 
taking attendance daily. The vendor may not transfer ownership or rent the market 
stall. Once the vendor has completed all payments and the transfer of full ownership is 
obtained, he or she must wait seven years before selling or renting the stall. In unusual 
cases, when the owner has died or permanently left the country, a sale has been 
permitted by the UECP. Vendors must also respect the public spaces of the 
commercial centers; they may only place a limited number of items in the hallway 
space and trash must be disposed of properly.  
Although the rules are rigid, particularly given the manner in which the street 
markets functioned, they are designed to create order and control from what was 
considered, from the municipal perspective, a disorganized and disorderly situation. 
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 Mr. Cuenca and Ms. Vega state that they were selected by their association members as managers. 
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The municipality hopes that the markets will function much like a private shopping 
mall, with regular opening hours, clean and clutter free public areas and a secure and 
hospitable environment for the clients. By prohibiting the re-sale and rental of the 
stalls, the municipality hopes to prevent the transfer of the stalls to creditors, both 
formal and informal. The seven year time frame from the complete purchase will 
hopefully allow the majority of the vendors to sort out any financial problems that 
would put at risk their ownership. The objective of the project was to provide the 
primary work space and income generating opportunity for small scale vendors 
through a municipal subsidized program resulting in stall ownership, not a 
supplemental income or a secondary job. Prohibiting the rental of the stall or the 
hiring of an employee was intended to ensure that the stalls are the primary work 
place of the owner.  
90% of the vendors interviewed by the author spoke positively about the rules 
and regulations and indicated that it helps the sales. This was unexpected, given that 
the vendors abided by their own rules prior to relocation; they worked the days and 
hours they desired and often left trash in the streets. The SDS survey indicated that 
only 60% of them are familiar with the new regulations and of those, 89% are in 
agreement with them (SDS, 2008). The managers of the commercial centers are 
responsible for informing the vendors of the rules, and all commercial centers have 
posters indicating them. Overall, the author interviews and the SDS survey reveal a 
difficult transition, particularly due to the unclear division of responsibilities between 
the municipality and vendors.  
Role of Associations 
The vendors were relocated into the commercial centers by association. Three 
commercial centers have as little as one association: the Granada, San Martin, and La 
Merced.  
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Table 20: Commercial Centers and Number of Associations 
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Number of 
Associations 7 22 1 35 6 3 6 1* 14 1 
Federation   FD   FD             
SAV   I   FD             
I   I   I       I FD   
SAV   I   SAV             
FD - Front of Defense, SAV - Small Autonomous Vendors, I - 
Independent (Do not belong to a Federation)    
* This market originally had 2 associations. 1 has 
completely abandoned their stalls.       
Source: UECP, 2008 
 
The Hermano Miguel has 35, which include associations that belong to both 
the Front of Defense and the Small Autonomous Vendors, who clashed during the 
negotiations (table 20). Some of the associations have weakened or dissolved since 
2003, others remain relatively organized. The interviews revealed that reasons for not 
participating in association meetings are the disappearance of the organization, lack of 
interest, lack of confidence in the association, or lack of time to attend meetings. 
Formation of Management Boards 
Each commercial center was required to form a management board61 before 
the commercial centers can be officially transferred to the vendors. The UECP has 
encouraged each commercial center to form a board before the transfer; this will 
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 The board functions in a similar way to a condominium board/association. 
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ensure that training and legal matters can be resolved (Montalvo, 3/3/2008). Some of 
the commercial centers have already formed a board that collaborates with the 
administrator and the UECP. Other commercial centers have encountered difficulty 
and the boards’ functional capacity is limited or positions are vacant (table 20). The 
management boards must be elected by a majority of the general assembly;62 after the 
board is elected a set of rules and regulations must be developed. These regulations 
must be approved by the general assembly as well and may differ from the municipal 
imposed rules. Only Ipiales del Sur has been successful in electing a board and 
drawing up regulations. As of 2008 the other commercial centers are in various states 
of progress. The inability of the vendors to elect management boards can be attributed 
to the internal conflict that exists in some of the commercial centers (table 21).  
The SDS survey, with regard to conflict, was not consistent with my 
interviews. The SDS survey finds the least amount of conflict in the Hermano Miguel 
and Montufar commercial centers, interviews revealed a different picture (table 22).  
The managers of the Hermano Miguel and the Montufar both spoke of inter 
and intra organization conflict, that has repeatedly resulted in physical violence. The 
inability of the vendors to agree on a board has resulted in various tense elections. On 
the contrary, La Merced, reported as having a high level of conflict and disagreement, 
the manager and association president reported little conflict and no violence.  
Interviews with vendors in the Granada commercial center indicated 
dissatisfaction with the management and internal conflict in the El Salvador  
association. The reasons cited had to do with the monthly payments the vendors make 
for maintenance costs. They feel they should not shoulder this responsibility as long 
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 The General assembly is composed of the vendors themselves.  
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Table 21: Election of Management Board as of December 2008 
Commercial Center 
Management 
Boards 
Payments 
Taken Over 
Chiriyacu No progress None 
El Tejar No progress Electricity 
Granada Voluntary 
Commission (not 
elected by the 
general assembly) 
All, except 
infrastructure 
maintenance 
and publicity 
Hermano Miguel In process; 
temporary 
representatives from 
associations 
Individual 
electricity 
Ipiales del Norte* In process N/A 
Ipiales del Sur Management Board 
elected and rules 
approved by the 
general assembly  
Individual 
electricity and 
communal 
electricity 
Ipiales Mires Temporary 
board/commission 
None 
La Merced Management Board 
approved by the 
general assembly 
Communal 
electricity 
Montúfar In process; 
temporary 
representatives by 
passageway 
Individual 
electricity 
San Martín Board 
elected;Investigative 
committee formed 
to examine board 
Individual 
electricity 
Ipiales del Norte remained under 
construction in 2008 and the vendors are 
only temporarily relocated. 
Source: UECP, Interviews with commercial center managers, 2008 
 
as the other commercial centers do not. Mr. Cuenca, the manager of Granada and 
association president, prefers that the commercial center maintain some level 
independence from the UECP, and stated that the vendors have some personal 
responsibility for these expenses (Cuenca, 4/24/2008). However, this can be 
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interpreted as Mr. Cuenca’s inclination to remain outside of the regulations of the 
municipality. 
Ipiales Mires which also indicates a high level of conflict is consistent with the 
interviews. Freddy Lopez, manager, reported the inability of the members to elect a 
board at this commercial center due to disagreements; at the time of research Ipiales 
Mires had a temporary management board appointed by Mr. Lopez, until the vendors 
can democratically elect one. Mr. Marin, manager of the San Martin commercial 
center also reported difficulties in electing a management board, even though there is 
just one association. A management board was elected, but is now under investigation 
by a team of vendors. The association president discussed significant conflict among 
the vendors and difficulty in convincing her members to remain inside the commercial 
center.  
Chiriyacu which the survey indicated moderate levels of internal and 
association conflict has been unable to elect a board. The manager, Mr. Racines, 
reported serious inter-organization conflict that sometimes hinders the day to day 
functioning of the commercial center. El Tejar, which is occupied exclusively by 
Front of Defense vendors, has also been unable to elect a board and 40% of the 
vendors indicated conflict in the management boards. Since the relocation the Front 
has experienced internal conflict, as the unifying goal of negotiation with the 
municipality has disappeared; member associations are more concerned with the day 
to day business of their members than their membership in the federation. 
On average, only 31% of the vendors and 13% of the author interviewed 
vendors support self administration in the SDS survey (table 23). The author 
interviews revealed a variety of reasons the vendors prefer a continuation of municipal 
administration. The principle reason cited is the potential provocation or worsening of 
conflict between the vendors. The second most common reason is the poor 
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Table 22: Vendors Perception of Conflict in Management Boards 
Commercial Center C
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% that perceive 
conflict 50% 40% 67% 24% 56% 30% 61% 15% 63% 
Source: SDS, 2008 
 
management skills of the vendors. Others stated that it would turn into chaos, the 
administrators would look to benefit themselves or return to corrupt practices, would 
increase costs, or that decisions would not be respected. 
 
Table 23: Vendors who support the self-administration of the commercial centers (%) 
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yes 22 38 51 28 41 32 58 17 25 
no 78 62 49 72 59 68 42 83 75 
Source: SDS, 2008 
 
Overall, the vendors seem satisfied with the municipal management system. 
The SDS survey found that over 50% are satisfied or very satisfied with the 
management (table 24). El Tejar has high levels of dissatisfaction; this commercial 
center is managed by vendor and Front president Angelita Vega. Ipiales Mires also 
shows high levels of dissatisfaction; this commercial center has had various managers 
over the years. Freddy Lopez was manager for about one year in April 2008. 
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Previously he was manager of Ipiales del Sur and was transferred to sort out the 
problems that hinder the proper functioning of the Ipiales Mires commercial center. 
Commercial centers where internal conflict among or within associations is 
high, show overall satisfaction with the municipal managers: Hermano Miguel, 
Montufar, and San Martin (table 24). The resolution of conflict between vendors and 
associations is part of the municipal managers’ job responsibilities. Mangers and their 
supervisors often sort out issues of attendance, use of hallway space, trash collection, 
personal conflicts, and any other issues that cause disturbances or complaints. In these 
cases an outside mediator is probably more effective than an association president or 
leader.  
 
Table 24: Evaluation of the Management of Commercial Centers (%) 
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Very Good 4 1 6 7 10 6 6 14 13 
Good 55 29 50 45 37 51 42 58 58 
Regular 17 33 26 32 22 31 42 24 13 
Not Good 24 37 18 16 31 12 10 4 16 
 
Source: SDS, 2008 
 
Ms. Vega and Mr. Cuenca both claim to be democratically elected 
administrators. However, these two markets also show high levels of conflict and in 
the case of El Tejar, overall dissatisfaction with Ms. Vega’s management. These are 
indicators of the replication of street level rules and regulations in the commercial 
centers.  
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MOVING TOWARDS OWNERSHIP 
One of the original points of the negotiation between the municipality and the 
vendors was whether to rent the stalls to the vendors or to create a project that would 
transfer ownership and eventual management of the commercial centers from the 
municipality to the vendors. The vendors preferred ownership, and the municipality’s 
previous lack of success with rental stalls in the La Merced market, made them weary 
of developing a similar project on a large scale. It was decided early in 1999 that the 
new commercial centers would provide a mechanism for the municipality to sell the 
individual market stalls to the vendors and the vendors would eventually manage the 
commercial centers themselves under the laws of horizontal property, or those 
pertaining to a condominium association. The municipality has made varied progress 
in transferring the property to the vendors and in the last year attempted to accelerate 
the process due to the fact that the Mayor Moncayo’s term ended in August 2008.  
By May 2008, 60.79% of the vendors had completed their payments and 
received the property deed of their stall (UECP, 2008). However, ownership varies by 
commercial center (table 24). The Granada, Chiriyacu, and Hermano Miguel have 
high rates of ownership, all over 70%. Other commercial centers, such as La Merced 
and Montufar, have very low rates, 27% and 31% respectively. The unique 
circumstances of La Merced make the percentages misleading; of the stalls that are 
actually in use, only two remain in process and the others have received their property 
deed. For all commercial centers, 17% remain in process and the UECP is hopeful that 
these cases will be resolved before the end of Mayor Moncayo´s term. The remaining 
22% which are deemed ineligible, will either have their case resolved with the help of 
the legal team at the UECP or sold to other vendors if the eligibility requirements are 
not met in a reasonable time frame (Montalvo, 3/3/2008).  
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Table 25: Progress of Ownership Transfer to Vendors  
Progress 
# of 
Stalls 
Full 
Ownership In Process Not eligible Total 
Chiriyacu 593 432 73% 90 15% 42 7% 564 
El Tejar 1,117 450 40% 321 29% 346 31% 1,117 
Granada 430 322 75% 52 12% 56 13% 430 
Hermano 
Miguel 1,604 1,147 72% 158 10% 295 18% 1,600 
Ipiales del 
Norte 47 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Ipiales del 
Sur 353 169 48% 120 34% 53 15% 342 
Ipiales 
Mires 209 94 45% 39 19% 29 14% 162 
La 
Merced 190 52 27% 14 7% 6 3% 72 
Montufar 411 131 32% 5 1% 211 51% 347 
San 
Martin 172 105 61% 15 9% 20 12% 140 
Total 5,126 2,902 57% 814 16% 1,058 21% 4,774 
Source: UECP 2008 
 
There are three reasons the municipality has not been able to transfer 
ownership: (1) lack of payment, (2) improper documentation, or (3) vendor has been 
deemed ineligible to participate in the project (table 25). In most cases, the inability of 
the municipality to transfer ownership is due to lack of payment. The co-management 
of the construction carried out by the Front of Defense has complicated this aspect. In 
the case of the Front, the municipality provided “floor and roof” and the Front 
constructed the interiors of the stalls. The vendors need to present a certification from 
the Front that they have paid for the interior of the stall. Poor accounting on behalf of 
the Front and its association leadership has resulted in a delay of these documents and 
therefore an impediment to full ownership. In an effort to resolve some of the conflicts 
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regarding payments to the Front for the interiors the municipality has intervened and 
in some cases assumed the payments in order to settle disputes (Montalvo, 3/3/2008).  
There are three reasons that cause the vendor to be unable to present proper 
documentation: (1) the inability of the stall holder to prove their affiliation with an 
association or that they were a vendor for at least three years in the historic center, (2) 
a name change (for example due to marriage), (3) the vendor has left the country, but 
as not completed a power of attorney, or a combination of these reasons (table 26).63  
 
Table 26: Reasons for Ineligibility 
Reason 
Lack of 
Payment 
Improper 
Documen-
tation 
Does not 
Open Stall 
2 or more 
problems 
Chiriyacu 14 22 13 7 
El Tejar 184 234 16 88 
Granada 19 40 0 3 
Hermano Miguel 219 47 45 16 
Ipiales del Norte 0 0 0 0 
Ipiales del Sur 27 41 5 20 
Ipiales Mires 2 7 20 0 
La Merced 3 2 4 3 
Montufar 123 114 21 47 
San Martin 3 5 13 1 
Total 594 512 137 185 
Source: UECP 2008 
 
The reason for ineligibility is the failure to respect the rules and regulations of 
the commercial centers, primarily not opening the stall on a regular basis. In 2008, 
UECP budgeted US$ 100,000 for legal assistance to the vendors who have not been 
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 The UECP reported that a number of vendors have left for Spain since the decline of the economic 
situation in Ecuador. This has presented a variety of problems for the UECP as the vendor can no 
longer personally run his stall.   
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able to complete their legal obligations. Until the transfer of ownership is completed, 
the municipality can not transfer management of the commercial centers to the 
vendors. At the time of research, only one commercial center, the Granada, was 
functioning semi-independent of the municipality. The rest remain primarily 
dependent on the municipality. 
MUNICIPAL MAINTENANCE OF COMMERCIAL CENTERS 
The priority of the municipality is the maintenance of commerce free streets in 
the historic center, regardless of the cost. Given the difficulties the municipality 
encountered transferring ownership of the market stalls to the vendors; the 
commercial centers were still not operating under the laws of horizontal property in 
2008. According to municipal officials and the vendors, the original project objectives 
included training for the vendors, the transfer of property under horizontal property 
law, and management of the commercial centers by the vendors, so that the markets 
are eventually self-sustaining. Ms. Estrella notes that the municipality had set aside 
resources for training and technical assistance and the municipality was to ensure that 
the vendors have good sources of credit and financing. However, since relocation, 
training has been limited and only credit for the market stall has been made available 
to the vendors (Estrella, 4/24/2008). Since 2004, the UECP budget and operating costs 
of the commercial centers has ranged from $1.4 to $2.8 million a year (table 26). The 
estimated 2008 budget was over $3 million (table 26). Due to the fact that Mayor 
Moncayo ran for re-election in 2004, a number of the original ideas in the plan were 
pushed aside for political reasons. The vendors were resisting the transfer because the 
municipality provides significant financial support, as well as an independent 
management team. According to Ms. Estrella, withdrawing this support would have 
been politically dangerous for Mayor Moncayo, and could have cost him re-election.   
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The interviews revealed that the vendors recognize their responsibility to take 
over or assist with the maintenance costs of the commercial center. However, the 
majority expressed that their financial situation is too precarious to contribute (table 
20); 47 vendors agreed that the municipality should continue to subsidize the 
maintenance costs until sales in the commercial centers are increased, as well as 
manage the centers. Only the Granda commercial center has assumed a significant 
shore of the operating costs, such as water, electricity, security, and sanitation. Each 
vendor pays a monthly fee of $9.50. However, the manager, Luis Cuenca, notes that 
the municipality, through funds from FONSAL and the UECP, provides financing for 
any infrastructure maintenance or other costs not related to the daily functioning of the 
commercial center. In El Tejar, they are semi-autonomous and each vendor 
contributes $3.47 a month. In addition, this is the only market that rents its communal 
areas. On Tuesday and Saturday wholesale vendors from Atuntaqui (Imbabura 
province) occupy the hallways. According to Ms. Vega, the manager, the rental fees 
account for approximately $2,000 a month in additional income. The municipality 
assumes the remainder of the costs. Ipiales del Sur and La Merced have also assumed 
the responsibility of the electricity costs for communal areas.The vendors of Hermano 
Miguel and Montufar have assumed the costs of electricity for their individual stalls. 
When the municipality stops paying the remainder, each vendor will probably have to 
contribute between $10-11 a month. 
Benefits of Commercial Centers 
In addition to providing an indoor space, the commercial centers offer a 
variety of other benefits subsidized by the municipality. Security was the 
improvement cited most frequently in the interviews; others cited social programs 
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Table 27: Municipal Expenditures for Commercial Centers, 2004-2007 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Category 
Thsd 
US$ 
Per-
cent 
Thsd 
US$ 
Per-
cent 
Thsd 
US$ 
Per-
cent 
Thsd 
US$ 
Per-
cent 
Thsd 
US$ 
Per-
cent 
Salary 362 19% 306 20% N.A. - 339 12% 466 14% 
Basic Services 557 29% 186 12% 229 13% 184 6% 550 17% 
Publicity and 
Events 264 14% 124 8% 308 17% 210 7% 525 16% 
Seucrity 274 14% 253 17% 92 5% 433 15% 100 3% 
Alarm Service - - 84 6% - - 2 0% - - 
Janitorial 
Services 170 9% 156 10% 157 9% 266 9% 315 10% 
Leases 9 0% 15 1% 23 1% 25 1% - - 
Training and 
Studies 42 2% 17 1% 5 0% 10 0% 200 6% 
Social 
Programs - - -   1 0% 15 1% 390 12% 
Operating 
Costs 
(electricity, 
water, etc.) 54 3% 24 2% 11 1% 7 0% - - 
Legal 
Expenses 91 5% 61 4% 37 2% 35 1% 100 3% 
Infrastructure 
Maintenance 
and Repairs 78 4% 268 18% 963 53% 1,358 47% 595 18% 
Information 
Systems and 
Database 
Management - - 2 0% 2 0% 3 0% - - 
Total 1,899 100% 1,496 100% 1,829 100% 2,885 100% 3,241 100% 
Source: UECP, 2007-2008 FONSAL 2004-2006 
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such as health and child care. However, the majority seem pleased to be off the streets 
and in a secure and clean environment.  
Security 
The majority of vendors feel that security has improved in the new commercial 
centers. Although the municipality provides security service in the form of guards and 
electronic alarms, there have been some major incidents. In the Chiriyacu commercial 
center, over US$ 100,000 in goods and merchandise were stolen on November 2006. 
In the San Martin commercial center, two night time break-ins resulted in thousands 
of dollars of merchandise stolen (Marin, 5/7/2008). The vendors of the Montufar 
commercial center reported that although they feel secure in the commercial center, 
their clients experience security problems in the streets surrounding the commercial 
center as they enter and leave due to the insecurity of the location and the type of 
merchandise sold in this center, primarily jewelry and electronics. Overall, 83% of the 
vendors interviewed were positive about the improvements in security. 
Social Programs 
In addition to providing an indoor market space, the project integrated a 
number of social benefits at the request of the vendors. The municipality created an 
organization called the Home of Peace (Hogar de la Paz) with the objective of 
attending to the social needs of the vendors. It is located in a central location in the 
historic center, in a separate building. Since the majority of vendors are women, child 
care was a top priority. Subsidized child care is available for $5 a month at the Home 
of Peace. School age children enrolled in first to seventh grade may also seek 
homework assistance, in a program called “Supervised Homework (Deberes 
Dirigidos).” Vendors may also enroll in the metropolitan health insurance plan at the 
cost of $2.90 per person/month.  
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Although these programs were solicited by the vendors themselves, the 
interviews revealed that many of the vendors are unaware of the services offered, 
although flyers and pamphlets can be found throughout all of the commercial centers. 
For the vendors working in the northern and southern commercial centers, the location 
of the Home of Peace is inconvenient and does not allow them to make use of the 
services. For those working in the historic center, the Home of Peace is conveniently 
located for the majority of the commercial centers. However, only 18 or 33% of the 
vendors interviewed utilized at least one of the services offered.  
The incorporation of child care and other services is not new to municipal 
markets in Quito. A few of the municipal fruit and vegetable markets in the city offer 
subsidized child care to their tenants on the upper floor of the market, including the 
Central Market and the Santa Clara Market. This is particularly important given that 
the majority of vendors are women, and the burden of child care falls primarily on 
them. The failure of the municipality to design the historic center markets with child 
care in each facility is a drawback, and is not practical for those working outside of 
the historic center. This could indicate that if on-site child care is not provided, then 
vendors are more likely to bring their children to their stall instead of to a central child 
care facility, due to time or transportation constraints.  
The municipality may also need to promote the programs or inform the 
vendors of the benefits of the programs. Although the fees seem nominal, to many 
living on day to day earnings, an additional $10 a month may be too costly. However, 
the incorporation of these programs demonstrates attentiveness on the part of the 
municipality to the social needs of the vendors, who often do not have child care 
alternatives or access to health care. For the municipality, the programs are costly; the 
UECP budgeted $390,000 for child care alone in 2008.  
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Infrastructure and Sanitation 
The municipality has employed a janitorial staff that is responsible for the 
daily cleaning of the facilities. In this regard, all 54 vendors interviewed feel their 
situation has improved. However, although they indicate an improvement from the 
street stalls, 6 or 11% categorized the commercial center structures as cheap and the 
interiors, in comparison to some of the other shopping centers in the city, unattractive. 
They feel they lose business to the private shopping centers, such as El Jardin and El 
Recreo, due to the less attractive appearance. However, the private shopping centers 
offer a different range of products, many of which are imported and more expensive 
so the comparison is not quite appropriate. In addition, they are not financially 
supported by the municipality.  
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The municipal publicity campaign about the relocation advertised that the 
economic situation of the vendors would improve after relocation. This assumption 
was based primarily on the costs saved due to a permanent location; it did not 
integrate the idea that sales might decrease. Only 15 or 28% of the vendors 
interviewed indicated that sales were equal or better than on the streets. The remainder 
(57%) stated that sales have decreased, and 8 or 15% would prefer to abandon the 
commercial centers for the streets in order to improve their economic situation. The 
SDS survey illustrated similar opinions (table 28).  
Vendor Income 
 The income of the vendors is difficult to evaluate, as the majority do not keep 
account records. The SDS survey collected income data, but the UECP feels the 
majority have incentives to under report their income, so that the municipality 
continues to subsidize the operating costs. Prior to the relocation, the 1996 AZC study 
estimated vendor income was $100-$215 a month. In 1996, the basic basket of goods 
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Table 28: Condition of Sales since Relocation 
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Increase 7% 2% 7% 2% 9% 5% 19% 9% 3% 
Decrease 68% 74% 56% 80% 72% 57% 39% 60% 68% 
No Change 26% 25% 37% 18% 19% 37% 42% 26% 30% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 
*4.86% did not answer 
        Source: SDS, 2008 
 
for a family of five cost $376.11, the poverty or essential basket of goods for a 
family of five cost $164.57, and the minimum salary was $260.27 (INEC, 2008). 
According to the AZC study, the vendors were barely earning enough to afford the 
essential basket of goods and below the minimum salary at the time.  
In April 2008 the basic basket of goods for a family of five was $495.82 and 
the essential basket of goods was $349.70 (INEC, 2008). The minimum salary was 
$373 (Ibid). The SDS survey illustrated a volume of sales per vendor that ranged from 
$182 to $8,000 a month. The average sales income of the vendors by commercial 
center estimated by the SDS survey is between $402 and $1,192 (table 29). 90% 
(1,333) of vendors earned between $182 -$666. A very small number of vendors, less 
than 1% (13) have an income above $2,500 a month. The remainder, 9% (149), earn 
between $666 and 2,499 a month. The vendors earning above $2,500 are located in 
the Tejar (2), Granada (1), Ipiales Mires (7), and the Montufar (3).  
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Although some vendors are earning exceptionally well, the majority of 
vendors barely earn enough to support a family of five; this is consistent with the pre-
relocation earnings. A vendor in the Granada commercial center commented, “For 
example, I buy a pair of pants for $10, I sell it for $12 to earn something, but not even 
at that am I able to sell; sometimes I do no business all day, I am desperate because I 
don’t even earn enough for lunch, much less my debts. Sometimes I don’t open my 
shop to avoid the debt collectors (Informant 34, 4/25/2008).64” This vendor’s 
comment is similar to many made to the author during the interviews. The majority 
indicated sales are low and pressures to repay debts from creditors, particularly 
informal creditors, are high.  
However, the vendors’ perception of the situation in the interviews seems far 
worse than the survey results indicate; particularly when calculating the pre-relocation 
expenses incurred by the vendors (storage rental, transporter/cargador expenses, and 
payments for association membership) which are no longer deducted from their 
income.  
Of course sales income per month represents a gross figure not taking into 
account the labor costs of the vendor. Vendors typically do not maintain sales or 
accounting records.65 The only commercial centers which do so regularly are the 
Granada and El Tejar. This is another indication of the replication of street level 
commerce.66   
                                                 
 
64
 This vendor has debts with Bank for the purchase of the stall, with the loan shark (chulco), and the 
jeans factory.  
65
 The SDS survey revealed that 67% do not maintain sales records and 87% do not maintain records of 
expenditures and income (SDS, 2008) 
66
 Mr. Cuenca and Ms. Vega stated that they maintain accounting records, manually in Granda and 
electronically in El Tejar; however these records are considered private and were not shared with the 
author or the UECP.  
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Interviews with the vendors revealed that the vendors expect the municipality 
to assist them with marketing and promotion, as well as subsidizing the operating 
costs until sales improved. The vendors identified a variety of competitors that 
interfere with sales such as the wholesale vendors and Chinese merchandise discount 
stores. In addition, transportation and parking were described as problems that reduce 
the sales potential of the commercial centers. 
Transportation and Parking 
The vendors identified transportation and parking as one the primary reasons 
for a decrease in sales. Parking is limited in the historic center and only two of the 
commercial centers have parking garages, the Tejar and Montufar. Providing them 
was identified as an advantage of these centers by the vendors; 21 or 39% of vendors 
felt that increased parking could contribute to improved sales. Public transportation in 
the historic center has been restricted by the municipality in order to limit congestion. 
Only the Montufar and San Martin are near major public transportation routes in the 
historic center. The remaining centers located in the historic center require a 10-15 
minute uphill walk from the nearest major bus stop. 26 or 48% vendors feel that re-
routing buses closer to the commercial centers would help improve sales.  
Competition 
Vendors also identified four competitors, namely wholesale vendors, Chinese 
merchandise discount stores, new formal business in the historic center, and roaming 
traders. The vendors’ comments suggested that the municipality needs to assist in 
regulating and controlling these competitors. As described in Chapter 5, the wholesale 
vendors now operate seven days a week and sell in both bulk and retail; prior to the 
relocation they only worked two days a week, Tuesday and Saturday, from 4am until 
10am. The vendors consider the new commerce structure of the wholesale market a 
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violation of the former rules of commerce and regularly petition the UECP to control 
the opening hours of the wholesale market in Cablec. This is because prior to the 
relocation wholesale vendors only sold in bulk, primarily to the fixed stall vendors, 
and only during a limited time frame. Although there were no formal written rules, 
this was internally regulated and respected by the vendors themselves. However, with 
the relocation, the former rules and regulation of street commerce have begun to 
disintegrate. Regardless of vendor dissatisfaction with the Cable traders, according to 
the SDS survey, 28% of the vendors still purchase their merchandise from the 
wholesalers in Cablec.  
Luis Montalvo commented that Mayor Moncayo has personally received 
association leaders to discuss the problem, but the municipality is faced with a legal 
matter that they can not resolve (Montalvo, 5/3/2008). The wholesale vendors have 
purchased a market, with the assistance of the municipality, but it functions semi-
autonomously, as the vendors themselves are the owners, not the municipality. The 
wholesalers also no longer sell exclusively in bulk. The vendors claim that this is an 
unfair competitive advantage. Colonel Montalvo claims that the only course the 
municipality can pursue is that of dialogue; legally they have no right to restrict the 
commercial practices of the wholesale vendors. Colonel Montalvo has pursued 
dialogue through the organization of meetings with the Mayor, the wholesale vendor 
representatives, and the association leaders of the small scale vendors. However, he 
does not see a solution to this specific problem, but hopes to “find mechanisms to 
support the small scale vendors so that they can improve their sales and become more 
competitive (Ibid).” 
The proliferation of discount stores that sell inexpensive products from China 
are direct competitors to the vendors, who primarily sell low cost goods from Ecuador 
and other Latin American countries. Chinese merchandise entered the Ecuadorian 
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market in 2002 after an economic cooperation agreement. Trade between China and 
Ecuador has been increasing rapidly since 2002, and between 2007 and 2008 doubled 
from just over 1 billion USD to 2.38 billion USD in 2008 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009). The national and other Latin American products can not compete in 
price with the Chinese products, and the vendors feel the UECP should intervene on 
behalf of the vendors to restrict the opening of these shops and the importation of 
Chinese merchandise. As with the wholesale vendors, Colonel Montalvo indicated 
there is no legal recourse and the vendors must find new ways to compete. An 
interview with Cecilia Quishpe revealed some interest of vendors to enter the Chinese 
merchandise market in the same way they bring other Latin American products into 
Ecuador. This is done primarily by pooling resources, often through an association 
and to purchase the items in bulk, and distribute to the participating vendors. Ms. 
Quischpe commented that she has made suggestions to the UECP, but with no results. 
Colonel Montalvo is looking at other approaches to improve competitiveness and this 
is not part of the strategy. Although the municipality seems concerned about this 
matter, they believe it is something that if dealt with at all, is a central government 
issue.   
The rehabilitation of buildings in the historic center has allowed new formal 
businesses to rent retail locations in what were once storage rooms. Many of these 
new businesses are concentrated near the commercial centers and compete directly 
with vendors in the commercial centers; they often sell similar merchandise as those 
in the center, but are required pay rent and VAT, though many may not. A survey of 
commercial center clients by INNOVER indicated that this problem is most relevant 
for the Hermano Miguel, El Tejar, and Ipiales Mires commercial centers (table 29). 
Since most clients reach the commercial centers by foot, these new shops often catch 
the attention of the consumer before he or she enters a center, and makes the sale 
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before the client ever enters the commercial center. From a location perspective, these 
shops have an advantage of being more accessible from the street than the commercial 
centers.  
 
Table 29: Commercial Center Clients who Patronize Adjacent Stores 
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 % Yes 9% 16% 9% 15% 6% 15% 9% 7% 6% 
Source: INNOVAR-ICA, 2007 
 
The matter of the roaming the traders is the only case where the municipality 
has breached the terms of relocation reached with the vendors. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, regardless of municipal efforts, thousands of roaming vendors work the 
streets of the historic center, particularly in the areas surrounding the new commercial 
centers. The municipality finds it lacks the resources to control the roaming traders. 
The AZC in collaboration with the Metropolitan Police is responsible for controlling 
the use of public space. The AZC, like other municipal departments, lacks the staff 
and resources to effectively accomplish their responsibilities (Paz Miño, 2008). In 
order to manage this problem the AZC and members of the Metropolitan Police spend 
one hour a day patrolling the streets and issuing warnings, fines, and confiscating the 
goods of street vendors. In addition, AZC workshops with formal business owners 
include a session on the ordinances of the historic center, including that which 
prohibits the purchase of goods from street vendors. The AZC requests the 
cooperation of the public and encourages them not to purchase from roaming vendors. 
Ms. Barrazueta noted that although a municipal ordinance which prohibits the 
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purchase of goods from street vendors in the historic center exists, it is rarely enforced 
(Barrazueta, 3/11/2008). The vendors of the commercial centers complain that the 
municipality is not upholding their agreement. However, on any given day, vendors 
can be seen purchasing items from roaming traders. Roaming traders sell cheap goods, 
often food products, and offer the convenience of coming to the client. For example, a 
vendor does not have to temporarily leave his or her stall to purchase a snack or a 
drink if they buy from a roaming trader. The commercial center managers and security 
staff do their best keep the roaming traders out, but as Mr. Davila commented, it is an 
impossible task (Davila, 3/12/2008).  
To sum up, although the vendors face new forms of competition that did not 
exist before; the majority remain in the commercial centers and demonstrate an 
overall satisfaction with the relocation project. Luis Montalvo, Marcelo Ribandeneira, 
and six administrators consider the vendors public dissatisfaction with sales a tactic 
employed in order to dissuade the municipality from the eventual transfer of 
maintenance and management costs to the vendors. Due to the difficulty of estimating 
and comparing the income of the vendors, other indicators of economic success of the 
markets include the levels of stall abandonment, the request of vendors who 
voluntarily opted out in 2003 to be integrated into the project, and the resale value of 
the few stalls that have, under extraordinary circumstances, been sold. I deal with 
these issues in the next section of this chapter. 
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Figure 17: Stalls per Commercial Centers and % Unoccupied, Source: UECP, 2008 
 
ABANDONMENT, NEW INTEREST, AND THE RESALE OF STALLS 
The economic hardship described by some of the vendors has resulted in the 
abandonment of some of the market stalls by the vendors (figure 17). The 
architectural design of the commercial centers attributes to some of the economic 
problems, particularly for the vendors located on the upper floors. All of the 
commercial centers located in the historic center have at least two floors. The vendors 
on the upper floors find that clients finish their shopping on the first floors; the stalls 
located on the upper floors are not frequented and in some cases have been 
abandoned.  
Some of the commercial centers have high rates of occupancy, such as El 
Tejar and Granada, where 100% of the stalls are occupied. The Granada commercial 
center is the only one where all vendors regularly show up for work at least five days 
a week and have voluntarily taken over some of the basic maintenance costs. The 
Granada is located just opposite the La Merced Church, close to the central plaza, the 
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Plaza Grande. Although there is no transportation hub nearby, its central location 
provides plenty of pedestrian activity. In addition, these vendors belong to a single 
association, the El Salvador association. The market is managed by their president, 
Luis Cuenca. This association sells clothing, and although there are five floors, each 
floor is categorized by item. For example, underwear and stockings can be found on 
the first floor, on the second floor belts and handbags, and on the fifth floor sweaters 
and other knit products. This helps encourage the clients to move through all five 
floors instead of finishing their shopping on the first floor. Since it is one single 
association, they were able to organize the stalls by category and then used a lottery to 
allocate the stalls within each category. Other markets, which are occupied by various 
associations, are not organized by product, rather by association. Associations were in 
some instances formed around merchandise, but not always, and usually consisted of 
vendors selling a variety of products. Given these circumstances, clients can often find 
what they are looking for on the first floor. The model used in the Granada market 
would be difficult to implement in the other markets at this stage, particularly given 
the levels of conflict. Although the vendors as a whole may benefit, if a handful 
resisted the reorganization, it would be nearly impossible to implement. The lottery 
system probably should have been organized around product category instead of 
association from the beginning. In future markets, such a system might produce 
improved sales results, especially for multi-story commercial centers.  
Hermano Miguel has four unoccupied stalls; the administration uses these 
stalls for storage space and offices and they are no longer intended for occupation by 
vendors; occupation capacity of available stalls is at 100%. The administrator 
indicated good sales, but noted that the vendors on the upper floors probably don’t sell 
as much as those on the lower floors.  
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 Less than 5% of the stalls in Ipiales del Sur and Chiriyacu have been 
abandoned. These markets, which bring the product closer to their clients in south 
Quito have ample public transportation and a parking garage. Ipiales Mires and San 
Martin both have high abandonment levels. San Martin is occupied by one association 
that previously worked in the streets near the location of the market. However, the 
second floor of the building is partially abandoned. The manager and vendors report 
that clients complete their shopping on the first floor. Ipiales Mires has a similar 
problem. The stalls of the second and third floors are often closed or abandoned.  
The Montufar center has seven floors. The abandonment of the stalls is 
exclusive to the upper floors. The center is partially organized by product. The first 
floor is electronics, second floor is jewelry, and the remaining floors offer a variety of 
clothing, toys, and kitchen products such as dishes and glasses. The commercial 
activity of the first and second floors is energetic, and is one of the few instances 
where vendors interviewed reported improved sales. The Montufar is located near the 
Marin, a transportation hub at the edge of the historic center; it also has its own 
parking garage. The specialization of products on the first two floors, which are not 
readily available in the other commercial centers, attracts a large number of clients. 
However, shoppers in search of clothing and other merchandise are likely to visit the 
Hermano Miguel or Granada, where a larger selection of this type of merchandise is 
available. As a result the vendors on the upper floors have begun to abandon their 
stalls to due to limited sales.  
La Merced, regardless of its relatively central location near the Plaza Grande, 
has the highest rate of abandonment and the vendors are experiencing severe 
economic hardship. The second floor of the La Merced market is completely closed; 
the first floor is partially closed and the open stalls offer a limited range of products. 
Vendors report that since only a few stalls are regularly open for business, clients 
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avoid this commercial center due to the limited availability of merchandise. The 
commercial center is occupied by a single association, and the members are generally 
senior citizens. It is the only center where the municipality has given permission to the 
administrator to rent abandoned stalls, in an attempt to revive the commercial activity 
of the market. The association president regularly meets with the UECP in order to 
attempt to resolve the problems faced by his association and the market. The vendors 
note that although the location is central, its proximity to the larger and more vibrant 
Granada commercial center leaves them with no clients. According to the 
administrator, Mr. Galvez, the vendors show low levels of enthusiasm and the 
majority does not fulfill their obligation to work at least five days a week. The only 
successful part of the commercial center is the food court, which is known to offer the 
cheapest lunches in the historic center. Mr. Galvez is working with the association and 
UECP to try to create a market niche, perhaps of tourist merchandise, due its 
proximity to the Plaza Grande and the Museum of Colonial Art. In addition, Mr. 
Galvez and the association president feel that the La Merced market is not recognized 
by clients as part of the network of commercial centers and is need of additional 
publicity.  
New Interest  
The transfer from the streets to the commercial centers in 2003 did not include 
vendors who voluntarily entered the project late, and were later relocated in 
Chiriyacu, Ipiales del Sur, and San Martin. Another association later petitioned the 
municipality to be integrated and the construction of the Ipiales del Norte commercial 
center began. In addition, according to the UECP, approximately 250 vendors have 
since solicited the municipality to be integrated into the project (Montalvo, 3/3/2008; 
Ribandeneira, 5/7/2008). The UECP applies the same regulations to these vendors as 
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those who entered the project in 2003. Colonel Montalvo and Mr. Ribandeneira 
consider the continued interest of the vendors an indicator of success.  
Re-sale of Stalls 
Under extra-ordinary circumstances, the UECP has permitted the sale of 
market stalls prior to the seven year limitation. This has happened in 6 cases. The 
reasons for permission have been death of the owner, serious illness of the owner that 
inhibits his or her ability to operate the stall, or the owner has permanently left the 
country and the immediate family can not take responsibility of the stall. Mr. 
Ribandeneira, the legal assessor of the UECP and Professor of Planning at the 
University Central of Ecuador, has legally assisted all six vendors in the re-sale of the 
stalls. Depending on the commercial center and the location of the stall, the lowest 
price was US$3,400 (Ribandeneira, 5/7/2008). A well located stall on the first floor 
near an entrance was sold for $15,000. According to Mr. Ribandeneira, the stalls 
could not be sold for these prices if business was not good in the commercial centers. 
However, Mr. Ribandeneira commented that some stalls are worthless at the moment, 
referring to those located in the La Merced commercial center where the UECP is not 
able to attract renters, much less owners (Ibid).  
A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
The vendors no longer demonstrate a contentious relationship with the 
municipality. In fact, the relationship can be described as paternalistic and the vendors 
seem satisfied with this arrangement. All 54 vendors interviewed indicated that by the 
closure of the project, the municipality had made an effort to engage and dialogue 
with them. They also feel that the UECP does a good job at maintaining the 
commercial centers and 41 describe the relationship as approachable and positive. 
Those who feel the relationship is not positive felt that the UECP does not pay enough 
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attention to their needs and the deteriorating financial situation. Others commented 
that their debt burden is too high and the UECP does not provide assistance with these 
matters. Colonel Montalvo commented that when it is possible, they intervene on 
behalf of the vendors with regard to debt; the majority hold informal debt and there is 
little they can do to resolve these issues (Montalvo, 3/3/2008). The closure of Mayor 
Moncayo’s term in August of 2008 may have left the vendors in a precarious 
situation. The municipality hoped to transfer ownership and administration of the 
markets before the end of the Mayor’s term, but such a deadline would be impossible 
to meet (Montalvo, 3/3/2008; Ribandeneira, 5/7/2008). If Mayor Moncayo does not 
win re-election, it is unclear if the next administration will support the project in the 
same capacity.67   
To sum up, the objective the municipality sought to accomplish was the 
vacating of the streets. As described in Chapter 2, there are many incentives for a 
municipality to formalize informal vendors, primarily to create order, increase tax 
revenue, and rethink urban landscapes. The case of Quito did not intend to seek tax 
revenue from the vendors, but rather it was hoped that the relocation would clear the 
path for the development of a tourist destination and increase real estate values that 
would eventually sustain the project. So far, the streets of the historic center remain 
primarily clear of vending, with the exception of roaming traders and from this 
perspective the project can be considered a success.  
Vendors also played a critical role in the transfer and the evolution of the 
commercial center policies. The vendors sought to obtain improved work conditions, 
property ownership, and self-managed commercial centers through a municipal 
subsidized project. The work conditions have certainly been made better; ownership 
                                                 
 
67
 General Moncayo lost the mayoral election to Augusto Barrera, who took over in August, 2008. 
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and self-management improvements remained in process in 2008. Although during the 
negotiation the vendors explicitly petitioned for self-administration in the negotiation, 
the survey responses, interviews with the author, and overall behavior indicate the 
opposite. The vendors are no longer distrustful and suspicious of the municipality. In 
fact, they seek municipal support to resolve a wide range of problems; we have seen 
that this new relationship has created new forms of informality in the historic center of 
Quito.  
FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL 
The transfer from the streets to the commercial centers has created new rules 
and regulations. Although the vendors are not fully formal vendors, they are also not 
informal vendors. In fact, the vendors themselves no longer refer to themselves as 
informal, but rather as small scale vendors (minoristas). A vendor in Ipiales Mires, 
commented, “No we are no longer informal vendors, now we are small scale vendors 
(minoristas) (Vendor 27, 4/3/2008).”  
Once the vendors become owners, they must begin to pay a real estate tax to 
the municipality on the stall. This is directly related to the size of the stall and is 
between $5 and $10 a year (Ribandeneira, 5/7/2008). Although the vendors did not 
legally own the space on the streets, they often behaved as if they did, and traded and 
sold space for several hundred or thousands of dollars. The change here is the legal 
backing of the law, and the vendors are free after seven years to sell or rent their stalls. 
However, many are resisting the transfer of ownership due to financial difficulties and 
the consequences of ownership, which may result in the withdrawal of municipal 
subsidies and support. 
As described in Chapter 5, new laws at the national level now obligate the 
vendors to register with the SRI and pay a small tax. The majority welcome the 
change that will allow them access to services, as long as the payments are small. A 
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good deal of the merchandise on sale in the markets is contraband products from 
Colombia, Peru, and Panama. There are no plans to tax these imports at the local or 
national level. The vendors remain in between informality and formality. In some 
ways, these commercial centers represent a semi-tax free zone for the poor.  
The two commercial centers managed by vendors, El Tejar and Granada, show 
signs of a replication of street level rules within the commercial centers. Their desire 
to be semi-autonomous, as opposed to dependent on the municipality, can be 
interpreted as their preference to remain outside of the regulations of the municipality. 
The level of conflict among the vendors in these two commercial centers is high, and 
can be attributed to their dissatisfaction with the management.  
The conflicts could be attributed to extension of informal credit to the vendors, 
by The Front and the El Salvador association, making them dependent on their 
leaders. The interviews indicated that credit is a main concern and source of stress for 
the vendors; this could be exacerbated when the creditor is the center manager. In 
addition, the vendors pay higher monthly maintenance fees in these two centers. This 
has caused internal strife as the vendors have indicated a reluctance to pay the fees 
until the municipality withdraws the subsidy from the other centers. Moreover, the 
charters require a change of leadership; however Mr. Cuenca and Ms. Vega have 
never relinquished power. These two commercial centers indicate that when a full 
transfer is made, it is likely that the old rules and power structure of the vendors will 
return.  
Vendor’s and their associations constitute a critical stakeholder in the historic 
center and local politics. When they are relatively strong and united behind a 
formalization regime, then organization is possible. However, local officials must also 
support that formalization regime. When vending organizations are weak, or when 
they bicker over strategy amongst themselves, conflict and the replication of street-
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level governance become more likely outcomes. Thus, the research indicated that only 
with the support of both local officials, vendors, and their associations or the 
breakdown of the association, that stable governance of the commercial centers is 
possible.  
The diminishing level of conflict in some of the municipal managed centers 
indicates that an external manager may have more success than an association leader 
or vendor. An association leader or vendor may be seen to have personal interests or 
alliances which may influence decision making. A municipal manager has no prior 
relationship to the vendors, and sole responsibility is to ensure the daily functioning of 
the market, which includes mediating conflicts among vendors. The municipal 
managers interviewed discussed mediation and conflict resolution as one of their 
primary tasks. The vendor interviews revealed confidence in the managers’ ability to 
be fair with regard to conflict resolution. Where associations are strong, the leaders 
must cooperate with other leaders and the managers for successful administration; 
where the associations have primarily disintegrated, a new organizational structure has 
emerged behind the commercial center, instead of by association. This indicates that 
municipal managers or external managers with no association links are better suited to 
administering the centers than the vendors themselves.  
MODERNIZATION – AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORCEFUL REMOVAL OF VENDORS 
The case of Quito illustrates some successes, as well as drawbacks to the 
relocation process. The time frame originally planned by the municipality for the final 
transfer of the commercial centers to the vendors was too short. A longer process of 
training and preparation is necessary. In addition, external managers, from the 
municipality or an external party are probably necessary given the need for mediation 
and conflict resolution within each of the centers. In a case where the stalls are 
purchased, a greater involvement with the matter of credit is probably necessary. 
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Although the seven year moratorium on sales or transfer of the property will prevent 
the immediate acquisition by creditors, after seven years, given the debts reported by 
the vendors, it is likely that many will lose possession of their stalls to creditors. From 
the municipal perspective, sorting out issues with chuqueros and loan sharks seems far 
from the municipal agenda; however the sustainable success of the project probably 
rests on this issue.  
The design and lottery system of the commercial centers could have been 
improved. The multi-floor centers provide difficult sales conditions for those located 
on the upper floors. The lottery system could have been designed around product 
rather than association. Given the involvement and requests of the vendor associations 
in the negotiation, these proposals probably would have been rejected by association 
leaders. The breakdown of associations and subsequent decrease in conflict in some of 
the centers will probably contribute to a more stable administration after the final 
transfer. One of the original goals of the municipality was to break the association and 
mafia style governance of street vending after the relocation; the ability for Mr. 
Cuenca and Ms. Vega to continue as administrators will probably prevent these two 
centers from becoming truly independent from this type of governance. However, it is 
important to note that Mr. Cuenca and Ms. Vega claim to be democratically elected 
administrators, and the municipality respected the decision of the vendors in these 
cases to be self-managed. A prohibition of this type of management from the 
beginning might have been a better policy, however the municipality needed the 
collaboration of these two leaders to accomplish the relocation, and denying their 
demand to manage the centers might have put the entire project at risk.  
On the positive side the municipality engaged in an open dialogue with a high 
level of participation from the association leaders and some vendors. It is clear that a 
prerequisite for participation was a high level of organization of the vendors; without 
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this organization the dialogue and incorporation of the requests of the vendors would 
not have been possible. In theory participatory planning should open a political space 
for all stakeholders, regardless of organizational levels; however the case of Quito 
demonstrates that some organization is necessary in order for a meaningful 
engagement and dialogue to take place. Building democracy at the local level through 
political engagement requires not only interest on the part of the stakeholder, but also 
a certain level of order and stability. From the local government perspective, they 
must demonstrate political will and openness, particularly with regard to the socio-
economic and cultural differences. Here, the municipality employed a strategy of 
socialization, but they also attempted to pay attention not only to the future economic 
well being of the vendors, but also to their social needs by incorporating programs of 
child care and health insurance into the project. These programs may show limited 
success at this stage, but demonstrate an innovation for the region that with certain 
improvements could prove worthy of replication. 
 On the local and national level the tax structure introduced through the RISE 
tax also illustrates an interesting compromise between formality and informality. This 
tax allows the vendors to continue to work in the same manner, but with a small tax 
participate in social programs and eventually access formal means of credit from 
which they have been traditionally excluded. These progressive policies at both the 
local and national levels demonstrate innovative policies that benefit both the state 
and the vendors. It also recognizes that informality is a real part of the economy, and 
bringing them into society without burdening the vendors with taxes and regulations 
that would encourage them to remain outside is possible and can prove beneficial for 
both.  
The relocation of the vendors is considered by Mayor Moncayo and all the 
municipal employees interviewed to be the most important aspect of the recuperation 
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of the historic center. Fernando Carrión, city council member, considers the project of 
relocation of the vendors as emblematic and directly related to the recuperation of the 
historic center, and for these reason its sustainability is important (Carrion F. 
11/2/2007). He commented that “The principle problem to attack is the cultural order. 
The public is accustomed to buying in the street…it is an old highland custom, that of 
the market.” Angelica Moreno, a vendor, also commented that “The public have poor 
manners and have learned to only buy in the streets (Moreno, 4/11/2008).” Cultivating 
a new culture of vending and buying is a long term process, particularly when street 
vending is still available to the consumer in other parts of the city or through roaming 
traders. In fact, the vendors themselves seem unwilling to give up purchasing from 
roaming traders, regardless of their complaints about their persistent presence in the 
historic center.  
The UECP and the municipality are collaborating with the vendors to create 
solutions to increase their competitiveness and guarantee an improvement in sales. 
One of the proposals is to eliminate intermediaries so that vendors can purchase 
merchandise at lower costs. Others include additional training in accounting, sales, 
and marketing. The UECP hopes that with additional skills, the vendors will be able to 
compete. 
 From the vendors’ perspective, the municipality has a responsibility to 
subsidize and manage the commercial centers, as they have made good on their 
promise to vacate the streets. Luis Cuenca commented,  
“We (the vendors), in the majority, have given our support to the municipality. 
The municipality has not been careful enough to give us their complete 
support… We hope that he (Mayor Moncayo) never stops supporting us, 
because we will always need municipal assistance, because we think that we 
have done our part to improve the image of the historic center by leaving the 
streets clean we know that the historic center will remain beautiful (Cuenca 
4/24/2008).”  
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The relocation of the vendors into modern municipal markets remains the 
landmark achievement of the rehabilitation project. However, the project outlined 
several goals and objectives other than streets clear of informal commerce. These 
included housing, real estate, and tourism development. Although the municipality 
and the IDB felt that progress towards these goals would be limited while the vendors 
remained on the streets, limited progress has been achieved in these areas since the 
relocation in 2003.  
A NEW IMAGE: ENTERTAINMENT, REAL ESTATE, AND INVESTMENTS 
The municipality hoped that the modernization of informal commerce would 
pave the way for a new historic center, one of open plazas, commerce, and tourism. 
The modernization of informal commerce was intended as the first step towards a 
large scale redevelopment of the historic center in an effort to attract tourists and 
residents, as well as new businesses and investments. Though the relocation has been 
considered a great success by the municipality, the anticipated investments that would 
follow has been limited. 
The economic development component of the project focused on the creation 
of a tourism industry in Quito which highlighted culture and image creation as a 
redevelopment strategy, as well as success measured by private investment and real 
estate development. Progress in these areas remains limited for two principle reasons. 
First, the re-creation of the image of the historic center as a safe, residential, and 
touristy destination is incomplete. Second, due to the failure to change the image, 
investors find the potential benefits insufficient to outweigh the risks. In order to 
better understand these issues, the municipality has undertaken several studies to 
further explore these concerns.  
In 2005, the municipality, in collaboration with the European Union and 
Corporation for the Development of Emerging Countries (COSPE) carried out a 
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survey of six hundred international, national, and local tourists in the historic center in 
an effort to assist the Municipality and the AZC to improve the services of the historic 
center (ProQuito-COSPE, 2005). A second study was carried by INNOVAR in an 
effort to evaluate why investments have not followed and to determine the function of 
the historic center for Quiteños in 2007 (INNOVAR, 2007a). INNOVAR surveyed 
272 residents from different parts of the city to understand how they use the historic 
center and their perceptions. INNOVAR also interviewed nine prominent business 
figures in Quito to inquire why they are not interested in investing the historic 
(INNOVAR, 2007b). Statistics on local visitors, national, and international tourism 
are available through the Metropolitan Corporation for Tourism (MCT). Author 
interviews with Lourdes Rodriguez, director of the Corporation, and the vice-
president of Metropolitan Touring, Paulina Burbano provide some insight into the 
tourism trends and recent public and private efforts. Interviews with Maria Mercedes 
Vega, program manager at INNOVAR, Pedro Jaramillo, Architect, and Luis Moral, 
representative from the Chamber of Small Industries in Pichincha (CAPEIPE) 
provided information regarding investment and real estate in the historic center. 
The 2005 study surveyed six hundred people at tourist destinations in different 
parts of the city. 561 respondents indicated that they visited the historic center at least 
once in the last twelve months, 39 did not. Of the 561 who visited the historic center, 
332 or 59% were Ecuadorian nationals and 229 were international tourist. Of the 332 
Ecuadorians who visited the historic center, 305 live in Quito; most reside in the 
northern sector of the city, 61%. The remainder live in the south, 15%, the center, 
14%, and 10% from the suburban valleys. The international tourists come from North 
America, Europe and other Latin American countries (table 30). 
Of the 256 non-Quiteño tourists, the majority spent less than 5 days in Quito 
and 15% spent over 30 days (table 31). Those that spend over 30 days in Quito could 
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be attributed to the popularity of Quito as a destination for language study and 
volunteer tourism, most of which is concentrated in the Mariscal Sucre neighborhood. 
 
Table 30: Nationality of Tourist that Visits the Historic Center 
Country of Residence Number Percent 
Ecuador 332 59% 
USA 59 11% 
Canada 24 4% 
Colombia 21 4% 
Germany 15 3% 
England 14 2% 
France 12 2% 
Chile 10 2% 
Other 74 13% 
Total 561 100% 
Source: ProQuito-COSPE, 2005  
 
 Of the 256 non-Quiteño tourists, the majority spent less than 5 days in Quito 
and 15% spent over 30 days (table 31). Those that spend over 30 days in Quito could 
be attributed to the popularity of Quito as a destination for language study and 
volunteer tourism, most of which is concentrated in the Mariscal Sucre neighborhood. 
Although the majority spent significant time in Quito, 77% spend less than 5 
hours in the historic center (table 32). This indicates that the majority visits the 
historic center as a day trip and has not utilized a hotel in the historic center and/or the 
use of other services such as restaurants may be limited. According to the survey, 93% 
of the 561 historic center visitors did not use a travel or tourism agency and visited the 
historic center on their own, employing taxi services, local transportation, or car. 
According to this survey, the historic center is perceived primarily as a location that 
  
 
258 
requires less than one day to visit. It also illustrates limited over night stays in the 
historic center, and out of town tourists are most likely staying over night in the 
popular Mariscal Sucre Area.  
In July 2008, the Metropolitan Corporation of Tourism surveyed 46,796 
tourists at the Mariscal Sucre Airport. On average, the tourist spent 5.7 days in Quito 
and spent just under $96.70 a day. 12,777 utilized a travel agency. Of these, 7,444 
visited the historic center, 33,991 did not utilize a travel agency; 22,662 visited the 
historic center. Less than 65% of the visitors to Quito visited the historic center during 
their stay. In addition, in 2009, the rate of hotel occupancy was low compared to the 
popular tourist district, the Mariscal Sucre, 36.4% to 55.8% respectively. However, it 
has increased from 2008 when occupancy was 30% (MCT, 2009).  
 
Table 31: Length of Stay in Quito for Non-residents 
Duration of Trip Number Percent 
Less than 5 days 97 38% 
5-15 days 87 34% 
16-30 days 38 15% 
More than 30 days 34 13% 
Total 256 100% 
Source: ProQuito-COSPE, 2005 
 
In 2009, 444,680 foreigners arrived in Quito by air. This is a decrease from the 
previous year when 477,808 foreigners arrived in Quito by air. However, in 2002, 
only 282,741 foreigners arrived by air and in 2007, it was just over 430,000 (MCT, 
2007; 2009). According to Metropolitan Touring, the largest travel agency in Ecuador, 
they have experienced a decline in the number of visitors requesting a stop over in 
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Quito. This is attributed primarily to the recent availability of direct flights to 
Guayaquil, which allows international visitors to the Galapagos Islands to completely 
bypass Quito (Burbano, 4/24/2008).68 On the other hand, Metropolitan Touring 
reports almost 100% occupancy year round of the only tourist class hotel in the 
historic center, the Patio Andaluz. This demonstrates a new found demand of visitors 
who do choose to visit Quito, that the historic center, not the Mariscal, is the first 
choice for many tourists. However, the availability of tourist class hotels is limited in 
the historic center. According to Ms. Burbano, if the Patio Andaluz is booked, the 
second choice is the Hilton Colon, located in the Mariscal Sucre neighborhood. 
  
Table 32: Duration of Visit to Historic Center 
Duration  Number  Percent 
Less than 5 hours 433 77% 
5-12 hours 41 7% 
12-24 hours 61 11% 
More than 24 hours 26 5% 
Total 561 100% 
Source: ProQuito-COSPE, 2005 
 
Although there are a number of small pensions and hostels in the historic 
center, there are limited tourist class hotels. There are twelve second-fourth class 
hotels in the nucleus and two pensions. However, there is only one first class tourist 
hotel, the Patio Andaluz. Published rates for the Patio Andaluz range from $200-
250/night. However according to Ms. Burbano groups rates at the hotel average 
                                                 
 
68
 Previously, flights stopped both in Quito and Guayaquil. However, American Airlines introduced  
direct flights to both Quito and Guayaquil a few years ago. Flights to the Galapagos islands leave from 
Guayaquil (Burbano, 4/24/2008).  
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around $100/night. A luxury option became available in 2005, the Hotel Plaza 
Grande. The Hotel Plaza Grande is located on the corner of the Plaza Grande, a prime 
location and is owned and managed by the Swissotel group. The published rates range 
between $315 - $2,000/night. According to Ms. Burbano this is not in the price range 
for the average tourist, and occupancy remains low. Ms. Burbano indicated a need for 
more first category tourist class hotels in the historic center to fill customer demand. 
This might increase the number of tourists who visit the historic center; however this 
would not help to encourage a stop-over on the way to the Galapagos Islands.  
Quito needs to continue to market the historic center as a destination in itself, 
rather than a side trip from the Galapagos. Though visitors have slowly been 
decreasing, Quito and the historic center have received recognition in several 
international papers and tourism expos. The New York Times top 53 destinations for 
2008, ranked Quito at number 15. The following is the description in the New York 
Times: 
If you’ve been to Quito, Ecuador, there’s a good chance you were heading to 
the Galápagos. But Quito, the colonial capital perched 9,200 feet up in the 
Andes, is no longer just a whistle stop. The city’s crumbling historic center, 
one of Latin America’s least altered, has been reborn… (New York Times, 
2007).  
In July 2009 the Wall Street Journal featured a piece on Quito titled “Historic 
Quito, Rescued: Once rife with crime, Ecuador’s capital is now much safer for 
tourists.” Quito has also been featured on the Travel Channel in 2008. The recent 
surge in recognition by international newspapers and travel outlets may provide the 
publicity necessary to increase the tourism and encourage stop-overs in the next years.  
INNOVAR understands that changing the image of the historic center 
internationally probably starts at home. How the Quiteño resident perceives the 
historic center, how they use it, and what prevents them from relocating, opening a 
new business or spending leisure time in the historic center is critical to creating a new 
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image. The 2007 survey of 272 residents of Quito provided some insight. The findings 
illustrate that although most Quiteños agree that significant changes have taken place 
and the majority do visit the historic center, at least occasionally, they cling to an 
image of an insecure and poor neighborhood.  
According to the survey, 243 or 89% have visited the historic center in the last 
year, and the average number of visits was 19. Of the 243 who have visited, the most 
cited objectives of the last visits were the Plaza San Fransisco, 18%, the Plaza Grande, 
14%, the commercial centers, 8%, and the churches and municipality 6% each. 58% 
visited for leisure purposes and 22% to shop. Though only 22% visited with objective 
of shopping, 28% said they purchased something on their visit. The average spent just 
under $48 shopping in the historic center. Of the 22% who shop, 68% visited one of 
the municipal commercial centers. The image of the church and the Plaza Grande are 
what come to mind when thinking of the historic center at 40% and 22% respectively. 
80% believe the historic belongs to all citizens. However, 18% perceive the historic 
center as pertaining to the municipality and 1% perceives the historic center belongs 
to tourists.  
Congestion, traffic and narrow streets can make the historic center a difficult 
place to transit to. Of those interviewed, 58% arrived in their own car, 28% took the 
tram, 17% the bus, 8% walked, 6% borrowed a car, and 5% took a taxi. Of the 243 
who visited the historic center, they were asked to evaluate how they perceive 
security, cleanliness, ease of access, a good place for entertainment, and if it is a nice 
place to visit on a scale of 1-5, 5 being excellent, 1 being poor. Security and 
cleanliness were given a 2.6 and 2.86 respectively, relatively low ratings. Access was 
given a surprising 3.03, particularly given the congested nature and limited parking in 
the historic center. As a place for entertainment, it was rated 2.93 and a nice place to 
visit a 3.33.  
  
 
 
Figure 18: Sign on Guayaquil St.
sexual work in the street”
 
Of the 29 respondents
they were questioned why they have not visited. 41% said they lack the time, 24% 
responded that it did not interest them, 14% prefer other places, an
is unsafe. Another 10% said they would not know what to visit. 3% responded they 
did not have enough information. Lastly, 3% responded it is too difficult to arrive at, 
10% there are too many people, and 7% it is too far. 
Of the 272 surveys, 
the problems of the historic center, 38% responded 
municipality was taking action
lives in the historic center. 76%
historic center. However,
percent indicated it was desirable. Only 8.8% responded that it was very probably they 
would purchase real estat
and 43.4% very improbable. The obstacles most cited were insecurity, congestion, and 
traffic. For those indicating a likelihood of purchasing, the reasons cited were it is 
touristy, they like the center and the commerce.
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The survey was taken in April 2007, four years after the relocation. It indicates 
that residents still do not perceive the historic center as an attractive place to live. 
However, many choose to spend leisure time in the historic center, as well as to shop. 
Though police presence has increased in an effort to limit prostitution and general 
delinquency, the majority still perceive the historic center as insecure (figure 18). 
Though much progress has been made with security, local businesses owners and  
residents also complained at AZC community meetings of problems of prostitution, 
drugs, and general delinquency, particularly at night. Until the historic center is 
perceived as a secure neighborhood by locals and tourists alike, at night and during 
the day, its functionality and as space for tourism and leisure will remain limited. 
With regard to attracting private investment, INNOVAR indicated limited 
success. Ms. Vega and Mr. Moral who manage the IDB financed co-investment 
program have encountered difficulty arousing interests in this program. The program 
matches funds for investment of approved projects to start new businesses or to bring 
new life to old ones. At the time of research, only 50% of the 1.4 million allocated to 
this program had been committed. Ms. Vega commented “the people still perceive 
(the historic center) as a risk and our economic investment funds are difficult to utilize 
(Vega, M., 2/28/2008).” She also noted that this is a critical point for the historic 
center, as the vendors have been relocated, the buildings under rehabilitation, and the 
need to attract private investment essential to the long term sustainability of the 
project.  
In an effort to understand the difficulty encountered with allocating the funds, 
INNOVAR interviewed nine prominent businessmen in Quito to understand their lack 
of investment interest in the historic center. The summary of the interviews states 
“The historic center has a historic footprint; it also has a stigma, with respect to 
insecurity, it is not lack of police presence, but rather lack of residents (INNOVAR, 
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2007b).” Contamination, noise, inadequate transportation networks, vehicle 
congestion, lack of parking spaces, limited pedestrian areas without vehicle 
interference (the sidewalks are too narrow), and insufficient information about the 
actual planning and zoning available to potential investors were all cited as obstacles 
to investment. The informants indicated that the actual residents of the historic center 
have limited purchasing power, the visitors have a nervous attitude which is not a 
good state of mind for sales, and the businesses that function to serve the tourist sector 
are included in the package purchased from the travel agency, so there is not open 
competition with regard to tourism. In addition, tourists are often accompanied by the 
tourism police while in the historic center, which limits the businesses and services 
they can access. Many also spend less than one day in the historic center, which 
means that revenues should not rely solely on tourists; attracting the local population 
is also essential. With regard to real estate investment, the informants considered the 
rehabilitation of old buildings expensive and the municipal regulations with regard to 
historic buildings too complicated.  
In addition to tourism and business development, considerable efforts have 
been made to promote housing programs in the historical core in an effort to attract 
new middle and upper income residents. As indicated above, this is essential to the 
overall economic development of the area.  
In an effort to improve the deteriorating housing stock, the municipality in 
collaboration with the IDB and other international organizations including the Junta 
de Andulucia has collaborated and executed a variety of programs. These efforts are 
also linked to the national housing program as well as a new project called “Mi Barrio 
Lindo” financed by the IDB through separate loans, not as a part of the historic center 
rehabilitation project.  
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In 1997 the IDB financed neighborhood improvements in Ecuador through 
assistance to the national housing program. Special conditions in the form of 
additional subsidizes were made to residences in historic center neighborhoods (IDB, 
1997). Put your house in Shape,69 a joint project with the Junta de Andulucia, is the 
probably the most visible housing program in the historic center due to a clear 
marketing campaign. It encourages owners of inventoried buildings to rehabilitate 
their homes through access to credit, technical expertise, and the facilitation of 
building permits and construction licenses. Over 300 units were improved through this 
program. In 2006, the IDB approved a new loan for over $37 million to support 
neighborhood improvements in Quito and municipal modernization. The project aims 
to raise the living standards of 28,000 families in the poorest neighborhoods, which  
include, but are not limited to the historic center.  In addition, the municipal 
modernization project aims to unify several municipal companies into INNOVAR in 
order to improve efficiency. A new system of property registration and taxation will 
be implemented in effort to raise tax collection (IDB, 2006). These efforts 
complement the historic center rehabilitation projects, which do not focus on housing. 
The 1997 loan also represents an example of collaboration between national level 
programs which incorporate the special objectives of the municipality. 
One landmark real estate project is the Conjunto Camino Real, an INNOVAR 
investment, which rehabilitated and subdivided a large building into 95 condominiums  
for sale between $48,000 and 95,000. In 2008, pre-sales had been sluggish, as middle 
income buyers are weary of relocating to the historic center. In addition, the historic 
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 Translated by author, Pon a Punto tu Casa 
  
 
 
Figure 19: Photo of Marketing Campaign, Pon a Punto tu Casa
 
center lacks the services available in other residential neighborhoods, such as 
supermarkets, hospitals, and pharmacies necessary to attract middle and upper income 
residents. However, the first 
the historic center, just off the Plaza Grande in
Since the relocation of the informal vendors, the overall economic 
development of the historic center remains limited. Tourism is stagnant, inve
funds difficult to distribute, and efforts to attract new residents and rehabilitee existing 
housing stock inadequate. Though the municipality has made significant tangible 
changes in the historic center, res
historic center offers, at least in the eyes of the municipality and international 
institutions. Enhancing the image the historic center, as well improving infrastructure 
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will require not only financial investment, but also a transformation of local 
perceptions. If the municipality is to achieve a self sustaining rehabilitation of the  
historic center, an enthusiastic and vigorous campaign to create a new image, backed 
by improved security will be necessary. In addition, though the relocation remained 
stable at the close of research, success of the modernization of informal commerce 
should be measured with caution. Full transfer of responsibility to the vendors is 
likely to jeopardize the years of work and significant financial investment of the 
relocation project.  
The final chapter examines the implications of international recognition, 
financing, and heritage. It also sums up the findings of this study and a discussion of 
the Quiteño experience and its implications for planners and future research.   
  
 
268 
CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
Rehabilitation of urban historic centers and the preservation of cultural and 
historic patrimony have become integral parts of development programs at both the 
World Bank and IDB. Lending in this field has attempted to maximize cultural and 
architectural history in an effort to develop sustainable projects that intertwine 
economic development with preservation. The rehabilitation of historic centers 
attempts to provide cities with a marketing advantage in ever global world. As these 
efforts converge, the management of the historic districts becomes the focal point of 
several institutions, though the final responsibility, including coordination of 
institutions, is frequently shouldered by the local government. The case of Quito 
illustrates a municipality which has managed several actors at the supra-national level, 
national level, and local level in a complex network of stakeholders in a coordinated 
effort to rehabilitate and bring new forms of functionality to the historic center.  
The principal obstacle to rehabilitation identified by both the municipality and 
the international organizations was the high concentration of informal street vending 
that occupied public space in the historic center. Tackling this problem was essential, 
before any physical conservation or investment could take place. This created a 
conflict over the use of space in the historic center that took almost a decade to 
resolve. 
Conflicts between planners and street traders are not unique to Quito. Mexico 
City has attempted to eradicate the historic center of traders since the 1950´s, through 
a program of decentralization and markets (Cross, 1995). In Lima, traders were 
forcibly removed from the city center in 1997 with the assistance of the National 
Police after unsuccessful negotiations with the vendors (Dias, 2001). Caracas and 
  
 
269 
Bogotá are also facing a struggle over the rights to the streets between the 
municipality and the street vendors (Donovan, 2008 and Rojas, 2008).  
The historic center of Quito provided a spatial context for the convergence of 
power relations and confluence of interest at different levels of governance and 
between civil society groups that led to a new strategy for managing street vending in 
the historic center of Quito. The ECH/INNOVAR, in collaboration with other 
municipal departments, was charged with delivering the combined visions of the 
historic center, primarily those of the IDB and Municipality. The ECH/INNOVAR 
was also confronted with reconciling the use of public space, the restoration of 
buildings and monuments, the creation of a tourist attraction, and improvement of real 
estate values with the activities of the street traders. The divergent interests of those 
who live, work, and use the historic center are numerous, not to mention the goals of 
international agencies and local and national governments made the elaboration of a 
rehabilitation project complex. Though the development and execution has been 
challenging, after 30 years of limited progress since world heritage recognition, 
financing and political will of the municipality finally resulted in tangible successes.  
The problems created by the informal commerce in historic center in many 
ways represented a cultural difference, illustrated by the conflicting perspectives of 
the use of space, and made reaching agreements difficult. However, both sides 
recognized this difference and after several years were able to reconcile their 
divergent perspectives with regard to public space. The municipal institutions 
recognized the human dimension, as witnessed through participation and engagement, 
and financing provided training and education; both were preconditions for the 
successful transfer of the vendors from the street to the commercial centers. The 
vendors recognized the importance of recuperating public space to the municipality, 
and the majority voluntarily agreed to the relocation.  
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This dissertation has examined the impact and change that international 
financing and heritage preservation brought to informal vendors in the historic center 
of Quito; I have argued that the convergence of different interests in the historic center 
at the local, national, and international levels opened a space for dialogue and 
discussion between vendors and the municipality to create new forms of formality 
(informality) in the historic center of Quito through democratic, economic and social 
planning. Political coordination at the local, national, and international levels was 
required to move the project ahead. The development of new institutions that allowed 
for easier management of projects and funds were created, and models from abroad 
were employed to assist in the project design. 
Through the investigation of political, social, and economic factors that 
influenced the behavior of both the vendors and the municipality, this research project 
offers significant insight into the informal sector debate. Most centrally, it shows that 
the traditional conceptualization of informality as a dichotomous concept, formal 
workers are regulated, while informal workers escape regulation, is problematic for 
the case of fixed stall street vendors. The unique policy problems created by fixed stall 
vendors prompted a continuous process of negotiation over formality between the 
vendors and the municipality in a process that often involved street vendors on one 
side and municipal officials on the other side who each pursue conflicting and partial 
formalization measures. In this context, formality/informality is a contested state, 
rather than a static one. Additionally, the research presented provides new insights 
into a newly emerging system of political representation that has come to characterize 
countries throughout Latin America. Decentralization in the region has increased the 
autonomy of municipalities and the engagement of citizens in local democracy, where 
societal associations have come to play a fundamental role in politics in contrast to 
previous decades. Within that context, street vending associations represented a 
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potential channel for aggregating the interests of a significant segment of the urban 
workforce.  
DECENTRALIZATION AND HERITAGE 
Decentralization from the central government to the local government can 
mean that local politics are transformed into spaces of contestation, as they are the 
most decentralized territorial and administrative social unit with direct contact to the 
community and its problems. In Quito, this democratic opening helped enable new 
stakeholders to enter into the political arena, in this case the vendors. Typically 
municipalities face political and financial constraints; particularly from the central 
government and often hold little influence over the decisions made at the national 
level. However, significant financial constraints were removed through Quito’s ability 
to secure international financing, primarily from the IDB. 
There were a number of instances where political constraints interfered with 
the project due to divergent policies at the national and local level. In particular, the 
right to work clause at the national level, which in essence permits street vending, 
directly conflicts with municipal regulations and ordinances which prohibit such 
activities. Little invocation of this clause has been witnessed in Quito, but forceful 
evictions of street vendors in Guayaquil incited protests in 2008. The protestors’ 
utilized the constitutional right to work clause in their chants and banners (El Hoy, 
2008). It is unclear whether or not the national government will have the political will 
to enforce this constitutional article and interfere in municipal politics in the future.  
Quito, like many municipalities in the region, handles some functions that until 
now had been only under the central governments responsibility. At the same time, 
they have bypassed the central government, seeking assistance from international 
agencies in an effort to build working relationships with international organizations, 
particularly the IDB and UNESCO. The presence of these institutional actors at the 
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municipal level has allowed for the creation of new urban policies that incorporate 
social, democratic and economic dimensions into heritage preservation. The process 
of glocalization, by which the municipality, IDB, and UNESCO and other institutions 
connected, is not wholly independent from the central state. Although communication 
and limited forms of collaboration may take place without the participation of the 
central government, the central government is still required to participate on some 
level.  
Quito has encountered a lack of cooperation with the central government on a 
number of matters including the location of schools and jails, which need to be 
managed in order to fulfill not only the municipal vision of the historic center, but also 
that of international agencies. In addition, the central government jeopardized the 
second IDB loan agreement due to the lack of attendance of the Minister of Finance at 
a series of meetings with the IDB and the municipality, where the guarantor forms 
needed to be signed (Vega, 2008). Although the municipality of Quito has achieved 
some autonomy, it is limited, and must still rely on the cooperation of the state for 
some matters.  
On the one hand, the municipality encountered assistance from the central 
government during the elaboration of the first phase of the loan (Arizaga, 2008). 
Additionally, the central government incorporated the historic center into national 
projects; for example housing rehabilitation. Although glocalization appropriately 
describes the reaching out of local and international institutions to each other, as well 
as the new pressures exerted on local governments, it fails to incorporate the role of 
the state and the lack of full independence from the state that both sides experience.  
The IDB, Latin America, and Preservation 
In Latin America, the IDB has worked with the national governments on a 
mutual collaboration basis regarding development projects. However, since the 
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1990’s, encouraged by the growing interest shown by local governments, particularly 
regarding urban development, the IDB to began engage municipalities directly. 
Within the last two decades, it has undertaken ambitious collaboration projects, after 
developing a loan and technical assistance program fostering significant innovations 
related to the way in which preservation works are financed and carried out. The main 
goal was to make preservation a sustainable process in the long term. In order to do 
so, the IDB financed not only investments related to preservation and conservation, 
but also all actions needed to enable cultural, economic, and democratic activities that 
would ensure the long term sustainability of preservation efforts. Besides preserving 
monuments and buildings, programs included investments to improve public premises 
and infrastructures, institutional strengthening, resources to restore private buildings 
and foster economic activities. Another goal was to link public and private entities to 
collaborate on local economic development and job generation; this would eventually 
draw real estate investors and other forms of private investment that would create 
favorable conditions for sustained preservation. In this sense, preservation would 
become an issue under the responsibility of a wide range of public and private 
stakeholders.  
The cities of Quito, Ecuador, Cartagena, Colombia, and Recife, Brazil can be 
highlighted as the first successful experiences to employ these mechanisms (Rojas 
1999; 2001). These cities must be noted not only because they reflect preservation 
efforts carried out within the region, but also because they have implemented different 
approaches towards how to draw new investments, and have developed a wide range 
of profitable activities in their historic centers. 
BARCELONA AND QUITO? 
According to the IDB, Quito has shown the greatest success in the region and 
has encouraged visits by other Latin American municipalities to Quito to learn about 
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the project.70 The IDB claims Quito drew more diversified business interests to 
support the preservation process, which may be in part to the incorporation of some of 
the Barcelona model’s tenets into the project (Rojas, 2001). Although Quito may have 
been successful in comparison to other Latin American cities, research indicates that 
investment is still limited and well below the goals of the municipality and the IDB. 
The city of Barcelona has attracted worldwide attention for the linked public-
private efforts intended to preserve and restore its historical quarter. An approach 
based on the impact of key public investments that improved public utilities and 
spaces, and eventually attracted private investments. Through the creation of a mixed-
capital corporation, Barcelona initiated programs to enhance not only the economic 
conditions, but also the social and democratic circumstances.  
The ECH/INNOVAR, following a similar approach to the one used in 
Barcelona, undertook urban preservation and restoration in the historic center in an 
attempt to draw new investments to the area, while assuming the investment risks. 
Among the ECH/INNOVAR’s main functions are urban planning and development, 
job generation, and tourism development. The sustainable nature of the 
ECH/INNOVAR and the case of Quito is more stable than that of similar projects 
developed by the IDB in Cartagena and Recife, is due to the fact that the project is 
based on a wider range of activities: residential, business, cultural, and service 
provision. However, the persistence of an unsecure and poor neighborhood has made 
attracting investment difficult, even though they offer programs to match investment 
funds, provide low interest credit, and risk management.  
The Barcelona model is sometimes criticized for lack of effective community 
participation and an ever increasing influx of private capital and middle class 
                                                 
 
70
 Representatives from Panama and Ururguay have visited Quito (Estrella, 4/24/2008).  
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homebuyers and renters which has contributed to gentrification. However, these 
characteristics were not yet obvious for Quito. Although the municipality has 
attempted to draw middle class buyers and renters, the success has been limited and 
the neighborhood remains characterized by low income renters and with limited 
middle class home ownership (Vega, M., 2/282008). It is important to note that the 
historic center has been losing residential population, particularly in the nucleus for 
decades. The municipality seeks to revive the residential population, not replace low 
income residents with middle income inhabitants. However, if they do achieve success 
in the future, gentrification will be difficult to avoid. Although the key components of 
attracting investment and developing a tourist industry require further development, 
the emblematic relocation of the vendors and the newly vacant public spaces was 
considered a success story worthy of dissemination and replication.  
The negotiation process, which was rooted in conflicting incentives for and 
against formalization for both sides, eventually produced a stable agreement between 
the municipality and the vendors. The primary objectives of both sides were attained: 
the municipality – the recuperation of public space; for the vendors – improved work 
conditions. The incorporation of social, economic, and democratic planning provided 
an interesting and innovative example of how local government can manage informal 
commerce, albeit some shortcomings.  
Much like the case of Barcelona (Balibrea, 2001; Blakely, 2005; Capel, 2005; 
Marchall, 2000), my research in Quito indicates that similarly, communication 
between the municipality and association leaders was fluid and transparent, however 
the transfer of this information to the individual vendors may have been limited, 
diminishing the democratic component of the project. As Sorenson describes as one of 
the pitfalls of network governance, the association leaders acquired the “right to 
speak” on behalf of all vendors, which resulted in a concentration of power among 
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certain leaders and individuals and an elite network of stakeholders (2002). 
Conversely, the time frame for negotiation from 1999-2003 was long, inefficient and 
costly. Opening the dialogue to a wider range of vendors may have extended what was 
already a lengthy process.   
FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The example of Quito suggests that heritage can be converted into a vital tool 
for municipal governments, not only for the conservation of buildings and monuments 
and the development of a tourist industry, but also for improvement of social 
programs and democratic engagement.  
The formalization measures described in chapters 5 and 6 have resulted in a 
semi-formalization and new degrees of informality off the historic center vendors, as 
they border on both formality and informality (Beneria and Floro, 2006). The new 
commercial centers operate under rigid rules and regulations in an effort to create 
order out of what the municipality considered a chaotic and disorderly situation. 
Compromises on taxation have opened a space for participation in federal social 
programs and created a semi-tax free zone for the poor. The prospect of stall 
ownership creates the opportunity for wealth accumulation that the majority of 
informal vendors often find difficult to acquire.  
Innovative programming at the municipal level with regard to child care and 
health insurance illustrate municipal attentiveness to the social needs of the vendors, 
regardless of the underutilization of the programs at the time of research. These 
policies incorporated gender planning through the recognition of the dual role of 
women as income generators, as well as caretakers (Moser, 1989).  
However, some lessons learned can also be drawn from this case. The issue of 
indebtedness of the vendors, particularly through informal forms of credit, will 
probably place the future ownership of the stalls by vendors at risk. The municipality 
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introduced a limited policy prohibiting the sale of the stall for seven years to avoid 
this potential consequence. However, in 2008 the vendors indicated high levels of 
debt and it is likely that after seven years many will lose ownership. Introducing 
policies to assist with creditors and debt could help avoid this possible pitfall.  
The breakdown of some associations has dissolved the mafia style governance 
of street vending that existed before the relocation. The future self-management of the 
commercial centers by the vendors may also prove detrimental. The negotiations 
illustrated a preference for self-management by the vendors as a principal condition of 
the relocation. The research in 2008 indicated a strong preference for continued 
municipal management. This is primarily doe to the municipal managers’ ablity to sort 
out conflicts and provide an independent voice. A compromise, such as a vendor 
oversight board and a municipal manager, might ensure a smoother functioning of the 
commercial centers in the future.  
The economic independence of the commercial centers also seems unlikely. 
Although the vendors report similar income levels as prior to relocation, they resist 
the transfer of the operating costs and threaten to retake the streets. This forces the 
municipality to assume these costs in order to maintain the recuperation of the public 
spaces, at an expense to the general public. Estimating the monthly maintenance costs 
prior to the relocation and clearly communicating this to the vendors might have 
helped vendors understand their financial obligations. Contributions, at least in part, 
from the vendors might have avoided a culture of paternalism that now exisits in the 
commercial centers. 
Overall, the case of Quito illustrates that a modernization of informal 
commerce without violence and with the consent of the vendors is possible when the 
needs of the vendors are incorporated into the project. Although the relocation was by 
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no means perfect, the exemplary pieces are worthy of replication, and the downsides 
can be evaluated to improve their effectiveness.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As cities become more important actors within the local, national, and global 
contexts, future research to better understand the roles and implications of the new 
governance structure is necessary. Community participation is often mentioned as a 
key component of the urban political dynamic; however the real level of community 
involvement is questionable given the concentration of power in an elite network of 
actors. Further exploration of the factors that affect the level of participation in local 
politics could be useful, as well as the communication between the elite actors and 
their supporters.  
Community driven projects often hold design flaws, as research and studies 
are pushed aside in an effort to reach consensus. Quito is no exception. Market studies 
indicated a decentralization of markets would bolster sales. The vendors demanded 
concentration in the historic center and the municipality yielded to their requests in an 
effort to reach an agreement. Finding ways of effectively communicating and 
incorporating technical studies in a participatory project design is essential to for 
sustainability.  
There is a need to further explore the role of tourism and heritage development 
resulting from local and global visions and the degree of cooperation and 
collaboration at different levels of governance. The impact of global policies on local 
cities is another area of with greater theoretical possibilities. As cities reach out to the 
supra-national level, the engagement with international institutions is not well 
understood. For example, what are the impacts of the loss of autonomy and how will 
debt be repaid, in particular if the project is not economically successful? 
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Finally, the case of Quito suggests that informality can be integrated into the 
local economy with the cooperation of vendors and local government. Quito presents 
an innovative method for the modernization of informal commerce, bringing together 
aspects of the formal and informal that provides a compromise for local government 
and the vendors. However, the future of the new commercial centers remains 
unknown. For example, what will happen to the stalls when the moratorium on sales 
and rentals is lifted? How will the centers function after a full transfer of management 
is made from the municipality to the vendors; and how will the municipality complete 
this transfer? Additionally, once the municipality disengages from the management of 
the centers, how will they ensure the vendors remain off the streets? 
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APPENDIX 
List of Interviews 
 
Municipal Employees 
 
Name Title/Affiliation Date 
Arizaga, Dora  Consultant INPC; former Director 
FONSAL 
2/7/2008 
Arregui, Edmundo Director, INNOVAR 5/15/2008 
Barraueta, Lorena  Head, Control of Public Space, AZC 3/11/2008 
Bermudez, Nury  Head, Unit of Studies and 
Information, Department of 
Territorial Planning 
12/13/2008 
Burbano, Paulina Vice-President, Metropolitan 
Touring; former Director, ECH 
4/24/2008 
Carrion, Diego  Chief of Staff, Mayor Paco Moncayo 12/13/2008 
Carrion, Fernando  Director, Program for the Studies of 
the City, FLACSO 
11/9/2007 
Chacon, Cesar  Employee, Department of Territorial 
Planning 
4/22/2008 
Cifuentes, Colon Head of Planning and Projects, 
Department of Territorial Planning 
4/11/2008 
Cobos, Carlos  Former Director, UECP 4/30/2008 
Estrella, Rocio  Consultant, INNOVAR 4/24/2008 
Gomez, Washington Union of Independent Associations 
of Pichincha 
3/7/2008 
Jaramillo, Pedro Architect; Former employee ECH 
and PACTARIM 
5/13/2008 
Kingman, Eduardo Professor of History, FLACSO 10/4/2008 
Lopez, Hernando  CONQuito 3/4/2008 
Montalvo, Luis  Director, UECP 3/3/2008 
Moral, Luis  CAPEIPE 4/15/2008 
Moreira, Monica  Former Administrator, AZC 3/10/2008  
4/16/2008 
Noboa, Gustavo  Head of Multi-lateral projects, 
INNOVAR 
3/7/2008 
Pallares, Carlos  Director, FONSAL 3/27/2008 
Paz Miño, Ines  Administrator, AZC 1/29/2008 
Proaño, Rocio  Employee, Department of Territorial 
Planning; former Employee, 
Department of Control of Public 
Space 
4/22/2008 
Proaño, Rosario Former Administrator, AZC 4/28/2008 
Quishpe, Cecelia Congressional Representative, 5/7/2008 
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Pichincha Province and Historic 
Center Vendor 
Ribandeneira, Marcelo  Legal Advisor and Professor of 
Planning, Central University of 
Ecuador 
5/9/2008 
5/10/2008 
Rodriguez, Lourdes  Director, Municipal Corporation of 
Tourism; Former Administrator AZC 
4/30/2008 
 
Sevilla, Roque President, Metropolitan Touring; 
Former Mayor of Quito 
4/25/2008 
Vaca, J. Inspector, Metropolitan Police 
Department 
5/14/2008 
Vega, Maria Mercedes  INNOVAR 2/28/2008 
Verduga, Maria Jose  CAPTUR 3/19/2008 
 
Commercial Center Manager Interviews 
 
Name Commercial Center Date 
Christian Marin San Martin 5/6/2008 
Angelita Vega El Tejar 4/23/2008 
Freddy Lopez Ipiales Mires 4/11/2008 
Luis Cuenca  Granada 4/24/2008 
Diego Galvez  La Merced 4/11/2008 
Santiago Lopez Montufar 5/6/2008 
Santiago Racines  Chiriyacu 3/11/2008 
Fabricio Davila Hermano Miguel 3/12/2008 
Patricio Parra  Ipiales del Sur 3/10/2008 
 
Vendor Interviews 
 
Infromant Number Commercial Center Date 
1 Hermano Miguel 2/4/2008 
2 Hermano Miguel 2/4/2008 
3 Hermano Miguel 2/4/2008 
4 Hermano Miguel 2/4/2008 
5 Hermano Miguel 2/5/2008 
6 Hermano Miguel 2/5/2008 
7 Hermano Miguel 2/5/2008 
8 Hermano Miguel 2/5/2008 
9 Hermano Miguel 2/5/2008 
10 Hermano Miguel 2/6/2008 
11 Hermano Miguel 2/6/2008 
12 Hermano Miguel 2/6/2008 
13 Hermano Miguel 2/6/2008 
14 El Tejar 2/19/2008 
15 El Tejar 2/19/2008 
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16 El Tejar 2/19/2008 
17 El Tejar 2/22/2008 
18 El Tejar 2/22/2008 
19 El Tejar 2/23/2008 
20 El Tejar 2/23/2008 
21 El Tejar 2/23/2008 
22 La Merced 3/5/2008 
23 La Merced 3/5/2008 
24 La Merced 3/5/2008 
25 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
26 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
27 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
28 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
29 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
30 Ipiales Mires 4/3/2008 
31 Granada 4/25/2008 
32 Granada 4/25/2008 
33 Granada 4/25/2008 
34 Granada 4/25/2008 
35 Granada 4/25/2008 
36 Montufar 1/9/2008 
37 Montufar 1/9/2008 
38 Montufar 1/9/2008 
39 Montufar 1/9/2008 
40 Montufar 1/9/2008 
41 Montufar 1/9/2008 
42 Montufar 1/9/2008 
43 San Martin 5/7/2008 
44 San Martin 5/7/2008 
45 San Martin 5/7/2008 
46 Ipiales del Sur 2/2/2008 
47 Ipiales del Sur 2/2/2008 
48 Ipiales del Sur 2/2/2008 
49 Ipiales del Sur 2/2/2008 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
Chiriyacu 
 
 
 
 
1/4/2008 
51 Chiriyacu 1/4/2008 
52 Chiriyacu 1/4/2008 
53 Chiriyacu 1/4/2008 
54 Chiriyacu 1/4/2008 
 
Other Association Leaders and Vendor Interviews 
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Name Affiliation/Commercial 
Center 
Date 
Curo, Jose Chiriyacu 1/2/2008 
Delgado, Renee Nuevo Amanecer 5/6/2008 
Gualichico , Jose  President and 
Administrator, Wholesale 
Market/Cablec 
1/15/2008 
Manyay, Marlena Federation of Small 
Autonomous Vendors/ 
Hermano Miguel 
3/12/2008 
Navarrez, Nelson Hermano Miguel 5/12/2008 
Portilla, Carlos Libertad, Paz, y 
Justicia/Hermano Miguel 
3/7/2008 
Troya, Maria 23 de Septiembre 2/12/2008 
Washington, L. Ipiales del Sur 2/2/2008 
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VENDOR INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Date: 
Name: 
Commercial Center: 
Permission to Record Interview:  
Association: 
Product: 
Residence: 
Place of work before relocation: 
Years working in the historic center: 
 
1. Please tell me how you came to work in the historic center as an informal vendor? 
2. Please describe your participation in the negotiation process? 
3. Do you feel the municipality made an effort to dialogue and engage with you 
and/or your association? Please describe your involvement. 
4. Did you join a federation or front? Why/Why not? 
5. When did you begin to support the relocation project? Why/Why not? 
6. Did you find the sale prices fair and the process transparent? 
7. Can you describe the management of the commercial centers? How does this 
differ from the streets? (Rules/Regulations) 
a. Do you agree with the rules and regulations? 
b. What do you think the managers’ role is? Does the manager do a good job? Is 
he fair?  
8. What advantages/disadvantages are their working in the commercial center vs. the 
street? 
9. Do you utilize any of the municipal sponsored services? 
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10. Please describe the relationship with the UECP and the municipality? 
11. Do you pay for any services such as electricity, security, sanitation? Do you think 
you and other vendors should be responsible for basic services payments and 
operating costs of the commercial centers? 
12. Could you describe sales prior to relocation? And after? (the same, lower, hight) 
13. Why have sales decreased/improved? 
14. Do you know anything about the wholesale vendors in Cablec? 
a. Do you purchase from the wholesale vendors? 
15. Could you describe your debt situation? Formal/Informal (both/none) 
16. Do you prefer to return to work in the commercial center or on the street? Why? 
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Sources Held in Municipal Document Centers 
Administration of the Central Zone Document and Communication Department, 
Quito, Ecuador 
AZC. (1997). Anteproyecto de ordenanza de contencio y racionalizacion del comercio 
 minorista en espacios, parques, y plazas de circulacion publica de Quito. 
AZC. Video taped meetings (1998-2000). VHS. Quito 
AZC. Meeting Minutes and Correspondence (1996-2001) 
AZC. (1998-2000). Press releases and communication documents 
 (2/4/1999) 
 (4/22/1999) 
 (5/6/1999) 
 (8/1999) 
 (9/6/2000) 
 (11/17/2000) 
 AZC. (1996-/2003).  Boletines Municipal  
 
INNOVAR/ECH Document Storage Center, Carapungo, Ecuador 
Arregui, E., Comercio  Informal  Documentos (2000-2003) 
Comercio  Informal  Promocion Comercial (1998-2003)       
Comercio  Informal  Proyecto De Modernizacion (1999) 
Comercio  Informal  Plan Maestro Para El Comercio Informal En El Centro Histrorico 
 Informe Final  (1998) 
Comercio  Informal  Municipio Metropolitana De Quito Administracion Zona Centro 
Sintesis Informativa Comercio Informal (1999)       
Comercio  Informal  Ordenanzas 
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Comercio  Informal  Informe De Presentaciones De Servicios 05/1999       
Comercio  Informal  Analisis Comercio Informal       
Comercio  Informal  Comercio Minorista Recaudacion Del Municipio Centro 
Histotrico En Banco Solidariaio Junio Del 2000       
Comercio. Minorista Y Mayorista  Correspondencia  651 (2000-2003) 
Comercio Minorista Y Mayorista  Plan Maestro Y Operativo Comercio Informal  652 
 (2000) 
Comercio Minorista Y Mayorista  Ayuda Memoria Reuniones  649 (1999-2000) 
Comercio Minorista Y Mayorista  Planes Y Cronogramas  646 (1999-2000) 
Comercio Minorista Y Mayorista  Contratos  (2001-2002) 
Comercio Minorista Y Mayorista  Propuestas  641 (2001-2002) 
Department of Planning Library and Document Center, Quito Ecuador 
Ilustre Municipalidad de Quito. (1887, Gaceta municipal. Archivo Historico 
Municipal,  
Ilustre Municipalidad de Quito. (1893, Gaceta municipal. Archivo Historico 
Municipal,  
Ilustre Municipalidad de Quito. (1995). Cuadernos de la administracion general: El 
comercio informal en el centro historico de Quito. Quito. 
Direccion General de Mercados. (September 1988). Resumen general. Ilustre 
Municipalidad De Quito.  
IMQ, UNDP, and UNESCO. Regional Project of Andean Cultural  
 Patrimony.  
PDM-1. (1991). Proceso Urbano (Quito actual – fase 1): plan distrito metropolitano. 
Quito: Direccion de Planificacion.  
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PDM-6. (1992). Asentamientos Populares (Quito actual – fase 1): plan distrito 
metropolitano. Quito: Direccion de Planificacion. 
PDM-7. (1992). Quito en cifras. (Quito actual – fase 1): plan distrito metropolitano. 
Quito: Direccion de Planificacion.  
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